THE ROLE OF INSPECTIONS IN THE COMMERCIAL KANGAROO INDUSTRY

This article provides an assessment of the enforcement of the law governing commercial kangaroo killing, focusing particularly upon inspectorial practices. Australia’s kangaroo industry is the largest commercial kill of land-based wildlife in the world. Professional shooters hunt kangaroos in rural and remote locations at night. Due to the remote and decentralised nature of the killing, the industry presents unique challenges to law enforcement agencies that are responsible for the enforcement of animal welfare standards. This article focuses upon the role that inspections have in detecting offences within the commercial kangaroo industry. It provides a comparative analysis across the states, highlighting key differences in terms of inspectorial practices and the resulting outcomes. A common theme across all of the jurisdictions is that none of the agencies responsible for enforcement regularly conduct inspections of shooters, making it impossible to ensure that these parties are complying with the National Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos and Wallabies. Recommendations for reform are offered, including stronger compliance policy, higher rates of inspection, increased resourcing and the introduction of alternative methods of inspection.


Introduction
The kangaroo industry is the world's largest commercial kill of land-based wildlife. 1During the last decade, 28 million kangaroos and wallabies 2 were commercially killed with a 'by catch' of approximately 8 million joeys. 3The killing occurs in remote locations primarily in the states of Queensland, New South Wales, Western Australia and South Australia. 4The animals are wild and shot by professional shooters who generally operate on their own at night. 5 Carcasses are brought in to a field chiller -a free-standing refrigerated building or, typically, a series of refrigerated re-furbished shipping containers -before being sold on. 6Professional shooters are expected to adhere to the National Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos and Wallabies ('Code'), 7 which is designed to provide welfare standards in kangaroo hunting both with respect to the target animal and )), with a 60% male harvest (or 40% female), the number of young at foot killed annually in the last decade is around 300,000 and the number of pouch young around 840,000. 4 There is also a small commercial industry in Tasmania.dependant young. 8As hunting activities take place over wide and remote areas, breaches of the Code are difficult to police and detect.Consequently, the regime primarily relies on self-regulation and periodic inspections by government agencies.The Code, in common with other model codes of conduct, is considered to provide minimum, though effective, animal welfare standards. 9Yet, reviewers have criticised the model codes for not being up-dated in a timely manner10 and for being developed in circumstances of conflict of interest. 11The latter, in particular, can foster regulatory weaknesses leading to lacklustre enforcement mechanisms. 12e purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of enforcement mechanisms of the Code, focusing on inspections for detecting breaches by industry participants.Not surprisingly, low levels of inspectorial activity bear a correlation with low rates of detection of offences.However, even with low inspection rates, the data reveals a preponderance of breaches relating to the method by which the animals are killed.As these breaches directly link to the animal welfare objectives of the Code, it calls into question the extent to which the objectives of the Code are being met.This paper argues that low-key enforcement methods, such as warnings and inspections are not operating to a sufficiently high standard, and this gap in the regime warrants greater government intervention.
The Code is based on 'smart and responsive' regulatory models, including the regulatory pyramid developed by Ayres and Braithwaite. 13This pyramid recommends escalating penalties, commencing with low-key enforcement processes such as warnings and inspections, leaving prosecutions as a top tier, and last-resort mechanism.Although smart and responsive regulation is useful to foster compliance, failings in the operation of the commercial kangaroo industry dilute this positive influence.In particular, smart and responsive regulation has limits where a regime develops systemic failure. 14Although there is insufficient evidence to reach such a definitive conclusion with respect to animal welfare outcomes of the commercial kangaroo industry, the data discussed in this paper reveals a trend that warrants close monitoring of the industry.
The discussion commences with a brief overview of smart and responsive regulation in order to provide context for the examination of the legal and regulatory framework that follows.In examining the regulatory framework, the discussion highlights the importance of inspections, not only as an enforcement mechanism but also as a means for governments and stakeholders to appraise the operation of the Code.The Code itself is voluntary and needs to be made operational within statebased regimes.Some weaknesses in the Code stem from the way the Code is integrated into regulation at the state level; this regularly happens by incorporation into nature conservation legislation rather than animal protection legislation. 15The integration of this Code within the nature conservation legislation rather than animal protection legislation gives it a somewhat ambiguous status, particularly in relation to how the Code relates to animal cruelty offences. 16 evaluating the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms, this paper concentrates on the inspectorial priorities of the relevant enforcement agencies.The research accesses available data on inspections to determine the number of inspections and offences detected in each state and, in particular, whether there are differences between the states.There are two steps to the methodology adopted: the first step was to locate and analyse the background material from journal articles and published reports; the second step was to analyse the primary materials available, including the Code, state legislation, regulations, annual reports of government agencies and other materials. 17 Finally, the paper considers enforcement outcomes in the states, focusing upon penalty infringement notices, warning notices and compliance letters.These actions form the bulk of enforcement activity in relation to the kangaroo industry.In the context of smart and responsive regulation, these methods are regarded as low to mid-range ways of addressing compliance issues.The paper seeks to identify relationships between inspectorial practices and these mid-low level enforcement outcomes.The paper does not assess prosecutions or sentencing outcomes, which are beyond its scope.However, it assesses data collected by the regulatory agencies that indicates that compliance with the Code is uncertain.This calls into question whether self-regulation is succeeding and, if not, whether this warrants consideration of new approaches.

Smart regulation and responsive regulation
'Smart regulation' is a regulatory model 18 that emphasises designing regulatory responses that take into account the needs, views and motivations of stakeholders against the backdrop of the 'cultural, economic, and institutional' environment of the regulatory regime. 19The smart regulatory model incorporates five principles that include using the optimum mix of instruments and institutional combinations: 20 the use of 'less interventionist measures'; 21 a pyramid of enforcement starting from persuasions and warnings through to sanctions such as civil and criminal penalties and loss of licence; systems that are also the essence of responsive regulation; 22 and harnessing the power of other parties, such as industry associations and pressure groups. 23esponsive regulation' utilises a prudent mix of compliance and deterrence and differs from smart regulation because it focuses more on the conduct of the regulated parties and less on a mix of regulatory mechanisms that may be suitable to the regulated.24 In accordance with responsive regulation, governments entrust stakeholders with much of the operation of regimes, 25 and it is incumbent on government to negotiate and settle regulatory responses with 'the regulated'.26 The regulatory pyramid is an enforcement mechanism common to both systems that proffers a broad base of soft measures such as education and warning letters, middle-range measures that include inspections and higher-range measures based on penalties including suspension of licences.27 Although the pyramid offers a range of measures, the recommendation is that regulators start at the base rather than the top or middle of the pyramid except in exceptional or life-threatening circumstances.28 Once regulators have tried low-key approaches, the more 'coercive control comes to be seen as more legitimate'.29 Although smart regulation and responsive regulation differ, they share similarities that juxtapose them against command and control systems.The latter creates regimes that comprise rules and regulations determined by government with little input from stakeholders.30 Consequently, command

Legal and regulatory framework
The objectives of the Code are clearly set out in terms of animal welfare: This Code has been produced to ensure that all persons intending to shoot free-living kangaroos or wallabies for commercial purposes undertake the shooting so that the animal is killed in a way that minimises pain and suffering.

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The way that the Code achieves this objective is by detailing how shooters accomplish rapid death of the target animals. 40To start with, shooters should aim for the brain of the target animal, 41 as this results in a quick, and comparatively painless death.Shooters should also avoid shooting female kangaroos where it is obvious that they have pouch young or dependent young at foot except in special circumstances. 42In addition, if a female is shot, then her dependent young must be killed as well.Methods for killing the young vary in accordance with their age, but include decapitation and _____________________________________________________________________________________ International Journal of Rural Law and Policy Occassional papers 2013 the use of a blow to the base of the skull. 43The Code also contains further directives that deal with the type of ammunition to be used and follow-up procedures on multiple kills. 44e Code itself is not enforceable, which means that it is the responsibility of the states to make the Code operational.However, because the states vary in their approaches, the Code's enforceability and integration into each state's legal framework varies (Table 1).In particular, the Code does not permit the use and sale of carcasses that are not killed in accordance with its provisions, which means the states have some discretion in determining which carcasses will be regarded as Codecompliant and which will not be Code-compliant.This also means that the states can vary in their regulation across the kangaroo industry supply chain.The licensee must not possess or sell any kangaroo carcass containing a bullet wound in the body.
Section 133(4) of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) A licence holder shall not contravene or fail to comply with any condition or restriction attached to the licence.
The maximum penalty for individuals is 100 penalty units which equates to $11,000 and if the offence is a continuing one 43 Ibid s 5. 44 Ibid s 2.4. 45Section 7(2) provides that in this section body means a part of the macropod's body other than its head.See also All shooting is to be carried out in accordance with the Code.
Condition 2 of the Licence to Take Kangaroos for Sale Only kangaroos that have been killed by a single shot to the brain shall be delivered to a licensed kangaroo processor.
Condition 2 of the Licence to Process The licensee shall only accept the carcasses of kangaroos that were killed by a single shot to the brain.

Condition 4 of the Licence to Deal in Skins
The licensee shall only accept the skins of kangaroos that were killed by a single shot to the brain.

Section 26 of the Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (WA)
Any person who contravenes or who fails to comply with provisions of the Act or the regulations is guilty of an offence against the Act and is liable.
If no other penalty is prescribed, to a maximum penalty of $4000 for a contravention or failure to comply with any provisions of the Act and $2000 for any contravention or failure to comply with any provision of a regulation.
Any licence issued pursuant to the provisions of the Act and held by the licensee may be cancelled.
In Queensland (QLD), for example, the 2005 Nature Conservation (Macropod Harvesting) Conservation Plan makes the method of harvesting macropods and the use of carcasses clearly enforceable in accordance with the Code. 50The position with respect to the sale of carcasses is less clear under New South Wales (NSW) laws.The NSW Director-General of National Parks can impose conditions on commercial fauna harvesting51 yet there are no conditions on processors to ensure that carcasses comply with the Code. 52Similarly, in South Australia (SA), while regulations apply to shooters, 53 no conditions are placed on dealers or processors to reject carcasses shot other than in accordance with the Code.In Western Australia (WA), legislation and regulations do not contain any specific provisions related to the Code although regulation 6(3) of the Wildlife Conservation Regulations 1970 (WA) stipulates that licences to take kangaroos for sale are subject to any condition endorsed on the licence and to the succeeding provisions of the regulation.However, there are no specific provisions that create offences for failure to comply with the licence.At most, the licence can be cancelled in accordance with section 26 of the Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (WA).
As already noted, the Code is designed to regulate animal welfare within the kangaroo commercial industry based on smart and responsive regulation that is stakeholder-led.Accordingly, the provisions of the Code have been developed with input from stakeholders; the enforcement mechanisms follow the tenor of regulatory pyramid model; and the Code itself is voluntary, although it is integrated into state regulation by a variety of means.Given that commercial kangaroo hunting occurs in a range of locations, it is not feasible for governments to provide inspectors at the point of kill.The Code thus focuses on the conduct of hunters and stakeholders in the supply chain, relying on their compliance.Yet the inconsistent implementation of the Code at the state legislative level, as well as across the supply chain, raises issues directly related to the enforceability of the Code and the efficacy of the regime that oversees the commercial kangaroo industry.Two issues are particularly significant: first, identification of enforcement agencies and an understanding of their role; and, second, the extent of compliance with the provisions of the Code.

Enforcement and compliance
The regulatory pyramid places inspections at the mid-range level, and accepted practice is to start from a lower level, with less coercive measures, such as education and warning letters.However, inspections are an important component of the commercial kangaroo industry as they not only operate at an enforcement level, but also assist with identifying whether the regime is meeting the animal welfare objectives of the Code.Accordingly, if inspections are not carried out properly, or indeed not carried out at all, it means that regulators cannot say with certainty whether the Code is operating as intended; and, if not, whether this indicates systemic failure or other flaws warranting greater government intervention.The methodology adopted for the research of the next sections of this paper involved obtaining the annual reports of the various state regulatory bodies, some of which were already publicly available.The statistics available in these reports were compiled and analysed individually and comparatively.

Enforcement agencies
Responsibility for enforcement of the relevant laws in relation to the commercial kangaroo industry rests primarily with state government agencies, including: on the 'worst cases' without sufficient attention to smaller, more institutionalised wrongful behaviour. 58In order for the Code to be implemented effectively it requires inspections to determine compliance levels, accompanied by adaptive management processes that are established in a timely manner.

Inspections
Unless otherwise stated, all references to inspection statistics in this section refer to state government annual reports.In QLD, Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (DEHP), formely known as DERM, conducts inspections of the commercial kangaroo industry with a number of priorities, including ensuring that non-head-shot macropods are not traded and that persons comply with the Code. 59Inspectorial data is available for dealer site and processing plan inspections in QLD in 2009, 60 2010 61 and 2011 62 (see Tables 2 and 3).In the last quarter of 2009, DEHP undertook an internal review and decided to inspect at least one per cent of total carcasses in 2010. 63DEHP also introduced a target to conduct a detailed inspection of at least ten per cent of the carcasses inspected. 64The same targets were used in 2011. 65In both 2010 and 2011 DEHP exceeded its targets for inspections (8306 and 10,133 respectively) and detailed inspections (2290 and 1793 respectively).
In NSW, between 2006 to 2011, the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) conducted regular inspections of chillers for a number of possible compliance breaches, including non-head shot kangaroos (Table 2). 66Shooters' vehicles were inspected for possible compliance breaches, none of which concern the Code (Table 2). 67OEH claims that inspections were carried out 'continuously' but also discloses that inspections of shooters' vehicles occur 'opportunistically'. 68 Such inspections mainly occurred when chillers were inspected in the early morning because this generally coincided with deliveries by shooters.OEH did not disclose the number of shooters' vehicles inspected.
The kangaroo management plan for SA (available records from 2008-2011) sets performance measures for inspectorial activities.These measures include inspecting each chiller at least once a year; inspecting medium-high volume chillers are least twice per year; and inspecting each processor at least four times a year (Table 2). 69Priorities for compliance activities are set each year and the program is 'reactive to change'. 70In 2011, the Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources (DEWNR) priorities were to further develop its reporting relationship with the Meat Hygiene Unit, AQIS and SA kangaroo meat processors; and to determine compliance regarding carcasses with bullet wounds to the body through an audit of skin tanners to view samples of skins from SA, NSW and  2). 71In 2011, DEWNR inspected chillers for a number of matters, including to ensure that kangaroos were shot in accordance with the Code. 72DEWNR inspects shooters' vehicles and areas where shooters have operated on an opportunistic basis or as part of investigations. 73

Quality of inspections
Enforcement agencies do not regularly inspect shooters to ensure compliance with the Code, particularly with respect to agencies in QLD and WA, which do not conduct any inspections of shooters.Although DEWNR (SA) and OEH (NSW) claim to inspect shooters on an opportunistic basis, these bodies do not report the number of inspections carried out.A further problem is that inspections of shooters in NSW do not relate to the conditions of the Code but instead relate to other matters.
The general lack of inspections of shooters by the enforcement agencies means that these agencies cannot ensure that shooters are complying with the Code.Inspections of shooters are an essential precondition to ensure compliance and the detection of offences, particularly in relation to the killing of dependent young and injured kangaroos.This is already a major problem, as the RSPCA discovered in 2002 when their research identified that shooters have difficulty capturing and killing young at foot. 77As already discussed, the Code specifies the way in which young kangaroos need to be killed.
In the light of the RSPCA report, it is significant that no training is required in methods for killing dependent young prior to the granting of a shooter's licence, and that such killing occurs without any direct monitoring. 78From an animal welfare perspective, these two points raise critical matters regarding the supervision and enforcement of animal welfare perspectives in kangaroo shooting.This also gives rise to a wider issue regarding the role of monitoring, a process which is consistent with smart and responsive regulation.As Wright and Head have noted, monitoring can inform whether regulation, in this case the Code, is operating as intended, and whether more or less government intervention is required.

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The available data reveals substantial variability across the states in relation to the inspection of chillers (Table 3).Inspection of chillers is important because it provides information on whether the kangaroos have been shot in accordance with the Code.In 2010, DEWNR (SA) conducted 92 inspections of 67 chillers and OEH (NSW) conducted 659 inspections of 150 chillers.In contrast, DEC (WA) conducted just five inspections of 574 chillers.Thus, while chillers in SA and NSW were inspected at least once in that year (and in NSW much more), the majority of chillers in WA were not inspected at all.Therefore, chillers in WA are subject to substantially less inspectorial activity than similar enterprises in other states.This situation greatly increases the risk that offences in the commercial kangaroo industry will not be detected in WA.This risk is amplified by the fact that DEC did not inspect shooters during 2010.
In 2010, DEWNR conducted 19 inspections of the six processors operating in SA (Table 3).In contrast, DEC (WA) conducted 21 inspections of 23 processors.Thus, the rate of inspections of processors was

Occassional papers 2013
International Journal of Rural Law and Policy much lower in WA than in SA.This situation again creates a high risk of offences not being detected.
The risk is further amplified by the fact that DEC did not inspect shooters and had a very low rate of inspections of chillers.A summary of the variation of inspectorial activities for shooters, chillers and processors across the states for 2010 is provided in Table 4.
Only DERM (QLD) disclosed the total number of carcasses inspected.In 2010, 3.1 per cent of carcasses were inspected in QLD.Although this result exceeds DERM's target, it also means that 96.9 per cent of carcasses were not inspected at all during that year.However, this disclosure provides an insight into the level of inspectorial activity and should be disclosed by the other states to aid analysis of enforcement.

Enforcement outcomes and regulatory models: Penalty infringement notices, warning notices and compliance letters
This part of the paper evaluates enforcement outcomes by examining infringement notices, warning notices and compliance letters in QLD, NSW, SA and WA.As already discussed, inspections which would ordinarily detect breaches of the Code are conducted at a low rate.Nevertheless, the data still reveals that substantial breaches stem from non-adherence to the welfare outcomes of the Code that focus on the method by which the animals are killed.
In QLD, DERM issues Infringement Notices, compliance letters and warning notices.These forms of enforcement actions are used for 'common breaches of the law where the impacts are not serious enough for court action'. 80The payment of an Infringement Notice does not result in the recording of a criminal conviction. 81Officers have discretion as to whether to serve an Infringement Notice but must take into account the intention of the statute to penalise breaches. 82DERM may also cancel or suspend licences given the meeting of certain conditions. 83DERM has issued compliance letters, warning notices and Infringement Notices to offenders in the commercial kangaroo industry Table 3.The majority of breaches detected by DERM have related to reporting requirements.However, there have been some offences detected that relate to the Code (Table 11).In 2004, there was one 'minor investigation' of carcasses that were non-head shot but the outcome of this investigation was not disclosed. 84In 2007, there were two instances of 'clear breaches of the code of practice with regard 80 Department of Environment and Resource Management, Enforcement Guidelines (October 2010) 9 <http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/management/pdf/enforcement-guidelines.pdf>. 81Ibid. 82Ibid. 83Ibid 14.These conditions are: when the breach of licence conditions has had serious consequences to human health, environment or natural resources; continual minor breaches have occurred despite warning being given by DERM; and provision is made for the automatic cancellation of the licence (eg accumulation of demerit points). 84Environmental Protection Agency/Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service, Final Harvest Report for Commercially Taken Macropod in Queensland for 2004 (2004), 10.
warning notices and compliance letters is not available except for 2010, when 26 warning notices were issued, and 2011, with 21 written cautions issued.* ?-denotes data that is unavailable or unclear OEH also made a number of licence cancellations over this period.In 2008, the licences of seven shooters were cancelled. 89One of these cancellations related to a repeated failure to comply with licence conditions. 90In 2009, the licence of one shooter was cancelled due to repeated failure to comply with licence conditions. 91The shooter lodged an appeal with the Minister for the the permit of one shooter on the basis of 'serious and on-going breaches of the Act'. 101The shooter subsequently undertook re-accreditation training and the permit was renewed with probationary conditions.102DEWNR detected a number of carcasses imported during 2009, 2010 and 2011 that had bullet wounds other than to the head or that were underweight.These carcasses came from NSW (Table 10) and QLD (Table 11).
As in the other states, Penalty Infringement Notices are issued in WA for minor breaches and their payment does not result in the recording of a criminal conviction.103DEC also has the power to cancel licences.104DEC has not disclosed the total number of Penalty Infringement Notices issued.In 2003 to 2007, DEC did not disclose whether any offences relating to the Code were detected.The lack of such disclosure makes it impossible to assess the types of offences detected in WA.DEC reported on the detection of offences in 2010 (Table 11) and reported that the total number of alleged offences for shooters was 'Not Applicable'. 105It is not clear what this statement means and whether there were no offences detected or whether DEC did not consider that offences were applicable to shooters.This statement may reflect a lack of enforceability of the conditions placed upon shooter licences in WA (as was discussed earlier).In 2010, DEC did not issue any Penalty Infringement Notices.There were 11 offences detected in 2010 for processors and zero for chillers.All of these offences were dealt with A similar situation may be occurring in WA where no offences were detected for shooters ('Not applicable') or chillers.DEC conducts a very low rate of inspections of chillers which make the detection of offences difficult.Therefore, the statistics from WA that indicate a low level of offences, are likely to emanate from its low level of inspectorial activity that results in the detection of fewer or no offences.

Conclusion
Regulatory theory based on smart and responsive regulation advocates the use of low-key enforcement and compliance methods in preference to penalties and suspensions.This philosophy is premised on the understanding that when stakeholders are involved in the design and implementation of regimes they are more likely to comply.Accordingly, regulators should invoke top-tier regulation only when necessary.This paper shows the results of an analysis of regulatory structures and state inspection reports carried out to assess how well the various state regulatory regimes operate on the kangaroo industry.
Overall, the legal and regulatory framework governing the killing of kangaroos could be improved to support more effective enforcement of the Code.In particular, the Code could be better integrated into state regulations to ensure that its provisions are enforceable in relation to all persons participating in the commercial kangaroo industry to the extent that these provisions are relevant.Furthermore, state departments charged with regulating the Code have multiple interests, including operating a kangaroo management program and ensuring the welfare of kangaroos.The ability and resolve of these agencies to inspect, charge and prosecute offenders may be impeded by conflicts of interest.
In order for the Code to be implemented effectively, it requires inspections to determine compliance levels.It is telling that increased inspections of shooters by DEHP (QLD) resulted in greater detections of offences.In contrast, the WA regime is particularly laggard in the detection of offences.Although the shooter's licences issued in WA are subject to conditions concerning the Code, the enforceability of these conditions is unclear.An extremely low rate of inspections of chillers (relative to other states) further exacerbates the matter, resulting in an inability to determine whether offences have occurred.It is clear that the laws and inspectorial practices of WA need to be reformed to align better with the standards set in other states.
The lack of consistent and uniform inspections presents the most significant gap in the regulatory activity within the kangaroo industry.Ten years ago (and less) there were no regular inspections (at least not on record).Inspection implementation has improved in recent years but variability of inspections within and amongst states is high and there is a lack of regular inspections of shooters.Gunningham et al 108 recognise the complexity involved in implementing Codes of Practice and note that highly interventionist approaches require substantial administrative resources, are generally less flexible and rate badly in terms of political acceptability.However, the Code may be operating under, what Braithewaite also describes as, 'system capacity overload'. 109In such situations offenders realise that the likelihood of their being punished is low.Although soft approaches, such as compliance plans, can still be effective in these instances, the regulated need to be aware that the regulator will step in with more serious punishments.Welfare outcomes may also be improved by formulating the integration of the Code into state laws with more focus on its objective of animal welfare.The authors suggest a number of measures such as that the granting of shooting licenses should be conditional on improved training programmes for humane killing; there should be effective selection and elimination processes in place for the granting of licences; the Code should be enforceable, with an emphasis on maintaining welfare standards; and, finally, the Code's 'soft' measures should be underpinned by sufficient penalties to foster compliance.
The current regime comprises of a mix of smart/responsive regulation but is undermined by the low inspection rate and underpinned by a weak command and control base.Consequently, the Code lacks the 'big stick', that is so important to the responsive regulatory pyramid.Overall, the legal and regulatory framework governing the killing of kangaroos could be better integrated into state regulations to ensure that its provisions are enforceable in a consistent and equivalent manner.This remains a pressing issue that requires serious attention to ensure better welfare outcomes for Australia's kangaroos that are killed for commercial purposes.
CCTV surveillance in NSW abattoirs to guarantee that incidents of unacceptable cruelty can be prevented or prosecuted in the future.
1 D Lunney, 'A History of the Debate (1948-2009) on the Commercial Harvesting of Kangaroos, with Particular Reference to NSW and the Role of Gordon Grigg' (2010) Australian Zoologist 384. 2 Information about the total number of kangaroos commercially killed is available from Department of Sustainability, Water, Population and Communities, ' 'Wild Harvest of Kangaroos and Wallabies' Wildlife Trade 8 April 2013 <http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/wildlife-trade/wild-harvest/index.html>. 3Based on R Hacker, S R McLeod, J P Druhan, B Tenhumberg, U Pradhan, 'Kangaroo Management Options in the Murray-Darling Basin' (Murray-Darling Basin Commission Canberra, 2004 5 D A Thomsen and J Davies.'Rules, Norms and Strategies of Kangaroo Harvest (2007) 14(2) Australasian Journal of Environmental Management. 6South Australian Department of Environment and Heritage, The Kangaroo Conservation and Management Plan for South Australia 2008-2012 (appendix 2, 2008) <http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/wildlifetrade/sources/management-plans/pubs/sa-kangaroo-08.pdf>. 7NSW Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water, Handbook for Kangaroo Harvesters (DECCW [now NSW Office of Environment and Heritage], 2010) <http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/nature/kmp/10160Hbkangharvesters.pdf>.

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Ibid; See Magistrate Wallace in Animal Welfare Authority v Keith William Simpson (unreported, Darwin Magistrates Court, Magistrate Wallace, 4 September 2008), 'in all likelihood other shippers from Queensland and New South Wales have been in the practice of doing the same things, taking the same sort of risks and everyone's got away with it'; as cited in Deborah Cao, Animal Law in Australia and New Zealand (Lawbook C, 2010) para 7.470.See also Department of Local Government and Regional Development v Gregory Keith Dawson (unreported, Fremantle Magistrates Court, Magistrate Musk, 22 July 2008), 65 (the Prosecution submitted that 'these sorts of offences are not easily detected, particularly given the vastness of WA livestock are not generally in the public eye.'). 59QLD Annual Report 2011, 20; Queensland Commercial Macropod Management Program, Annual Report 2010 ('QLD Annual Report 2010'), 22.Other priorities include: macropods are correctly tagged with 2011 harvest period tag; macropods are tagged with the correct species tag; macropods are tagged with the correct zone tag; shooters produce/carry valid written landholder consent as per licence conditions; and ensure timely, complete and accurate harvest returns from dealers. 60Queensland Commercial Macropod Management Program, Annual Report 2009 ('QLD Annual Report 2009') 20. 61QLD Annual Report 2010, above n 60, 22. 62 QLD Annual Report 2011, above n 55, 20. 63Qld Annual Report 2010, above n 60, 22. 64 Ibid, 23.The phrase 'detailed inspections' is not defined. 65QLD Annual Report 2011, above n 55, 20. 66Office of Environment and Heritage, New South Wales Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Management Plan 2007-2011: 2011 Annual Report ('NSW Annual Report 2011') 1, 5. Inspections are also carried out to detect the following possible compliance breaches: valid tags; correctly affixed tags; untagged kangaroos; display of premise registration number and licence number for either pet food or human consumption (NSW Food Authority); and the presence of other animal carcasses. 67Ibid 15.OEH inspects for the following possible compliance breaches: appropriate registration through NSW Food Authority (either for human consumption or pet food); correctly set up/fitted out (as per NSW Food Authority Memorandum of Understanding); untagged carcasses; and shooter carrying s 123 licence. 68Ibid 14. 69 Department for Environment and Heritage, The Kangaroo Conservation and Management Plan for South Australia 2008-2012 ('SA KMP 2008-2012'), 31. 70Ibid 30.
In 2008 and 2011, DEWNR did not meet its goal of inspecting each chiller at least once a year.In 2008, at least 19 chillers were not inspected, and in 2011 at least eight chillers were not inspected.In addition, it is difficult to conceive how DEWNR would have met its goal of inspecting medium-high volume chillers at least twice during these years because this would result in additional chillers not being inspected.The target was not met in 2008 or 2009 when the mean number of inspections was less than four times.In 2010 and 2011, DEWNR met its target for inspecting processors at least four times a year.DEWNR has not disclosed the number of inspections conducted of shooters or the areas where shooters operate.The WA Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) has not disclosed its priorities for inspections of the commercial kangaroo industry in WA (

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Department of Environment and Conservation, 2010 Annual Report on the Commercial Harvest of Kangaroos in Western Australia ('WA Annual Report 2010').(March2011). 75Department of Environment and Conservation, The Commercial Kangaroo Industry in Western Australia: Compliance with Performance Measures Detailed in the Red Kangaroo (Macropus rufus) Management Plan for Western Australia 2003-2007 and Western Grey Kangaroo (Macropus fuliginosus) Management Plan for Western Australia 2003-2007 ('WA Compliance Report 2007') (March 2007). 76WA Annual Report 2010, above n 75, 13. 77 RSPCA Australia, 'Kangaroo Shooting Code Compliance: A Survey of the Extent of Compliance with the Requirements of the Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos' ('RSPCA Australia Report 2002') (Prepared for Environment Australia, July 2002) s 5.2 < http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/wildlifetrade/publications/kangaroo-report/index.html>. 78For an analysis of the animal welfare outcomes of the Code, see Keely Boom and Dror Ben-Ami, 'Shooting Our Wildlife: An Analysis of the Law and its Animal Welfare Outcomes for Kangaroos and Wallabies' (2011) 5 Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 44. 79Ayers and Braithwaite above n 13, 4; Wright and Head, above n 19, 198.

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Command and control measures accompanied by enhanced methods of inspection can close the gap in regulatory activity.Top-tier regulatory responses, such as licence suspensions and revocations, should be applied in the worst cases, where the offender has been deliberately non-compliant or a repeat offender.Control measures such as minimum inspection rates can be included in the Code to ensure regular and uniform inspection rates.The inspection capability could be further enhanced by video surveillance mounted on shooters trucks -as has been suggested as a means to monitor the welfare of animals in the live export trade in overseas abattoirs 111 -and a greater number of inspections of carcasses at chillers. 108N Gunningham, 'Assessing the role of voluntary environment management arrangements in agriculture' (2007) 6(3) International Journal of Agricultural Resources Governance and Ecology 296. 109Braithwaite, above n 27, 486. 110Ibid. 111Labor MPs Melissa Parke and Steve Georganas have both demanded video surveillance in overseas abattoirs in relation to the live export trade.Greens MP Cate Faehrmann recently announced a Greens Bill for mandatory

Table 1 : Enforceability of the Code into State Legislation
These agencies/departments have multiple interests, including operating a kangaroo management program and ensuring the welfare of kangaroos.The ability and resolve of these agencies to inspect, charge and prosecute offenders may be impeded by conflicts of interest, and much of the focus is upon promoting industry compliance with the Code.It is generally difficult to assess the full impact of this conflict of interest, but one result is the development of a reactive regime that largely focuses •The Macropod Management Unit of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (DEHP) in QLD; 54 • The Kangaroo Management Program of the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) in NSW; 55 • The Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) in Western Australia; 56 and • The Department for Environment, Water and Natural Resources (DEWNR) in SA. 57 • Other bodies involved in enforcement including national parks, police and food safety agencies/departments. 54 Queensland Commercial Macropod Management Program, Annual Report 2011 ('QLD Annual Report 2011'), 20. 55NSW Government, '2010 Annual Report' New South Wales Commercial Kangaroo Harvest Management Plan 2007-2011 ('NSW Annual Report 2010'), 16. 56 Department of Environment and Conservation, 'The Commercial Kangaroo Industry in Western Australia: Compliance with Performance Measures Detailed in the Red Kangaroo (Macropus rufus) Management Plan for Western Australia 2003-2007 and Western Grey Kangaroo (Macropus fuliginosus) Management Plan for Western Australia 2003-2007' (March 2007) 6. 57 The Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources (DEWNR) was created on 1 July 2012 by amalgamating the Department for Water and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.See <http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/About_Us>.

Table 2 : Dealer site, processing plant, chiller, tannery and shooter inspections (all states, 2003-2011)
71Ibid 10.72Ibid 8. Chillers were also inspected for the following: sealed tags are correctly affixed; sealed tags are valid for use; correct colour sealed tag affixed to correct species; all kangaroos are presented in the correct form; and any meat hygiene issues are documented and reported.73Ibid30.__________________________________________________________________________________________ Occassional papers 2013 International Journal of Rural Law and Policy * ?Data is unavailable or unclear

Table 2 )
. Data is limited for WA, with an Annual Report available for 201074and a Compliance Report available from 2007.75These sources reveal that no chillers were inspected in WA during 2003, 2005 or 2007.There is no report of inspections of shooters' vehicles.No statistics are available for 2008 or 2009.In 2010, DEC conducted inspections of processors and chillers but did not appear to inspect skin dealers or shooters.76Itis difficult to assess the data set for WA because of limited data availability and differences in reporting (the earlier data is limited to specific areas whereas the 2010 data is not).However, there is a summary of inspections conducted of chillers.The rate of inspections of processors in WA has fallen from 2003-2007 to 2010.In 2003-2007, every processor was inspected at least once; yet, in 2010, two processors were not inspected at all.