It’s the third annual Britfest in Frankston—a city by name but known in Melbourne as the outermost suburb at the south-eastern end of the metropolitan train line. The location is the Frankston Football Oval, just outside the town centre. It’s late February and the temperature is approaching its projected maximum of 38 degrees Celsius. There’s not much shade on the expanse of the parched and browning oval, and many have sought relief under the veranda of the raised wooden grandstand. Here festival-goers can catch the breeze blowing across Port Phillip Bay and look out over Olivers Hill towards the beach, reminding themselves that, despite the best efforts of town planners to obliterate its existence, people initially moved to Frankston to be ‘beside the seaside’.

On a small stage in the middle of the football field, Rose Romeo has just finished her ‘Recitations’, her place taken by branch members of the United Kingdom Settlers’ Association who don Regency costumes to perform country dances. The average age of participants appears to be about sixty. Just to the side of the stage another group is gathered, possibly awaiting the upcoming ‘Knobbly Knees Contest’. According to the Britfest program, this will be followed by a dance by the Britannia Morris Men, the playing of Scottish bagpipes and then a ‘Varangian Guard battle’.

Apart from the stage entertainment, viewers in the grandstand can also see, ranged around the edge of the playing field, stalls—no more than twenty—selling a range of goods identified as British; promoting clubs, societies and interests identified as British; and selling food ‘proudly’ identified as British. There are cups of tea, ploughman’s lunches, fish and chips,
‘fudge with flair’, scones and ‘Rob’s British and Irish Butchery’, specialising in ‘British Gammon, Haggis, Irish Boiling Bacon, Pork Pies, Walsh Faggots, Black Pudding and much, much more’. There’s a Scottish clan-and-tartan stall suggesting you ‘look for your clan here’; there’s the Varangian Guard’s ‘medieval’ tent, with soldiers and their smock-clad families, and even Shetland pony rides nearby. The Victorian Re-enactment Society have provided a wizened Queen Victoria as well as a pearly king and queen. Also evident are a Punch and Judy show, beefeaters, British ‘bobbies’, various guardsmen, a Welsh witch, the ‘Front Parlour—specialising in country-ware gifts and English china’, a cake stall run by the ‘Blitz Brits’, and an assortment of second-hand oddments arranged under the banner ‘Steptoe’.

The entertainment program also features the Frankston Returned Servicemen’s League Pipes and Drums, a late afternoon ‘singalong’ and ‘twelve different British beers’ on tap in the football clubrooms. Every so often a cannon is wheeled out and space is cleared for a never entirely successful firing. As the day wears on, it becomes evident that some of the highlights of previous Britfests—including the Merseyside Association of Victoria with their T-shirts and banner (‘a swelling river, a rising tide, my heart, my pride, my Merseyside’) and a ‘Beauty Contest for British Bulldogs’ (‘no humans eligible’)—have not braved the heat to appear.

Notwithstanding the absence of bulldogs, Britfest with its re-creation and representation of Britishness provides an entry point for investigating the complex meanings within the transitional narratives of migrancy, ethnicity and ‘belonging’ among British migrants in modern Australia. The identification and promotion of Britishness at this event reflects recent trends in the re-imagining of that Britishness, which has also become the focus of popular and scholarly debate.\(^1\) In much of this debate, events such as Britfest are seen as representative of a newly emergent sense of identity among British migrants—as an organic reawakening of community pride, nationhood and sense of (an often privileged) place in Australia.

The renegotiation of Britishness upon which these assessments are based has emerged during a period that has seen forms of repression of many other symbolic and civic expressions of Australian migrant identities. The most prominent attempts at repression have been of those constructed as ‘other’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘illegal’ by a ‘core’ who imagine themselves as being within and representative of the national ‘mainstream’. As Ghassan Hage and others argue, the public spaces for migrant and ethnic identity in Australia are constantly monitored by members of this mainstream, who worry that the spaces ‘ethnics’ inhabit may threaten their ‘fantasy’ of a white national identity of Anglo-Australian origin. While certainly not a new phenomenon in a nation that has been historically anxious about immigration and race, recent responses to issues such as border control, national security and ‘ethnic tension’ have constituted and occasioned newly effective strategies to repress the legitimacy of some migrant identities.\(^2\)
British identity may seem, in this context, the least problematic or contested of categories—and one which, on the surface, is more closely aligned with the national ‘mainstream’ than with ethnic ‘others’. But recent attempts to find a public space for Britishness, and analyses of such moves, offer insights into the broader tensions that surround the meanings of migrant identity. Most revealing is that such re-creations of Britishness prove problematic, or at least unsettling, for many postwar British migrants. The Frankston Britfest, and by extension the activities of its organising body—the United Kingdom Settlers’ Association (UKSA)—are not so much an example of British ‘self-ethnicising’ in an attempt to establish ‘a new visibility and new power’ in Australia. Rather, they can be seen as the attempted remobilisation by an uneasy but socially empowered group of a heightened public presence for their conception of history, culture and nationhood. This newly emphasised public presence involves a negotiation, or indeed non-negotiation, of that presence by a majority of British migrants who, for a number of reasons, are much more ambivalent about the need for such forms of ethnic self-display. While it is self-consciously styled as a vernacular expression of transnational identification, Frankston’s Britfest originates from and is contoured by the concerns of those British migrants who wish to delineate and/or curtail British cultural identity through performative and symbolic display. In this process, British ethnicity is positioned as ‘other’—although certainly not as ‘alien’—to the national mainstream.

Britfest, like the numerous public festivals of ethnicity in Australia that simultaneously celebrate cultural distinction and national incorporation, offers a historically specific reaction to the re-imagining of the nation. This article examines this new expressive tendency within the context of recent debates about Britishness in Australia, and explores the ramifications for identity formation and cultural affiliation among British migrants. By locating this analysis in the Melbourne suburb of Frankston, we aim to provide a situated example of the ways in which British ethnic identities are being negotiated. Such localised and specific responses, however, are operating within and are influenced by the broader context of shifting representations of a diverse British diaspora. Like British-Australians, members of this diaspora also inhabit nations shaped by the legacies of British imperialism, colonisation and migration. Shifting meanings of Britishness also represent and inform a more general ‘crisis of whiteness’, indicating how culturally embedded the colonial equation of Britishness with whiteness has been for those who imagine themselves at the core of the contemporary Australian nation.

— LOCATING BRITISH IDENTITY

Recent scholarship has tracked, traced and positioned contemporary expressions of British identity in Australia in relation to a variety of cultural, social and geographical spaces and moments. Frankston has not attracted attention thus far, but it is no accident that it has hosted Britfest since the festival’s inception in 1999. With a population of around 100,000,
Frankston functions as a regional retail, service and commercial hub, largely as a result of extensive residential development since the Second World War. With its scenic beaches and cheap land, Frankston became the place where postwar British migrants’ dreams of seaside suburbia could become a reality, providing the ideal locale in which to seek ‘comfort and security in a warm climate’. By the mid-1960s, almost 20 per cent of those living in the Frankston area were British-born, and while this number has slowly diminished due to an ageing population, in 1996 still 12 per cent of all Frankston residents were born in Britain or Ireland (compared to an average of approximately 6 per cent of British-born living elsewhere in Melbourne). And yet, despite this relatively high concentration of British-born, Frankston is not recognised as an ‘ethnic suburb’ and has no public profile as a ‘little Britain’ or ‘little England’. In this particular case, the invisibility of British migrants as a distinct group is coupled with the fact that they live in an ‘ordinary’, and now some-what economically depressed, working and lower-middle-class suburb on the fringe of greater Melbourne.

The migrants drawn to Frankston were, of course, part of the huge postwar drive to attract Britons to Australia. Between 1947 and 1991 a total of more than one and a half million migrants arrived from Britain, many as assisted ‘ten pound tourists’ or under other related sponsorship schemes. It has been widely accepted that Britons were willing migrants, welcomed and easily assimilated into Australian society. In part this is why assertions about the place and identity of British migrants—lumped with the Anglo-Australian mainstream—have been too easily made or gone unchallenged. There has been little recognition that for Britons, also, migration has resulted in complex changes in relationships with the ‘homeland’, and thus in the migrant’s transformed sense of self and community in Australia. Australian postwar immigration policies clearly favoured migrants from Britain, and the arrival of British migrants in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s inspired little of the curiosity and alarm that was sparked by the arrival of significant numbers of migrants from northern, central and southern Europe, and, a little later, from the Middle East and South-East Asia. In this regard, Mark Peel has argued that British migrants are among ‘the poorest served of all groups in the history of Australian migration, with accounts ranging from anecdotal whimsy to an almost hostile dismissal of migrant Britons as the pampered beneficiaries of Australia’s cultural cringe’.10

By developing new non-totalising conceptions of British migrants to Australia—and especially the English within this group—it is possible to re-evaluate how forms of Britishness have constituted a ‘dominant cultural myth in Australia’ that has been ‘more pervasive in Australia than in Britain itself’.11 Understanding the way this still resonates today involves recognising that Britishness is historically based, and that during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, the idea of a ‘British people’—combining those of English, Scots,
Welsh and Irish origin, and more broadly diasporic British peoples across the empire—had a particular currency in Australia.

There are, of course, significant problems with the idea of Britishness, Englishness, Anglo-Celticness or Anglo-Saxonness, even within Britain itself. It has been claimed that an Anglo-Saxon racial lineage lies at the base or ‘taproot’ of an Englishness often collapsed into Britishness—an idea of Anglo-Saxonness reinvented and romanticised by the English themselves in the nineteenth century as a myth of commonality and subsequently transported to Australia. Unsurprisingly, imperial and colonial Britishness has proved similarly elusive. Just as sociologists and historians have been unpicking British and English identities in Britain and the post-imperial world over the last two decades, this unravelling extends to Australia.

The formulation that a singular and coherent Britishness has made more sense in Australia than in Britain is at first glance persuasive. As James Jupp has argued, while there were significant cultural and economic differences between the distinctive nations and regions of Britain, the colonial environment was highly assimilatory because of the scattered nature of settlement, the decline of non-English speaking migrants, the use of English in the education system and the Anglicisation of Britain itself. In Australia, the argument goes, peoples from England, Scotland, Wales and even Ireland had much more in common than they did in Britain. Britishness in Australia was not the same as Britishness in Britain—it was a unique form of Britishness that underscored an emergent Australian nationalism.

The development and consolidation of Australian national identity is crucial to understanding how a ‘transplanted’ Britishness was, and is, constructed. The sentimental attachments to ‘home’ and ‘kith and kin’ by postwar leaders and immigration planners meant that the ‘Australian way of life’ was grafted onto notions of British heritage, community and ‘standards’, and a sense of the ‘indissoluble unity of the British people everywhere’. From 1948 to 1987 the *Nationality and Citizenship Act* protected and reinforced the British character of Australian society, and deemed ‘alien’ those who were not a British subject, an Irish citizen or a ‘protected person’. The idea of Anglo-Saxon kinship, of ethnic commonality, has continued to be remarkably persistent within Australian culture. It is still possible to hear the echo of prime minister Robert Menzies, who, arguing for a redistribution of ‘Empire population’, believed we should ‘no more question the movement of people from England to Australia than we would question a movement of people from Yorkshire to Somerset or Melbourne to Perth’.

For migrants themselves, their movement was never a matter of simple ‘transplantation’ to a British settlement overseas. Migrant Britons who arrived after the Second World War often felt distant from established ‘Anglo-Celtic’ Australia, but were assumed to feel ‘at home’.
Because Britishness was culturally embedded within Australian identity, it was available as a point of identification both in terms of formal citizenship and in other specific instances and locations—from the romance of a Royal Tour to the closed rank of shop steward or domestic and culinary Englishness. But the class-based nature of cultural Englishness that found expression in the modulated accents acceptable for radio broadcasting on the ABC, or among the professions and ‘high’ society, did not produce a sense of belonging among the mainly working- and lower-middle-class Britons who migrated to Australia. Drawing on Hage, we would argue that contrary to popular conceptions that the British have constituted a ‘natural aristocracy’, most British migrants have not experienced governmental forms of belonging and some have not experienced even ‘homely’ forms of it. As Hage has argued, ‘one needed to accumulate something more specific within Britishness to acquire … governmental power’, and that something was ‘class’.19

One ground for suspicion of much discussion of shared ethnic identity is that it ‘presupposes conceptions of collective identity that are remarkably unsubtle in their understandings of the processes by which identities, both individual and collective, develop’.20 In the Australian context, themes of mobility—of opportunity, getting on or going nowhere21—establish a crucial link between the construction of identity and the circumstances in which lives and identities are made. While Britfest is problematic because of the ways in which it is not a representation of migration history or culture among British migrants in Frankston, the interactions and performance of class identities at this ‘ethnic festival’ are striking.

The centrality of class to British identities in Australia makes us pause before agreeing with Jon Stratton that ‘rather than being imposed on them [as in the case of other migrant groups in Australia], British migrants and their descendants are engaged in a process of self-ethnicisation’. Efforts by the Hawke and Keating governments of the 1980s and 1990s to remove privileges enjoyed by British migrants led to a feeling among these people that ‘they have lost a status, and an entitlement, to what was naturally theirs’. Stratton argues that changes in formal ties between Britain and Australia in the 1980s had the effect of ‘decreasing the rights of British migrants and of making them feel that they no longer have political leverage in Australia’, and that this led ‘to a self-ethnicisation of the British in Australia in order to claim a new visibility and a new power’.22

While in some quarters spurious notions of racial identity have crept back into public discourse under the guise of a recovered ethnicity,23 Stratton’s assertions are too totalising. Such a stance may reflect the position of some British migrants, but, on the basis of extensive community interviews and observations of Britfest over three years, we would argue that many, possibly even a majority, of British migrants are no more interested in self-ethnicisation than they are in increasing their visibility or in producing ‘an increasing sense of ethnic self-consciousness’ among themselves as a community. The reasons for this are twofold. On
the one hand, many are happy to maintain the comfort of being ‘invisible migrants’ for the privileges of settler status and the perceived lack of necessity to recall the consequences of ‘settlement’, including the troubling history of the conquest of Indigenous Australians and a long ‘tradition’ of racism. On the other hand, while their British culture and identity may be invisible to certain cultural arbiters, less visible forms and signs of identification do exist and to some extent prevail. Some have argued that ‘lurking behind’ the insistence of British migrants ‘that their side of the story should be told, [and] that the history of British migrants had been forgotten’ is a ‘palpable’ sense of a need ‘to express their version of a distinct “British” … ethnic identity, apparently overwhelmed by the multicultural emphasis on non-British ethnicities’. However, our observations in the Frankston area suggest that the self-construction of individual and collective British identities is as multiple as it is contradictory: any notion of self-ethnicisation needs to be seen as fluid, evolving in response to the specificities of temporal, spatial and political ‘moments’ and circumstances.

— Organising british identity

British migrants have met in the Frankston area throughout the postwar period, forming credit cooperatives, soccer clubs and social groups either independently or as a focal point within other, often church-based, organisations. As early as 1953, the Immigration Department’s Good Neighbour bulletin was reporting on the activities of a reinvigorated Hearts of Oak Club holding fortnightly dances in a local hall. Britfest, however, is an activity organised by the UKSA, which was formed in 1967 by migrants living in the Frankston area. Although these ties with Frankston remain important (the current president resides in the nearby suburb of Mt Eliza), the UKSA now has six branches within the Melbourne metropolitan area. Originally established as a support network for new arrivals, it has undergone several changes over the years, at one time comprising a travel agency that provided discount airfares, with offices on Brunswick Street, Fitzroy, in inner Melbourne.

In its current manifestation, the UKSA claims to be ‘the only national organization representing migrants from all parts of the British Isles’ and to act in the interests of British migrants and their descendants who are ‘proud to be British Australians’. Members receive a copy of the bi-monthly journal Endeavour, discounts on various goods, access to a library of folk music from Britain and the opportunity to participate in the branch-organised social events. While these social functions are central to the UKSA’s present operations, over the past decade the organisation has assumed a more active role in the promotion of ‘British culture and heritage’. The major vehicle for this has been Endeavour, which contains reports of the association’s events, letters from readers on items of ‘British interest’, articles on British history and culture, recipes for ‘British Regional Cuisine’, and advertisements for venues such as the Charles Dickens Tavern, the Pint and Pickle, and for services to readers, including
cheap phone cards, ballroom-dancing lessons and immigration consultants. ‘British interests’ are defined broadly and include Scottish, Welsh and to some extent Irish as well as English interests. UKSA membership tends to reflect the breakdown of the English (80 per cent), Scottish (13 per cent), Welsh (3 per cent) and Northern Ireland (3 per cent) migrants in Australia.

As those responsible for *Endeavour* admit, the tone of the publication is highly defensive. In the past few years, issues have included articles with titles such as ‘British Australians now officially second-class citizens’, ‘Anglophobia costs Australia $millions’ and ‘Threats to Brits’.28 In the June–July 2002 issue, the defensive stance had become an offensive front, with opinion columns calling for volunteers to form ‘a UKSA sub-committee to address the issue of racial vilification directed against our community’, and an article supporting findings of the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority in Britain that ‘UK educationists want to teach pride in white English culture’. Most of these articles are reproduced on the UKSA’s website (which features a Union Jack-clad Geri Halliwell). *Endeavour* also provides the opportunity for members to purchase stickers and T-shirts reading ‘Proud to be Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘Proud to be Celtic’.

The UKSA makes broad claims to represent British migrants and their descendants, to make representations to Parliament and government departments in the name of British migrants, and to represent the interests of the British community against media prejudice and discrimination. One segment of the UKSA certainly sees its role as a defender of Britishness and British heritage,29 and the association has received small grants from both the federal and state governments for specific projects aligned to their constituency. But this does not necessarily mean that the UKSA has, in the past decade, rebuilt itself along ‘ethnic’ lines, and that advocacy has become its primary function.30

According to the president, ‘the backbone of the Association’ is really the social activities, mostly the dances, held by the six regional branches: Camberwell, Eastern Districts, Glen Waverley, Preston, Springvale and Frankston. Moreover, interviews with UKSA branch members suggest many are more interested in the organisation as a forum for social activity—for dancing, darts nights, coach trips to play poker machines and meals at pubs—than in promoting a more prominent role for, or rarefied sense of, British culture and heritage. Indeed there is evident tension between those who see it needing to become a more viable vehicle for the advocacy of all things British and those who prefer to concentrate on the weekly social activities, born of the shared experience of migrancy and forms of sociability and entertainment based on working-class lifestyle and values.

Although both groups are present at Britfest, it appears to be the advocacy group who has done most to push for the event. The Frankston Britfest organisers took the idea from a similarly named event in the Sydney working-class suburb of Blacktown, which began in 1996.
and usually attracts somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 people. Frankston’s Britfest has been less successful. Dogged alternately by rain and hot weather, there have been difficulties in attracting the necessary crowds to make the festival financially viable. The 2001 Britfest attracted less than 2000 people, numbers so low that the Frankston Football Club refused to run a bar at the oval. When all costs had been accounted for, the UKSA barely made a profit from the event, dashing any hopes of it being an important fundraiser for the association.

If a festival of Britishness has not proved to be a drawcard for spectators, the organisers have also reported serious problems in recruiting participants willing to put their ethnicity on display. The UKSA president commented during an interview that ‘the Scots are very good; there’s an enormous range of Scottish things going on … But there’s Scottish things going on all over the place’. By inference he indicated that Britfest had hoped to cater for ‘the Irish [who only] have St Patrick’s Day and that’s about it [and] the Welsh [who] have a church service for St David’s Day’. Most of all, it appears that a major aim of Britfest was to provide an outlet for the re-creation of English ethnicity, and perhaps to compensate for the small turnout at St George’s Day functions. This reflects, of course, wider historical conflation of English and British identities, but also more recent (and perhaps anxious) reconstructions and re-affiliations.³¹

Given the relative failure of Frankston’s Britfest, the UKSA has decided to promote Britishness, and the association itself, through stalls at other events and by instigating a new range of social activities. It intends to make more use of its clubrooms at the English Speaking Union, closer to the centre of Melbourne, and to develop its role as an umbrella organisation with affiliated groups around the state and country. The UKSA already has some affiliates within the South Australian group TEA (The English in Australia), which set itself up rapidly but quickly dwindled to only sixty members. It has also approached the Merseyside Association of Victoria and the WISE (Welsh, Irish, Scottish, English) People, who are centred in the nearby suburb of Dandenong. Both of these groups, however, prefer to maintain their independence and not unite as part of a wider mobilising force to act out Britishness in Australia.

— Performing transnational identity?

As Richard White has commented:

It is not usual for people to act out their nationality. Only in particular circumstances is nationality self-consciously and actively imagined, usually circumstances where the borderlines between ‘us and them’ can be not only marked but negotiated and brought into being.³²
This begs the question of whether borderlines between Australian and British identity can be drawn so easily, and how British ‘being’ is actively marked and negotiated.

Understanding Britfest as a folklife festival provides a useful way to think through these issues. Richard Bauman and Patricia Sawin have argued that folklife festivals are forms of cultural production in which ‘symbolically resonant cultural goods and values are placed on public display’, often as a counterpoise to mass, elite or official culture and to preserve and promote histories seen as valuable and necessary. And yet as Bauman and Sawin also note, folklore and folkways are largely the invention of the late eighteenth century, and have always been about the politics of culture. They point out that at folklife festivals in particular certain aspects of cultural life are valued over others in the service of larger political agendas.33

One need only consider the symbols that dominate Britfest—the Union Jack, the distinctive British police, the military and the early medieval, the Royal rather than the Royle family—to understand what kind of Britishness and what vision of Britain is being celebrated at this event. It is not a pluralistic vision of a varied and changing group of peoples with a broad range of social, cultural, racial and linguistic affiliations, but imagined characteristics of shared origin, language, religion and race—a singular social identity and often inherently conservative (a)political community. Apart from the romantic idealisation of the morris dancer and the pearly king and queen, there are certainly no working-class values or symbols evoked—no mention of British unionism, the solidarity of miners or indeed of the Tolpuddle Martyrs, who arrived in the penal colony of NSW as very early, albeit unwilling, migrants. There is no acknowledgement of the industrial north or Midlands, of terrace living, Coronation Street, or city life in general. And there are certainly no references to the products of post—Second World War West Indian and Asian migrants to Britain: no curry sauce to go with the fish and chips, and nobody to replicate the cross-cultural mimicry of ‘Ali G’. For the organisers of the UKSA, while ‘there ain’t no black in the Union Jack’, there isn’t even ‘Britpop’ or ‘Cool Britannia’.34

In this respect, it is helpful to think, with Ien Ang, about Britfest as a form of ‘auto-biographical’ display deliberately and rhetorically constructed for public purposes, ‘a strategically fabricated performance, one which stages … an identity which can be put to work’. To paraphrase Ang, it is the usefulness of that identity—what it is being put forward for—which determines the politics of such autobiographical discourse. As we have argued, Britfest cannot be understood as a spontaneous ‘organic’ emergence from the British community at Frankston, or within Australia as whole, but as the work of the predominantly middle-class heritage advocacy group within the UKSA—where this group within the UKSA is at has informed and articulated the meaning of where they’re from.35
As a strange intra-ethnic form of ‘prescribed otherness’, the UKSA may actually be articulating not so much the category British but the category Australian, or rather the primacy of Britishness within the category Australian, and the power of British and Australian identities to shape and define each other. We might understand the use of an event such as Britfest then—especially with regard to arguments made by Hage that a sense that being ‘white Australian’ no longer automatically yields the national privileges or opportunities once perceived to have existed—as re-articulating a concept of the British roots upon which Australian identity was supposed to be grafted. Britfest is thus a claim by a group of British-born and Anglophile Australians that there should be no crisis of identification or undermining of Australia’s ‘core’ culture. It may be an unsettled rather than a confident assertion, but it is an assertion nonetheless. And it is this brazenness that in many ways discomforts those more settled (Anglo-)Australians who might fear or simply see as irrelevant a public viewing of the ethnic/cultural markers of the so-called mainstream. Transnational identification can interrogate the privileged homogeneity of the nation-state. Britfest, then, may open spaces where membership of Australia’s core culture is less certain, and raise questions that are met with unsettled or ambivalent feelings.

The most obvious, and perhaps surprising, way in which this occurs is how the audience responds to and reconstructs Britfest. As Robert Lavenda states in relation to North American community festivals, once a festival begins there is the potential for it to take on a life of its own, to develop a ‘dialogic potential’. The festival, both text and action, becomes public property’, Paul Ricoeur has argued, ‘creating a public culture’. In this respect, the ‘dialogic potential’ of Britfest was clearly manifest in the importance that the different groups within the UKSA attributed to various events and stalls. For many UKSA branch members, the significance of the day seemed to lie more in its possibilities for social interactions (the dancing, the meeting with friends and acquaintances), than in the official function of celebrating or marketing Britishness. The (symbolic) cannon firing impressed no-one.

The public culture of Britfest as created and encountered by those not formally affiliated with the UKSA is harder to ascertain. Nevertheless, observation, interviews and impromptu conversations both at and after the festival suggested that many attendees were rather bemused by the event. They generally responded to the British products on sale and the self-conscious British displays and activities with (largely amused) irony. Even invited dignitaries such as consular representatives, the mayor of the municipality and local members of parliament appeared to feel that the most appropriate tone for their speeches should be playful rather than sombre, regionally parochial rather than nationalistic or patriotic. Few of the audience ventured into the middle of the oval to participate in the dancing and other events, preferring to observe the proceedings from the grandstand. Certainly, if those attending Britfest
did not challenge what the festival presented to them, neither did they embrace its message with a deep seriousness. If we think of the organisers of Britfest as ventriloquists of Britishness—trying to make Britishness speak\textsuperscript{38}—the festival appeared to say little to those assembled to listen.

Although the British-born population in Frankston and Australia as a whole is ageing, it is unlikely that the audience could identify beyond any superficial level with the ‘ethnographic other’ presented to them at Britfest. Beefeaters, ‘bobbies’, morris dancers, Punch and Judy, Queen Victoria and the Varangian Guard all appear rather arcane, or cartoonish, if indeed they are familiar at all (and they would not be for many of those second- and third-generation migrants accompanying parents and grandparents). The first-time appearance of a Varangian Guard at Britfest 2001, for example, provides a case in point, and perhaps one sign of the attempt at ethnic agency for which Stratton argues. This reference to an East Roman (Byzantine) imperial fighting unit, containing increasing numbers of displaced Anglo-Saxons until it eventually became known as the English Guard, represents freedoms lost and still denied. But illustrative of the preservation of ancestry through the tradition of practice, the Varangian Guard re-creation re-enacts and asserts ideas of heritage and identity that are more a reflection of the interests of the organising committee than of British migrants as a whole in Frankston or Melbourne, let alone Australia.

Interviews reveal that many of those who attended and participated in Britfest understand their Britishness—or Welshness, Irishness, Englishness or Scottishness—in quite different, more immediate, more contemporary and probably more transitional or at least transnational ways.\textsuperscript{39} By contrast, the presentation of traditional symbols of Britishness for their own sake at Britfest served to de-contextualise and render them ahistorical: forms of Britishness were celebrated as if, in the words of Stuart Hall, they contained ‘within themselves, from their moment of origin, some fixed and unchanging value or meaning’.\textsuperscript{40} But understandings of Queen Victoria and the British police force are as diverse as they are positional. Those migrants who enjoy watching their twice-weekly instalments of The Bill, re-runs of Prime Suspect, Silent Witness and Inspectors Morse and Frost, realise that the ‘British Bobby’, let alone British crime, isn’t all it used to be.

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Britfest is that while there are valid and important reasons for thinking about the meanings of Britishness in Australia, there was a striking absence of representations of the Australian context in which this supposedly uniquely united identity was formed. In other words, the performance of ethnic identity referred exclusively to pre-migratory forms of cultural expression, to a displaced and generalised ethnographic display. As Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett has argued, such ‘programs … generally represent an imagined community in which diversity is harmoniously integrated, where difference is reduced to style and decoration, to spice of life’\textsuperscript{41}. One only needs to consider current
discussion about the development of regional governments within England itself as part of the wider process of devolution of the United Kingdom to recognise the ways in which such displays, such aestheticisations, reflect a de-contextualisation and often de-politicisation of ‘Britishness’.\textsuperscript{42} Indeed Stratton argues that in promoting the notion that Australia’s heritage lies in England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, Britfest deconstructs what it wishes to promote, the existence of ‘British folkways’, and points to the ‘cultural recolonisation [of Ireland in particular] under the apparently benign intention of ethnic formation’.\textsuperscript{43}

In this respect, organisers cannot be oblivious to the effects of attempts to assert British or English ethnicity. One wonders how conscious they are of the ways, as Stratton puts it, that particular and positive claims about the role of the British or English in Australia’s settlement are often heard as nationalist claims for the primacy of an Anglo-Celtic heritage—which in turn easily slips into a reassertion of the racial superiority of Anglo-Saxon Australia. And how all of this, as Stratton also points out, ‘ultimately, works in the broadest context of Australia’s long history of the White Australia policy which promoted and privileged the ideology of a white race which for members of groups such as National Action, is by no means defunct’.\textsuperscript{44} But while function and effect cannot be ignored, we suggest that it would be misleading and reductive to describe a conscious agenda of organisers and participants at Britfest; the less formal or ‘dialogic’ expressions of Britishness that the festival embraces are ambiguous, contradictory and shifting.

Perhaps the biggest contradiction, or at least ambiguity, at Britfest is that the festival fails to represent what has shifted: it fails to represent a \textit{migrant} community. There is no sense of a history of movement in the formal displays at Britfest. The event occurs ostensibly because of an association based on the fact of \textit{settlement} in Frankston and Australia; Britfest does not represent the fact that this meeting on the Frankston oval is a result of many journeys. Britfest certainly prompted some of those interviewed to see it as a public space that largely ignores their autobiographical tracks. (In this respect Britfest is not unlike many other public and performative spaces in Australia, which ignore comings and goings, and the relationships of a place coming into being.) The festival has, it appears, failed to publicly acknowledge and celebrate what is important to its local audience, which isn’t ‘the Jack’ (or Britishness as a coherent and stable entity or field of influence) but the more intimate meetings and gestures that make up their ongoing journey of migration, of being placed. Learning to track not just the Jack but a series of relationships, not least that between Britishness and Australianness, and to recognise the ways in which these meeting places are never empty but a palimpsest of past movements is crucial to understanding any sense of migrant identity in Australia. Without wishing to claim too much for British migrants in the Melbourne suburb of Frankston, most are keenly aware of the fact that this display of Britishness takes place on an Australian Rules ground.
Indeed for those British migrants in Frankston, Britfest poses the question of identity in the sharpened form of counter-identification—by inviting visitors to question their common origins, shared characteristics and ideals, and the allegiances established on this foundation. Perhaps it alerts them to the fact that their identification is conditional, and moves them to understand, in their own way, the need to situate debates about identity, in terms outlined by Stuart Hall:

within all those historically specific developments and practices which have disturbed the relatively 'settled' character of many populations and cultures … and [within] the processes of 'free' and forced migration which have become a global phenomenon of the so-called 'post-colonial' world.45

Thus, from the perspective of some interviewees, an event such as Britfest serves to constitute identity through opposition: 'I really never wanted to be or go to anything like that, from that point of view … I think you should move forward.'46 In this respect it may also motivate some to consider that although the festival may

seem to invoke an origin in a historical past with which they continue to correspond, actually identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not 'who we are' or 'where we came from', so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves.47

While British migrants at Britfest may relate to this invention of tradition as much as to tradition itself—'it’s like it’s not quite genuine, but yeah I know all that British stuff',48—they may also, to quote Hall once more, find it produces in themselves 'not the so-called return to roots but a coming-to-terms-with our “routes”'.49

Despite the manifest identity tensions for some British migrants in Australia, many have not needed to undergo the process of self-ethnicisation; they have carried their history with them in the patterns of life, habits, memories, continuities and discontinuities that make identity and link it to place. As Carole Hamilton-Barwick has argued in relation to British women’s stories of migration to Australia, the subjectivity and purpose revealed by individual migrant narratives points to complex, sometimes epic, constructions of belonging. British migrant women ‘sing their songlines’, Hamilton-Barwick writes, '[c]rying What I do is me: for that I came’, and we should not rush to universalise such experiences, such expressions of identity.50 We need to ask about the circumstances in which British identity becomes a problem and for whom. Is it an ‘ocluded nationalism’ rather than an ‘identity vacuum’ that leads to such experiences?51 Is it more often groups wishing to re-animate this national identity
who feel the need to publicly narrate and/or curtail that identity through performative and symbolic displays? As Britfest’s recreation of British space in ‘multicultural’ Australia anxiously negotiates a nation of ‘others’, is it the context of an ‘occluded’ Australian nationalism also that brings such assertions into being?

It is in this context that Britfest—precisely because of our analysis of the festival’s inconclusive and ambivalent role in promoting Britishness—raises questions about the visibility (or invisibility) of British migrants in today’s Australia, and the tensions inherent between a public and private sense of ethnic and cultural identity. Most British-born in Australia do not feel the need to assert or display their Britishness. This is partly because it is all around them in the continuing inheritance of British political, social and cultural colonialism, but it is also more flexible and varied than the cultural forms on display at Britfest. It is this indeterminate ordinariness and shifting quality of Britishness in Australia—comforting for some, threatening for others—that has and will continue to undermine past and future attempts to put it on display at Britfest. In Australia, many migrants understand that they live in both old and new countries: they understand how history exists as a tangible sense of the past permeating everyday life, but also the anti-historical qualities required to transform space into place and embrace new cultural forms. In common with other ‘ethnic’ groups in Australia, British migrants display a heterogeneous and hybrid identity, which challenges the assumption of multiculturalism that individual ‘ethnicities’ may be neatly bounded. This hybridity, or fluidity, is not submerged in particularity, but negotiates its place in the broader community by rejecting exclusionary or unwanted inclusionary practices. The British in Frankston have on the whole rejected Britfest as their own festival of personal and collective belonging.

It is unlikely that that there will be another Britfest held in Frankston. But such events, and formulations of ‘self-identification’ indicate the need for further conceptual and empirical research on the nature of British migrants’ sense of place and identity in contemporary Australia. Indeed, while it is necessary to keep in mind the uniqueness of its social and geographical environment, one of the problems in conceptualising Britishness in Australia in the postwar period has been the way in which Britishness has always been discussed in terms of Australian national identity, always conceived in terms of a promise, threat or difficulty.

It is now time, perhaps, to think of these people on their own terms—to chart their narratives of inclusion and dislocation, and to probe and question the very existence of their specific transnational and transitional forms of identification. How British migrants occupy and negotiate the spaces between British and Australian identity, and the nationalist or ethnically absolutist discourses that manoeuvre them to appear either coterminous or mutually exclusive, may prove to be provocative and culturally insubordinate in both a British and Australian nationalist context. Zygmunt Bauman puts it this way:
one thinks of identity whenever one is not sure of where one belongs; that is, one is not sure how to place oneself among the evident variety of behavioural styles and patterns, and how to make sure that people around would accept this placement as right and proper, so that both sides would know how to go on in each other’s presence. ‘Identity’ is a name given to the escape sought from that uncertainty.53

The identity promoted, encountered and negotiated at Britfest by British migrants in Frankston does not just reflect uncertainty, or changes in the value of Britishness over time, but it reflects a capacity to see and remember differently. As others working on histories of British migration have begun to discover, as many of Australia’s British-born population enter retirement, they re-conceive and often reconfigure their identity in relation to their migration and how it affected their lives. British identity is still being reshaped by this process: for many, memory is migrating ‘home’ but not necessarily in a way that means where they are from overwhelms where they are at.

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Elizabeth, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1995; and Stratton.


6. James Jupp, Immigration, second edition, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1998, p. 97. Jupp argues that British migrants to Australia often aspired to a ‘respectable suburban existence’, and the desire for a suburban home ‘besides the sea’ was frequently mentioned in oral interviews as part of the lure of migrating to Australia, and to Frankston in particular.

7. In 1947 approximately 9.6 per cent of the total Frankston population was British born; 13.6 per cent in 1954; 16.1 per cent in 1961; 18.1 per cent in 1966; 18.3 per cent in 1971; 17.9 per cent in 1976; 15.9 per cent in 1981; 14.6 per cent in 1986; 13 per cent in 1991; and 11.4 per cent in 1996.

8. For details of assisted passage and sponsorship schemes available to British migrants, see R.T. Appleby, The Ten Pound Immigrants, Boxtree, London, 1988, and British Emigration to Australia, Australian National University, Canberra, 1964; and Betka Zamowska, The Ten Pound Fare: Experiences of British People who Emigrated to Australia in the 1950s, Viking, London, 1988. Of all settler arrivals, Britons represented 30 per cent between 1947 and 1961; 44 per cent between 1961 and 1976, and 22 per cent between 1976 and 1991. Between 1986 and 1991, the proportion had fallen to 15 per cent of the total, and to 12 per cent by 2001. Yet even this percentage still represents the second largest group of settler arrivals in Australia from any one nation.


15. In this respect, it is worth noting Meaney’s argument that Britishness was not, therefore, something imposed on Australia from outside—an outcome of British hegemony or manipulation—but was rather freely chosen. Meaney, p. 84. See also Linda Colley, ‘Britishness and Otherness—An Argument’, Journal of British Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, 1992, pp. 309–29.


17. R.G. Menzies, quoted in Brett, p. 146. In a recent example, there was discussion in Australia about ‘kinship’ with white farmers in Zimbabwe. For a more comprehensive view of this issue, see Editorial, Age, 13 August 2002.

whose task it was to make the object speak'. ‘Objects of Ethnography’, in Karp and Lavine, p. 398.

39 By transnational identity we refer, following Robert Smith, to the practices and relationships that link immigrants with their place of origin, that have significant meaning, are regularly carried out, and embody important aspects of migrant identity and social structure. See Robert C. Smith, ‘How Durable and New is Transnational Life? Historical Retrieval through Local Comparison’, Diaspora, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 2000, pp. 203–4.


41 Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, p. 432.

42 In 1999 elections were held in Scotland and Wales and power was transferred to two newly elected parliaments, as well as to a new executive in Northern Ireland, thus replacing domination by one parliament and civil service in Britain with governance by four legislatures. As part of a broad agenda to ‘modernise’ the British state, in part through devolution of power, the Blair Labour Government also reformed local government and the (un)representative nature of the House of Lords. See Selina Chen and Tony Wright (eds), The English Question, Fabian Society, London, 2000; Arthur Aughey, Nationalism, Devolution, and the Challenge to the United Kingdom State, Pluto Press, London, 2001; and Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.

43 Stratton, p. 27.

44 Stratton, p. 31.


46 Interview with B. Porritt, February 2001.


48 Interview with N. Armes, April, 2001.


