A decade ago, Tunbridge and Ashworth\(^1\) claimed that all heritage is dissonant: it is someone's, expressing some value, and is accordingly not someone else's, expressing some other. As such it may be contested and bears the potential for conflict. The dissonance of heritage may arise from all manner of causes, among them the spatial scale at which it is perceived, the agencies involved in its perception, the nature of its marketing, the political ideology it reflects and (merely the best known) the cultural identity it projects. Our claim of inherent dissonance has been widely accepted and not, to our knowledge, contradicted. It would seem to follow, therefore, that cultural heritage management is a dicey business – not for the faint-hearted! That said, conflict may not be obvious. Even when its innate potential is realised, it may be subtle, unspoken, deviously evaded and unrecorded. It may, of course, be anything but: Bamyan in Afghanistan is just one recent and dramatic example of the violence accorded throughout history to the 'false idols' of someone else's religious heritage.

This article need not reinvent the wheel. It offers instead some recent insights on our topic from Canada and Malta, the former being relatively well known to the heritage literature while the latter is not. They represent two contrasting geographical extremes which span a range of conflict issues with which heritage managers may be confronted. None of these are of the Bamyan variety; they are generally at the level of newspaper-column conflict, if that, but the management problem may be thorniest where civility has not been lost and may yet be productively sustained.

Canada and Malta have one critical heritage dimension in common, with each other and also with New Zealand and Australia: they are successor states of the British Empire and as such share linguistic and historical familiarity. Thus the postcolonial basis for heritage conflict, well recognised by Tunbridge and Ashworth,\(^2\) Boniface and Fowler\(^3\) among others, is centrally placed. It is important to note, however, that the perception of the colonial heritage is free of the excoriation which often emanates from postcolonial theorists. Its management is complex and equivocal in both Canada and Malta: they illustrate subtleties that
exist, and which can be encountered more widely, over attitudes to the colonial heritage, which may be conflictual but by no means involve the simplistic hostility which is often assumed (for example by Edensor and Kothari). The present article fits this collection primarily with respect to the dissonance between colonising and indigenous heritage meanings, which are powerfully implicated in contests over status and control of resources as others discuss here. There are noteworthy parallels between such heritage conflicts and their management in Ottawa and in Australian and New Zealand cities. The association with revitalising waterfronts is particularly intriguing: the longstanding issue of social equity in the appropriation of this rediscovered resource has acquired a particular aboriginal slant in Ottawa, Perth (below) and current developments in Wellington.

However, another, related, postcolonial theme is particularly apposite at this time. Recent commemoration of the ninetieth anniversary of Gallipoli was a pointed reminder, particularly in Australasia, of the Empire at war. The sixtieth anniversary of VE Day has further reconjured this heritage, notably in Ottawa, where the opening of a spectacular new Canadian War Museum has been timed to coincide. Furthermore in the author’s recent research on Malta the British wartime heritage association has been inescapable. To the successor states of the British Empire this has variously meant comradeship in arms, national identification, centrifugal recrimination and perhaps much else; it has been subject to changing perception as it has been harnessed to the ebb and flow of political agendas.

A particular focus of this article is the Empire at war as an issue of heritage management in Ottawa, as the capital of Canada, and in Malta: how does it compare and contrast, how far is it the subject of conflict, and by extension what insight might this discussion provide for the management of the same heritage in other imperial successor states? It goes without saying that New Zealand and Australia have their own long-established and well articulated heritage perspectives on the world wars, though like all heritages these are not immutable. Singapore has recently promoted its own wartime heritage, notably the day of its fall in the 'Battle Box' (Battle HQ Malaya Command); for it the parallel but antithesis of Malta, the island fortress that prevailed, is particularly poignant.

**CANADA AND THE ROLE OF OTTAWA**

The defining quality of Canada, for the present discussion, is its abundance of space but lack of perceptual time-depth. (Of course the native peoples have an ancient heritage identification with the land but for all its present political potency it has few tangible time markers). It has been eminently placed to acquire a cultural diversity of heritage resources, most of which are temporally shallow by world standards, but which can prompt rival claimants to the ‘real’ heritage of Canada just as easily as they can weave interdependent heritage threads. The rapidity of immigration in recent decades has turned Canada’s heritage definition into a moving target, an evolving identity susceptible to changing interpretation in
which political expediency has played no small part. Note that it is clearly ahead of New Zealand and Australia in this respect, judging by 2001 population statistics.

The story of Canada's evolution from a British through an Anglo-French to an officially multicultural identity is well documented, with the interpretation of its United Empire Loyalist co-founders changing chameleon-like along the way (see Tunbridge and Ashworth, among many others). However, this multicultural identity is dependent on the scale of its perception: it is credible at the national level and in Ottawa, the federal capital charged with its formulation, but less so on a provincial basis and much less so at the local level except in the major cities (Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver) which are overwhelmingly the destination of immigrants. Quebec is the best known source of provincial dissonance over multicultural heritage identity: its francophone majority have tended to see multiculturalism as a betrayal of Canada's former Anglo-French compact, reducing them to just one ethnicity among many, while the 'separatistes' among them fear demographic inundation by the multicultural tide in Montreal. The Atlantic Provinces remain predominantly Anglo-French, and Newfoundland is outstanding by virtue of its recent and equivocal adhesion to Canada (1949) and an Anglo-Irish identity 'purer' than any likely to be found in England or, soon, in Ireland. Indeed the resilience of British, monarchical and even imperial symbolism in this, the first overseas British colony, is striking; the bilingualism and multicultural references in Newfoundland's federally run National Historic Sites were slow to acquire credibility.

Canada, however, is committed to a multicultural heritage identity even where it is inappropriate or questionable; and even if it is nationally contested both by former hegemons who fear marginalisation (especially anglophones in Western Canada) and by recent minorities who fear trivialisation or protest that they came to Canada to discover its heritage rather than add their own to a coreless global mosaic. It is in Ottawa that the multicultural enterprise is focused and finds in the National Capital Commission an agency with the mandate to give it iconographic expression. Indeed the NCC's commitment to (re)design a capital expressive of Canadian diversity is more broadly multilateral: to the inclusion of all elements of society however defined, particularly those omitted from the narrative in the past. This is widely perceived to be anyone other than able-bodied, heterosexual, WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) males; though francophone equivalents might now also wonder about their standing in Ottawa's Canadian pantheon.

Ottawa's evolving heritage identity bears frequent re-examination. The NCC's national heritage mandate is focused upon the urban core, which includes the centre of both Ottawa proper and what is now Gatineau across the Ottawa River. To understand the context it is necessary to remember that Canada has no federal district but a capital city formally in Ontario which has been effectively extended to include the Quebec side of the metropolitan area (1,100,000 overall), within the framework of a rather tenuous National Capital Region sustained by
strategic federal land-ownership. This extends far into the rural and recreational fringe but its symbolic focus is the central area broadly defined by Confederation Boulevard, the national ceremonial route, a circuit inaugurated in 2000 around mainly pre-existing streets which bonds the dual city centre (Figure 1).

The national iconography has been developing on Parliament Hill and nearby Confederation Square for over a century, long before a bi-provincial NCR, let alone a ceremonial circuit, was conceived; in fact before the first federal agency was mandated to nurture and beautify the capital identity. Inevitably, therefore, it includes monuments from Canada's period as an autonomous British Dominion, the original symbolism of which could engender conflict since it is now obsolete, possibly offensive to some or simply no longer comprehended. Some of these monuments have pride of place in a limited federal core area, in which the NCC is in active negotiation with various contending parties for the creation of a new iconography considered, by its protagonists at least, to reflect the very different Canada of today. The question inevitably arises: what to do with the old in accommodating the new?

Canada, however, is no postcolonial latecomer characterised by instant glorifications of independence, empty colonial plinths and indiscriminate street-name changes. Canada was in fact the model for orderly constitutional evolution to independence, in pointed contrast to its revolutionary neighbour to the south. It retains a strong conservative constituency to whom historic identities remain important and whose provocation would be imprudent. It has grown beyond its external identity crisis of thirty-plus years ago: it is now a mature liberal democracy distinct from the former colonial power, with which it maintains relations of cordial equality, and divergent from the prevailing social and political vision of its US neighbour. It is also a notably courteous society which characteristically eschews rude affronts both at home and abroad. Against this largely implicit background it is not surprising that the NCC's management of its
inherited iconography is one of cautious evolution, involving retention, reimaging, reaction to placate where necessary and reconfiguration of context by current additions. It is, however, a process of conflict management rather than conflict elimination.

Thus Queen Victoria stands on Parliament Hill where she was placed over a century ago, in one of the most strikingly imperial of her ubiquitous representations, with daughter Canada offering her a wreath in tribute. Her longevity has been helped by peripheral placement: true to Canada’s evolutionary tradition, the early forces of independence nudged her out of a proposed central site. She is also reimaged, in the NCC’s tourism literature at least, away from the traditional imperial figure to one who presided over decades of peaceful national progress.

Conflict arose over another colonial-era monument, however, which required the NCC’s reactive adjustment. On a bluff overlooking the Ottawa River stands a larger-than-life representation of its European discoverer, Champlain. At his feet, for most of the past century, crouched his diminutively represented Indian scout. By the millennium, leaders of the Indian First Nations found it politically timely to demand the scout’s removal as demeaning to their people. Champions of both the sculptor and the statue, a prominent Ottawa landmark, were predictably incensed. After an extended prevarication, for which the structural stresses induced by the changing Canadian seasons provided an initial excuse, the NCC removed the Indian several hundred metres to a still-intervisible site, provided him with a title, and cross-referenced him with Champlain as the work of the same sculptor, without indicating their longstanding co-location. Thus was conflict substantially defused,
unknown to new visitors or the young; and without, as yet, opening the floodgates to demands for other changes to existing iconography.

In the creation of new national monuments, the redress of Indian/Aboriginal under-representation remains a prominent issue. It is fortunately easier to deal with than other sectional heritages, for the First Nations alone have an unequivocal claim to specific identification; in contrast, in Ottawa’s national iconographic space, the global spectrum of latecomers can only be generically represented by ‘minimalist’ commemoration of ideals and values. Aboriginal war veterans have recently been honoured with a monument which unsubtly, if beautifully, appropriates icons of the Canadian natural environment. The Canadian Museum of Civilization gives more prominent permanent representation to the First Nations than to the French and distinctly more than to the British; and Aboriginal mis/underrepresentation has also been countered among its rotating displays.

The most substantial First Nations representation currently awaits construction, and will break new global ground in giving primacy to Aboriginal heritage in waterfront revitalisation, unlike an otherwise close comparison in Perth, Australia. The Ottawa River islands were the industrial nucleus of European
settlement in the area and the NCC aspires to their revitalisation in the 'industrial aesthetic'. However, this provoked conflict to the extent that an Indian group protested by squatting for several years in the ruins of an early mill – no small feat in the Ottawa winter which may drop to minus thirty degrees Celsius. They claimed primacy for Aboriginal heritage on Victoria Island, which had served as an inter-tribal meeting ground before European contact. In due course the NCC acceded to their demand for a First Nations cultural centre, which is likely to be the first and most prominent component in the revitalisation of the islands; however despite compromise acceptance of the dissonant mill structure within their design, their architect continues to press for its elimination on pretext of cost. In other words heritage conflict continues, in one of its many subtle (more or less) manifestations.

The multiplicity of cultures and social groups cannot generally aspire to such specific recognition except in rotating displays in the CMC. The main exception is women: concern to redress their systematic underrepresentation as such has led to specific monuments, both involving some conflict; one memorialising women as victims of violence, from ceremonies at which the protagonists sought male exclusion, and another honouring pioneers of women's rights which created controversy by its siting on Parliament Hill, hitherto reserved for strictly political figures. Achievement in disability is also recognised by the figure of a nationally famous one-legged runner, moved from its original site for greater visibility near Parliament. Otherwise, new iconography accepted by the NCC, from many
proposals, reflects further values it seeks to ascribe to the now diverse Canadian society. The Peacekeeping Monument ('Reconciliation') which counterparts the War Memorial (below), and the Tribute to Human Rights, sacralised by a presidential farewell visit by Nelson Mandela, have been discussed elsewhere (see Gough, Tunbridge and Ashworth, Roberts). It is worth reiterating here, however, that the former was an uneasy compromise between the NCC and the very different resourcing agenda of the Department of National Defence, a reminder that conflict over heritage exists not only at different levels and in different guises, but between contending stakeholders in the production of heritage as well as in its consumption.

Peacekeeping raises the more fundamental question of war memorials – specifically those monumental echoes of the British Empire at war which are ubiquitous throughout its successor states. In Ottawa, the Boer War memorial received uncharacteristic attention during the observance of the centennial, at which its meaning was reconsidered, for Canada particularly as its first (and notable) overseas military accomplishment. The National War Memorial, in physical contrast, still dominates Confederation Square at the main junction in the ceremonial route; it has however gradually undergone a complex image metamorphosis from imperial to national. Its imperial beginning, created by a British sculptor and entitled 'The Response', clearly resonated when it was finally unveiled in 1939, by King George VI himself, in a ceremony portending another call to arms. The national agenda stirred in the First World War was greatly intensified in the Second, and postwar Remembrance Day commemorations gradually nationalised the memorial's emphasis until, in 2000, an unknown soldier was reinterred there from the quintessentially Canadian battlefield of Vimy Ridge.
(1917), to a high degree of national consensus. However the imperial echo reverberates still, especially in the ceremonial imagery of Remembrance Day.

Ottawa's current expression of the theme of this paper has just appeared in the relocated Canadian War Museum, opened on the sixtieth anniversary of VE Day on a prominent riverfront site and destined to play a central role in the city's waterfront revitalisation and tourist-historic development. It develops the theme of imperial to national evolution, emphasising Canadian contribution and cost but without rancour over perceptual imperial errors, noting for example that the heavy losses of the Dieppe raid (1942) constituted a failure of central planning in the view of some. Controversial issues and continuing questions are so indicated, but the tone of the exhibits is one of progression to a well earned independent postcolonial identity which has culminated in a respected international role as impartial UN peacekeeper. The presentation belies earlier conflict, however, associated partly with CWM's subordinate relationship with the CMC: but those who wanted it recast as a Holocaust museum or purged of reference to enemy atrocities have clearly failed to overcome the priorities of veterans. Its opening exhibition of war art staged jointly with the Australian War Memorial and the Imperial War Museum was an interesting statement of shared memory.

In postcolonial terms, the national heritage of peace and war as projected by Ottawa might be described as a graceful evolution away from its imperial past, in which dissonances are managed by discreet silences and, where appropriate or necessary, by the pragmatic adjustments noted above. Quiet ambivalences persist, but the conflicts over heritage that do indeed require continuous management are seldom a head-on collision between colonial and contemporary national imagery. In large measure this is because Canada has grown beyond the stage where the colonial heritage is a threat or even an irritant, as it may still be seen at times in Australia and New Zealand. But the legacy of the colonial era also remains a useful distinction from the US, in terms both of the colonial ideological inheritance of 'peace, order and good government' in preference to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness', and of its nationally iconic and tourist-marketable heritage of all those champions of the law in red coats and (with occasional cultural exceptions) boy-scout hats.

**The Case of Malta**

In sharp contrast to Canada, the defining quality of Malta's heritage resources is their unparalleled time-depth contained in a tiny archipelago some fifty kilometres long. Malta contains the oldest standing human structures in existence, Neolithic temples some five and a half millennia in age. In its small space there is a series of World Heritage Sites which span from Neolithic to Renaissance. Again in contrast to Canada, its cultural heritage resource 'problem' is not perceived scarcity...
but overwhelming abundance, in a microstate environment of very limited financial resources with which to maintain, let alone restore them. This has imposed choices as to which heritages should be favoured over other options. The issue has become of pressing importance as Malta is faced with growing external competition and internal environmental stress in the "blue" tourism field, which has largely sustained it through its postcolonial evolution from Britain's premier imperial naval base. In consequence it is now turning to 'grey' heritage tourism, cultivating a more elite tourism patronage which can be distributed more widely across space and seasons, but which consumes heritage relatively rapidly and is doing so in many other places pursuing a similar strategem. Thus Malta cannot afford to make mistakes in the selection and marketing of heritages.

In practice the heritage choice comes down to which eras should be favoured. Therein lies the focus of conflict, more or less subtle and largely a matter of verbal debate between stakeholders, no doubt particularly within the confines of the Malta Tourism Authority, the principal agency concerned, which has a relative importance to national planning out of all proportion to larger states with more diversified economies. The predominantly preferred eras are the Neolithic; and the Renaissance period under the Knights of St.John, who built the image-making cores of the urban centres and much else, above all the existing fortifications of Grand Harbour, culminating in the massively fortified city of Valletta (now a World Heritage Site) after successful resistance against a Turkish siege. However, the first is problematical since it must largely be presented as mystery, inconceivably remote from present concerns, and is furthermore too fragile to sustain heavy tourism flows. In contrast there is a third compelling
heritage resource which is clearly within living memory and relevance and is also abundant and robust: the British colonial heritage. Thus Malta, like Canada, cannot avoid the postcolonial tripwire. Unsurprisingly this is an equivocal heritage, but for reasons distinctly different from Canada's or for that matter New Zealand's or Australia's, which should compel us to take more discriminating stock of the colonial legacy as a heritage resource than the postcolonial literature is wont to do. Malta, like Canada, maintains cordial relations with Britain in part because the colonial relationship, though in general quite different, was equally in general quite benign. This in no way questions the prime need of any formerly colonial state to demonstrate its independence by moderating its exploitation of the colonial heritage resource; indeed the political forces which brought Malta to independence and the later termination of the British base were not short on postcolonial rhetoric which deepened equivocation over the colonial legacy. However this belies the facts: Malta became a British dependency at its own request; it found economic prosperity for over 150 years through the naval base employment, albeit with periodic downturns which were ultimately terminal; and its loyalty to Britain climaxed in a heroic shared defence which constitutes a heritage resource of titanic proportions, leaving a legacy of goodwill, often indeed affection, at the interpersonal level between the Maltese and British.

The context, of course, was the Second World War; and here we find a striking contrast with another British imperial fortress. In 1942 Singapore fell, but Malta held: a heritage perception perhaps of shame and recriminatory divergence is contrasted with one of pride and congratulatory consociation among the imperial legatees concerned. Indeed Singapore was one reason why Malta had to hold, at fearful cost in warships, Spitfires and much else, besides over 7000 lives. The 1950s film *Malta Story* is not the propaganda it might appear but a literal account of an epic of Maltese-British endurance, shared in the larger Mediterranean theatre by Canadians and ANZACs among others. At issue was Malta's strategic ability to interdict Axis north-south convoys to North Africa while minimally maintaining Allied east-west communication: it was ferociously contested for nearly three years and ultimately sustained by a hair's breadth. The Maltese survived unprecedented bombing, focused on the naval dockyard, in a labyrinth of underground shelters. Well remembered episodes include the underwater repair of the carrier HMS Illustrious by Maltese dockyard workers during aerial bombardment; King George VI's unparalleled award of the George Cross to the 'Island Fortress of Malta'; and at last the arrival in August 1942 of the remnants of Operation Pedestal, hardest-fought of the Malta convoys, with just enough food to save Malta from starvation until the fuel rescued from its sinking tanker Ohio ensured the destruction of Rommel's supply-line and his defeat at El Alamein. A stirring hinge of fate indeed: like it or not, it asserts Malta's two sieges as the most marketable products of its many heritage resources. The Great Siege of 1565, in which the Knights of St.John and the Maltese successfully held out
against the Ottoman Empire and thereby saved western Europe from Turkish sea-borne invasion, is vigorously promoted as the colourful centre-piece of the Knights’ era; Malta’s defence of Europe through a pan-European military order has a particular heritage resonance at this present time of Malta’s accession to the European Union. To this the Greater Siege of 1940-1943 would appear to be the ideal complement, securing for Malta a unique heritage identity as stalwart defender of monumental global causes.

If the Great Siege might now emit a frisson of dissonance over its implied defence of European Christendom, the Greater Siege is however a more complex problem of heritage management and marketing for a variety of reasons. The first is the paradox of its living-memory time-depth: it is at once the most immediately relevant yet the least credible heritage resource for a society which, unlike ‘new world’ settler societies, perceives its history in millennia. More generally it can be difficult to persuade even some professional colleagues in Malta to take the British colonial heritage seriously, whatever they may think of it: there is just too much of it, it is at most 200 years old, and how do you get excited about defending Victoriana (now belatedly happening in the old residential suburb of Sliema) when you have Neolithics and Knights on your mind, not to speak of your purse? Thus diffidence, rather than conflict, may cloud the management of heritage resources of which potential managers, as well as local consumers, are daily living the legacy. This diffidence can extend not only to the naval/military history, but to its eminently marketable wartime apotheosis.

The standard postcolonial conflict over heritage associations with former overlords is not a major issue. Ironically this is not because it is absent but because it can be concealed. Notwithstanding voluntary association, cordiality and loyal comradeship, predictable resentments chiefly on the left of the political spectrum have found heritage expression. However, they are expressed in Maltese, which unlike Italian (in elite/official use before 1940) is an Arabic-root language wholly indecipherable to any non-Maltese. Thus a ‘martyrs’ monument coexists peaceably in Valletta’s central square with colonial-era plaques in English on the wall of the Grandmaster’s Palace (of the Knights, later Government House and independent Parliament); and the Freedom Monument, whence the Royal Navy departed in 1979, displays a cordial flag transition ceremony and handshake irrespective of its inscription. Language cannot of course sidestep the visual evidence of respect for colonial buildings, but one cannot ascribe their sometimes indifferent reuse and condition to disregard, in view of their abundance and perceived recency, and the pragmatic reuse needs and paucity of restoration resources of a postcolonial microstate. Certainly the original uses of major colonial buildings and (very extensive in Malta) the colonial reuses of Knights’ structures are often acknowledged in English, albeit not as consistently as a systematic heritage development would require.

The British naval heritage has however created a conflict, or at least a particular mental block; unfortunate in that Malta was the premier British overseas naval base.
and its heritage resources are more than equal to successful tourist-historic revitalisations such as the Royal Naval Dockyard in Bermuda (see Ashworth and Tunbridge, Tunbridge). The reasons, however, are transparent. It was the run-down of the base that ultimately obliged Malta to seek a tourism economy and it
Dockyard Creek: on-site marina map. Malta Maritime Museum mid-right shore, drydock ensemble at head of creek (Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 2004)

Siege Memorial, Valletta, Malta. Overlooking Grand Harbour, Fort St.Angelo and dockyard (right). Siege Bell tower behind viewpoint (Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 2003)

requires some mental gymnastics to return full circle to see the naval heritage as the champion of that very economy. This is particularly the case when Malta still bears the imprint of the less romantic naval reality: the dockyard core remains a workaday commercial industrial environment, Malta’s service standards were long impaired by the fortress legacy, job losses were resented and postwar dockland reconstruction was often substandard. However, the naval heritage has a major if partly oblique place in the War Museum, which houses the George Cross along
with 'Faith' (survivor of legendary biplane defenders Faith, Hope and Charity), and in the Lascaris War Rooms which preserve the Mediterranean wartime command centre deep within Valletta's walls (equivalent to Singapore's Battle Box). Furthermore Dockyard Creek in Grand Harbour, historic focus of both the Knights' and British naval base, is now in process of revitalisation; while this is mainly for a marina and casino, which notes but has removed British modifications of Knights buildings, the British naval bakery has been adaptively reused as the Malta Maritime Museum, interpreting the British naval heritage generously. The original British drydock and adjacent composite Knights'/British buildings are also in the public review process for tourist-leisure adaptive reuse, a process to which the author has been privileged to contribute.

The civilian-focused heritage of the Second World War, from which the colonial dimension is inseparable, has found recent expression in the Siege Memorial, co-dedicated by Queen Elizabeth, and the Malta at War Museum which interprets an underground rock shelter network. Furthermore the quest for new heritage products within the national means is beginning to draw upon the colonial heritage more widely, civilian and particularly military.\(^2\) One current initiative of the Malta Tourism Authority is 'Countryside Walks', which by their nature in a mainly warm island need to exploit all wayside stops of interest. A noteworthy case is centred on the Victoria Lines, a rearward defence of the naval base which was built on an escarpment running across northern Malta and, with its supporting forts, creates a landscape feature as indelible as the various Knights' watchtowers which dot the coastline.

Wholehearted public management and marketing of the British heritage, particularly that of the Second World War, is however impeded by a fundamental problem. International consultants have advised against selling a fortress identity, with its negative associations, to tourism;\(^2\) even though such opinions may be changing with evolving heritage tastes, a problem of marketing the wartime heritage now confronts Malta. The British market has long been at ease with the fortress legacy, of which many were formerly part, and is obviously empathetic to the wartime associations. But Malta's tourism makeover must include maximum diversification, away from a largely blue-collar British sun/sea market to a more sophisticated international heritage market, notably including the Italians and Germans; and how do you sell the wartime heritage to those who at that time tried to throttle you? Clearly not by stressing close association with the then British military presence. Market segmentation in linguistically varied tourism literature can ameliorate the problem but a heritage conflict remains, particularly since the principal medium of communication with visitors is inevitably English, which for Malta remains a lucrative second language in which all Maltese are more or less fluent. A certain coyness over the British connection is routine in the postcolonial condition, if only because the zeitgeist is seen to require it; in Malta's particular tourism situation, however, it is hardly surprising.

The management consequence of postcolonial heritage foot-shuffling, whether or not it amounts to overt conflict, is predictable. What government won't,
or can't, do will be done by individuals who are passionately committed to the neglected heritage cause; such individuals typically materialise as heritage NGOs thus dedicated. This pattern has been observed with respect to the colonial military heritage in Trinidad, Bermuda, Newfoundland and Malta and is echoed in Singapore and no doubt more widely. In Malta's case, the champion is Mario Farrugia, president of Fondazzjoni Wirt Artna (one of two Malta Heritage Trusts), who specialises in restoration of colonial military and wartime heritage resources, notably Fort Rinella's 100-ton gun which defended Grand Harbour's entrance, and the Malta at War Museum documenting the 'home front' experience. This management solution is logical for heritage which might be dissonant to some: the onus is removed from public agencies (here the Malta Tourism Authority), whose tourism-generating purpose is nonetheless served by some degree of assistance – if never enough! – to the NGO; while the NGO provides a specialist resource, to be called upon for purposes ranging from a supply of Redcoats for historic festivals to guiding visiting academics with esoteric research interests.

Thus Malta's postcolonial heritage perspectives involve degrees of distinction from those of Canada, despite the parallels which include perception of utility in the colonial heritage, lack of overt hostility to it, even more or less equivocal regard for it. Paradoxically, a much older society is much more recently postcolonial and has lacked the time to work out its view of the British legacy – a process which may now be overtaken by the new British relationship of partnership in the European Union. Furthermore the enduring advantage to Canada of its colonial heritage in respect to the third party south of its border is contrasted with an equivalent disadvantage to Malta in its growing third party dealings with neighbours to the north.

CONCLUSION
This article has discussed a range of heritage issues in two case areas central to the author's current work. Comparison of heritage issues in Ottawa, Canada and in Malta clearly involves a range of markedly contrasting circumstances. Perceived differences of space and time are fundamental; the two societies are, respectively, recently multicultural and longstandingly unicultural (although an amalgam of diverse human elements over time). Their financial resources are radically different; likewise their cultural sensitivities, respectively to a growing diversity of residents and a needed diversification of visitors. Heritage conflicts and management mechanisms differ with these and other variables: questions of whose heritage, using which resources of what period, for whose benefit, and how managed (if at all) involve a different range of answers in the two cases. Nevertheless they are potentially conflictual in both, as they are likely to be in other cases for which still different arrays of answers may be debated. In the present cases there is a prime commitment to heritage development for citizens and visitors respectively; and its management is more comprehensively dominated by national government in Ottawa than in Malta. Management techniques, whether recognised or not, include linguistic manipulation: Malta has
a distinctive language advantage, but it serves Canada also since French translations can be more creative than even most Canadians realise. Market segmentation is a standard technique for the management of heritage dissonance, commonly assisted by language (though less effectively with the growing universality of English). Management of course requires a wider methodology, however, notably in dealing with obsolete iconographic messages as in Ottawa.

Heritage conflict potential and its management in the cases discussed are inseparable from the postcolonial condition. Inevitably the coexistence of colonial heritage with evolving national identity raises questions and perhaps tensions. But national identity in successor states of the British Empire is incomprehensible without reference to the colonial heritage, even where the society was largely shaped beforehand, as in Malta; indeed Britain's own identity and the English language itself are inexplicable without reference to its own colonisation from overseas. British colonial heritage is, however, too diverse within and between places to be value-generalised. Its utility is demonstrably flexible across space: it serves some external dealings well but others ill. It is also mutable over time and the changing political agendas that come with it. Ultimately there can be no single, immutable colonial heritage or postcolonial identity; contemporary appropriation of the colonial experience to fit a preconceived social ideology is thus liable to obfuscate rather than illuminate the issue. This in no way invalidates the generation of comparative insights between cases, which may however emerge in unexpected contexts such as the waterfront dimension of aboriginal heritage recognition noted in the above introduction.

Since its wartime 'finest hour' was also its swansong, the Empire at war is one of the predominant themes of the colonial heritage and often the cutting edge in the evolution of succeeding national identities. It is a theme that bears closer examination. In Canada, the military and resource contribution of two world wars created the conviction of nationhood and set the country on the difficult path of defining national identity in the face of internal Anglo-French dichotomy and external British versus US influences; an identity ultimately achieved through multicultural primacy and recent US divergence, though not without regional differences over the process. Malta, however, had found profit in earlier wars and ultimately a glory in the Second World War which enhanced its pre-existing national identity, as the George Cross in its flag, its philately and wider iconography bears witness.

New Zealand and Australia bear their own well known national imprints from the imperial heritage of war, most fully articulated in Wellington and particularly in the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. Singapore's current heritage narratives of its wartime catastrophe range from Japanese atrocity to the selfless dedication of the Malay Regiment as an undisguised national example; they may imply the further political message of self-reliance in the face of its potentially hostile regional climate today. Other imperial successor states have their own changing heritages of war, however. For example, in 1998 an ANC guide on South Africa's
infamous Robben Island stirred considerable heritage dissonance among his audience – the author not most – by dismissing the island’s Second World War gun installations (defending Cape Town) as a distraction from the real heritage of South Africa’s postcolonial/apartheid liberation, which Robben Island is now deemed to represent.

Irrespective of these themes of the present paper, there remains a widespread tendency to regard heritage as a value-neutral attribute altruistically determined by unbiased agents motivated by unassailable ideals. Such a vision is not unnatural among those who are professionally responsible for the conservation of resources from the past and who regard their motives as above reproach. But if we accept that all heritage is subject to dissonance, therein lies the potential for conflict and the necessity for management to avoid or to contain it. As if the bases for dissonance noted in this essay were not enough, there will likely be dissonances in the transmission of heritage messages, both intergenerational as implicit above and, more fundamentally, within the same time period. A message transmitted does not equal a message received, something which is amazingly still forgotten by authors who should know better – or perhaps choose not to for their own ideological reasons. For many reasons, therefore, heritage is not the soft and fluffy beast we might wish it to be; not least, ‘the management of the past as a resource in conflict’ has political implications. We noted at the outset that heritage conflict is often a matter of subtlety. From the perspective of dissonance, we might more precisely say that its ubiquitous potential may not develop but often surfaces as subtle tensions which, if not managed, can become overt conflict; to the detriment of all concerned.

**ENDNOTES**

2 Ibid.
5 Tunbridge and Ashworth, op cit.
7 See Tunbridge and Ashworth, op cit.
12 Tunbridge and Ashworth, op cit.
16 J. Ebejer, architectural consultant, Malta Tourism Authority, personal communication, 2003.
21 Pollacco, op cit.
22 Ashworth and Tunbridge, op cit, 2005.
23 Pollacco, op cit.
25 B.S. Shaw, Department of Geography, University of Western Australia, Perth, personal communication, 2005.
27 Tunbridge and Ashworth, op cit, subtitle.