See repetition will find
1606 Dutch ship, Duyfken
didn't come here for us black voyage
first discovery, previous motive
of our Asian brothers and sisters.
Valuable distrustful was the botany
sailed trespassed is quite frank
Portuguese Spanish defended themselves
well we will here today organise
armed resistance, native hostile
ending establishments
thinking they fit in our history

Lionel Fogarty, ‘Standardized’

The wonderful thing about re-enacting history is that you can re-write the script. Our
voyage is only prescribed to the extent we choose.

Peter Manthorpe, Captain of the Duyfken replica

These two quotations follow a similar theme. In terms used by Deleuze and Guattari, they
signal lines of deterritorialisation in an effort to avoid or resist capture. The authors are both
adamant in not wanting to be constrained: Fogarty by physical colonisation, Manthorpe
by the established versions of history. Until recently, history as written by the ‘victors’ has
been nothing more than repeated efforts to capture a certain slant of truth in order to (re)territorialise the position of ‘white’ dominance in this country. The re-enactment of historical events can be instrumental in the re-presentation of this privileged history. The re-enacted landing of the replica ship *Duyfken* in August 2000 was marked by an important shift in attitude for at least one of the leading protagonists in the event. In this respect, this particular re-enactment has offered some interesting ways of viewing history/ies in a postcolonial context and for appraising the concept of reconciliation. This essay considers three aspects of the re-enactment: the introduction of a historical discontinuity in Australian ‘race’ relations through the cultivation of a certain type of cultural intimacy during the journey; the (hi)story behind the re-enactment and some reflections on historiography; and, subsequently, an analysis of how the event of the landing could imply an expanded expression of reconciliation, potentially freeing it from its current constraints.

**Discontinuity: Duyfken as difference**

In 1606, the Dutch explorer Willem Jansz anchored the *Duyfken* (Little Dove) near the mouth of the Pennefather River on the western side of Cape York Peninsula. But as Lionel Fogarty points out, Jansz and his twenty-odd crew members were not the first travellers to arrive here. The Torres Strait Islanders had already established trading relationships with the local Aboriginal people of the region, and the Macassans with people further west. Even so, the Dutch were the first documented Europeans to have set foot on mainland Australia and, unfortunately, the resulting encounter with the local people seems to have set a precedent for almost all subsequent landings during this exploratory period of European expansionism. This first encounter ended in the deaths of nine of the Dutch landing party and in more than a few of the local people. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Cape Keerweer, 180 kilometres further south, translates as Cape Turn Around. With the landing of the *Duyfken* replica at Pennefather River, there was a corresponding effort to ‘turn around’ the feelings filtered down through such a history and, although largely unintentional in its official capacity, this event was nonetheless an important contemporary expression of the national discourse of reconciliation. The captain of the *Duyfken*, Peter Manthorpe, an Australian sailor and adventurer, sailed the replica for the ‘Chevron 2000’ expedition with a core crew of nine. Beginning the overall journey from Fremantle to Brisbane, they set sail from Fremantle up to Banda, Indonesia, in readiness for the re-enactment of the original ship’s journey to mainland Australia.

Of particular interest to our analysis of the re-enactment are some of the participants’ feelings associated with this purposeful intercultural meeting and the dialogues arising from such a historically mimetic experience. In contrast to traditional conceptualisations
of mimicry as ‘childish’ imitations by the ‘primitive’, Michael Taussig describes it as an important process usually shared by both sides of any cultural encounter. He suggests that ‘[c]olonial history … must be understood as spiritual politics in which image-power is an exceedingly valuable resource’. In this respect, the re-enactment, centred upon the powerful image of the replica *Duyfken*, serves as a potent reminder of European colonialism and the ‘spiritual politics’ that resulted from the poor outcome of the original meeting. For this reason, Peter Manthorpe explains that his interest is not only in the ‘experimental archaeology’ of early sailing technologies but also in the opportunity for cultural interaction, so that ‘this expedition might provide a focus for some very valuable discourse about Australia’s international relationships in the past … and help us better understand cultural difference in our region and in Australia’.7

We propose that the *Duyfken* re-enactment introduces a difference, a discontinuity, into the spiritual politics of our colonial history. In this respect, our analysis draws from Foucauldian historiography, which considers historical change primarily in terms of discontinuity, or rather in terms of a society’s continuous ‘exit’ from preceding configurations of social reality and the truths it holds to be self-evident.8 Our primary interest here, however, is Foucault’s suggestion that this process of historical transformation takes place through the critical practice of a determining *attitude*, which is presented by Foucault as ‘a task and an obligation’, such that ‘each individual is responsible in a certain way for that overall process’.9 He defines ‘attitude’ as follows:
a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way too of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos.10

An attitude, in this sense, is defined and materialised in a community of practice with others through collective actions and behaviours, and modes of feeling, thought and belonging. These are asserted against previous and alternative ways of being in the world and are embodied in the institutional structures of a society.

This conceptual apparatus foregrounds individual and collective agency in processes of social transformation. Social actors bring about particular actualisations of the present, in community with others, by adopting particular forms of sociability, or social disposition, which then structure social relations and become reflected in social practice. The attitude both constitutes this sociability, or form of belonging, and is itself constituted by it, in a double take that traces the movement between a disposition and its actualisation, each existing only in relation to the other. Accordingly, the progression of history is a reconstructive task, which is presented by Foucault as an ethical duty, realisable only in community. This is the reconstruction of the present on alternative foundations.

The Duyfken re-enactment introduces a difference into the social imaginary of contemporary Australia, which is significant precisely because the social imaginary is ‘constitutive of, not merely reflective of, the forms of sociability in which we live’.11 Furthermore, it can be understood as an event that contributes to reconciliation, since it brings about a collective attitude change and introduces a different set of practices and responsibilities, a different set of social tasks to perform as part of one’s obligation to belong. Insofar as these attitudes and practices are sympathetic to postcolony modes of social relations, they point to an alternative foundation for the construction of a postcolonial present.

This kind of approach prompts the questions: How were the local people encountered the second time around? And what emotions on both sides of the encounter were still tainted by the historical legacy of the original contact? Clearly, at the time of the original encounter both sides would have felt a sense of apprehension, and these feelings of apprehension still exist today. Mark Galliford recalls an incident that happened while travelling to Cape York in 1997 when he became lost in the back streets of Cairns:

When I asked a man watering his front lawn for directions, he inquired about my destination. On hearing that I was headed north ‘as far as I can go’, he replied with an air of knowing alarm that I had better beware of the blackfellas up that way. ‘You be careful’, he
commented, ‘they’re still wild up there. They still carry spears with them!’ My own reticence in heading up there had very little to do with ‘wild’ blackfellas and more to do with traveling in such country on an outdated motorbike.

Still, this man’s suburban wisdom appeared to draw on a local history of colonial encounters with Indigenous populations, such as those involving the explorers Mitchell, Leichhardt and Kennedy, and pastoralists, including the Jardine brothers. These meetings usually resulted in people dying and etched a feeling of mistrust on the social memory of the people of the area. Therefore, as Chris Healy writes in his book on social memory, there is a need to think ‘historiographically about history as re-interpreting, re-membering, re-arranging, and transforming apprehensions of the past’.13

In the context of the 1988 Bicentennial celebrations, Healy claims that ‘our history began as a journey, our history is that journey’.14 Indeed, for many non-Aboriginal Australians, the process of identity construction was initiated in 1788 with the journey of the First Fleet. The expeditions sometimes fatally undertaken by explorers opening up the land have also added to the iconic value of journeying as a formative part of masculine, white Australia’s colonial history. It is the encounters when journeying that are the raw material of adventure. New faces in new places offer explorers the chance of being unsettled, at the cutting edge of thinking and existence: encounters offer a creative space of becoming, pretending and acting, and perhaps even unravelling or death.15 Among the stories of expedition in Australia, encounters between explorers and Indigenous populations have aroused the most intense curiosity about the unknown and the uncertain.

Stephen Muecke, in a (poetically licensed) conversation in the front bar of some country hotel, suggests that these moments of encounter produce ‘dynamic slippages of identity and the intense need that people have to assert their sense of self’, raucously concluding that ‘[b]asically they get excited and want to f**k!’16 The problem of the first Duykhen encounter, after all, appears to centre on a masculine dispute over a young woman, and in this case the ‘people’ who are asserting their sense of self are clearly male-identified. Feminist historians have been critical of interpretations of colonialism that posit women as passive tokens in colonial transactions between men, arguing that this kind of approach elides women’s historical agency. Even so, the dominant history of Australian colonisation, written by the ‘victors’, is inevitably also a gendered history. It presents the colonial frontier as a masculine space, in which assertions of sovereign authority combine with assertions of dominant, masculine identity. Thus, while we do not wish to silence women’s historical agency, we acknowledge that the fact of male dominance, not only in writing the dominant version of history but also in producing it, posits women as a support in the struggle to establish authority in
the colonial period. In this respect, both Aboriginal and European women occupy an
interstitial, political space between Indigineous men and male colonisers. For our discussion
here, however, it is sufficient to note that Aboriginal women were occasionally ‘loaned’ to
European men as part of establishing reciprocal relationships of obligation, and were very
often forcefully abducted by European men.

As the original Duyfken’s log did not survive, there is no way of knowing for certain whether
the dispute over women was the exact reason for the trouble experienced on the landing,
although it is the most often cited explanation. A local of the Cape Keerweer region, Silas
Wolmby, recounts: ‘It started with a girl … Oh, she was a fine looking woman. She must
have been, eh. The more beautiful the woman the bigger the fight. And this was a big, big
fight.’17 James Henderson quotes another local, Francis Yunkaporta, as saying: ‘[the
Aboriginal people] found that there were a couple of girls taken away by the Dutch. And
that’s where the argument started. They said, oh well, those girls never been found, they
must be on the ship. This was not behaviour, you know, er, it was misbehaviour with those
people.’18 It appears, then, that on this particular journey, both the Dutch sailors and the
local men asserted themselves in their intercultural encounter without much success.
The ‘spiritual politics’ of this meeting would need another four hundred years to find a more
positive expression.

Because the story of the original Duyfken hinges on a sexualised drama, it gives rise to
thoughts about intimate engagements. Although the sexual or romantic content of the story
may be interesting in itself, the notion of intimacy between cultures is of primary import-
ance here. We will argue that ethical forms of cultural intimacy, along with different ways of
viewing history, are essential if the reconciliation process is to be successful in this country.
The journey of the Duyfken replica to Cape York in August 2000 initiated cultural encounters
that eventually became intimate and satisfying for some of the participants. The replica
Duyfken stopped at all the major ports along the Western Australian coast on the way to
Banda, and also at ports in Indonesia, and the encounters experienced by the crew inevitably
marked the journey with an intimacy born from engagement. Peter Manthorpe’s own personal
journey during the re-enactment had a profound effect on him, and his reconstruction of
the landing also had a significant impact on the people present, especially on some of the
locals.

Before the Duyfken experience, Peter had only limited contact with Aboriginal people,
mainly as acquaintances momentarily encountered at social events. The landing at Penne-
father River and the subsequent trip down to Cape Keerweer produced contact of a very dif-
f erent order and intensity. Before leaving Fremantle, Peter was given a message stick by some
local Nyoongah people to offer the local people on arrival at Pennfather River. On it was a
simple message: ‘May we whiteman walk upon your ground? Yes. No.’ Peter had kept the
message stick in his cabin during the journey and had reflected on its significance. On 9 August, the Duyfken replica was anchored offshore from the mouth of the Pennefather River, where a large party of Aboriginal people and other dignitaries had gathered, as pre-arranged by the Duyfken Foundation. After eight thousand kilometres and four months at sea, the moment to step ashore had arrived, like it had almost four hundred years previously.

After paddling a small Bandanese canoe from the ship to the landing site, Peter and two others of the crew waited in the shallows for the signal to come ashore. Although he was unsure of its historical significance, Peter complied with a request to bring a white flag with him, because he felt such a gesture clearly demonstrated ‘overtones of humility that I find entirely appropriate, since it is our intention not to set foot ashore until we have gained permission to do so from the land’s traditional owners’.19 Three women on the beach started a chant that meant the sailors had survived, and a Yupungutti man walked towards them with a spear, signalling them to come up. Peter planted the flag into the sand and the local man pushed the spear in next to it, then scooped up some handfuls of water and poured them over Peter. Three shell necklaces were placed around Peter’s neck, and one of the women stated: ‘This means you are welcome here, and you can come back anytime’.20 With this welcome, Peter made the following short speech:

In every port we have been to, every place we have landed, we have used the same maritime protocol that has been used for centuries. We have asked permission to come ashore. This is a protocol that I am sorry to say has been ignored far too many times by colonial powers in the past. So it’s a great privilege now for me to be able to do this thing and show the respect that is due to the traditional owners.21

The question on the Nyoongah message stick was then asked: ‘May we whiteman walk upon your ground?’ Peter was taken to a tent where three elderly women were sitting, and he handed the stick over to them. In return, they gave Peter a plaque of ironwood and shells, which read ‘Coen River, 2000’ (the former name for the Pennefather River). Peter asked the question again. Silence. In this space, Peter remembers thinking that, after such a journey, he could have waited patiently all day for a response, whereas some of the dignitaries were shuffling about and growing more restless as time wore on. Someone in the crowd then prompted: ‘It’s a question. Yes or no?’ And finally one of the women replied: ‘Oh, yes, you’re welcome to walk our ground. You’re very welcome.’ Speeches were made by important blackfellas and whitefellas, including the Queensland premier. Singing and dancing and more speeches followed, until eventually the gathering became an informal occasion of social mingling and interviewing. Whitefella dignitaries returned to their waiting helicopters to fly back out. Peter remembers the landing and welcome as being one of the most emotionally
poignant moments he has ever experienced. He reflected upon the fact that while the Dutch probably sailed away disappointed, for himself and the other crew of the replica, ‘that would already be impossible’.22

The issue of cultural responsibility in re-enactments first troubled Peter while working on the replica Bounty during the First Fleet event. He had heard how an Aboriginal woman had protested in Portsmouth, England, when some whitefellas handed over an Aboriginal flag and didgeridoo to the Fleet commodore. As she was led away by police, the woman loudly enquired, ‘Who gave them permission?’23 Learning of this event was the beginning of a political awakening for Peter, which led to his ethical and cultural sensitivity during the Duyfken event.

The 1938 Sesquicentennial re-enactment of the First Fleet’s landing was accompanied by the protest of Indigenous peoples meeting in Sydney to declare Australia Day as a day of mourning.24 But this critical Indigenous ‘participation’ in the events was largely overshadowed by the broader ceremony, for which ‘a group of Aborigines were kidnapped from near Menindee, held captive for a week, and forced to play ‘their’ part in the Sydney proceedings’ as the about-to-be-usurped primitive Other.25 By contrast, the 1988 Bicentennial re-enactment of the landing at Farm Cove was marked by a far more visible protest. A large number of Aboriginal people from all over Australia and a significant contingent of whitefella supporters demonstrated their mutual discontent with two hundred years of badly handled occupation. Peter recalls that throughout this re-enactment he was ‘completely politically naive’, being just a sailor and having ‘a really good time … celebrating our history’ (our emphasis). During the ship’s landing at Cape Town, South Africa, he started to become keenly aware of the politics involved. Here, one of the crew, a Jamaican man, was given the status of ‘honorary whiteman’, which was written into his passport. For Peter, this kind of overt colonialist racism began to overshadow the re-enactment, and he realised that the decision to fly the Aboriginal flag on one of the tall ship’s masts in an effort to ‘placate the Aboriginal people’ was yet ‘another piece of imperialism’, and another example of the whole affair being ‘insensitively’ managed.26

The ‘Chevron 2000’ event was also met with some protest, mainly conducted through the local media. In a letter to the Weipa Bulletin, ‘Descendants of … those who died fighting’ compared the event with a hypothetical scenario of a mass murderer showing off to the victims’ families the weapon used in the massacre.27 The letter suggests that the Queensland government could better support the cause of reconciliation by helping the local people put in place ‘a plaque of remembrance to the first defenders of this great country and state!’ The letter also suggests that the participation of other local people in the re-enactment would simply satisfy their own sense of self-importance. It ends on a cautionary note: ‘Anyway, you mob better do all them ceremonies properly because, them dreaming stories, old peoples
spirit and Chivirri’s spirit is proper strong you know. “Trelim” was spilt on the beach area, walk carefully!

Despite these initial concerns, the landing of the Duyfken replica succeeded in redressing what we can safely assume was an attitude of imperialist arrogance, enacted by the Dutch four hundred years earlier. Considering the historical significance of this first documented landing of Europeans on mainland Australia, the replica also played its part as an important contemporary expression of reconciliation. Permission was asked, humility shown and, instead of fear and apprehension, singing and dancing and good ‘spiritual politics’ resulted. The trip to Cape Keerweer, in the days following the landing, would revisit the scene of the trouble experienced by the original Duyfken crew and the local people, and here other stories and spirits would be revivified. The way history is locally remembered and some of its contemporary relevance would also be revealed.

— (Hi)stories

The present is now that we are living. The future is looking forward. We must not think about the past. Sometimes it’s a story to tell our kids what happened. But not all the time.
The past is back. Many of us feel terrible about the past but I think it’s best that we forget it. [And later] I cried inside—for the first time these people are honoured with (the request to land). Everything we did today was thrilling.28

With these words, traditional elder Ina Hall received the loudest applause at the Pennefather River welcoming ceremony. Although Ina recommends that ‘we forget it’, she still acknowledges that the Duyfken is a story to tell the kids. According to Henderson, Francis Yunkaporta also acknowledged the importance of the Duyfken to the histories of the area. He responded to some local people who were saying: “What about the Dutch, forget it.” Well, we won’t say let’s forget about the Dutch, but we might say we can forgive. Not forget, otherwise we won’t carry on the Dutch history.29 These two examples illustrate some views of local Aboriginal people on the historiographical aspects of both versions of the Duyfken.

The re-enactment of the landing was essentially an unscripted event that allowed Peter to muse and, in turn, to act on the political meanings of his previous experience with replicas. Peter suggests that ‘[p]erhaps the Duyfken has less to do with the past than she has to do with the present. Perhaps the most important function of the Duyfken is to provide a space where we can negotiate our contemporary relationship with the past.’30 In this respect the voyage could hardly be called a re-enactment, as the literal sense of this word would have demanded that people were speared, shot and kidnapped. The journey and landing in 2000 were not only a retracing of events but also, and more important, a retelling of past stories.
Prior to commencing the replica’s journey Peter had given an address at Fremantle’s Notre Dame University, in which he questioned the ethical role of the *Duyfken* in the process of historical revision, harking back to the lesson of cultural responsibility he had learnt during his involvement with the 1988 First Fleet re-enactment. According to Peter’s reading of Baudrillard, what he had been involved in was quite possibly an immoral simulacrum, replacing the original event of the First Fleet voyage and thereby erasing it. This, in turn, raised doubts concerning the *Duyfken* re-enactment:

Building a replica of the *Duyfken* would be immoral ... because it actually disguises the *Duyfken* of 1606 by substituting it with a contemporary image. We can no longer think of the 1606 *Duyfken* without picturing the contemporary version which we have all seen but which is not the original because the original is inaccessible. Conducting a reenactment of the *Duyfken*’s voyage of discovery would be immoral because it pretends to revisit the past and to relive it, but what is being enacted is actually a version of the past conducted by present day agents with present day political perspectives and agendas. These images of the past, according to Baudrillard, do more than simply mask the reality of the past. They contribute to the annihilation of the past reality altogether.31

A few days after the ceremony at Pennefather River, the *Duyfken* replica picked up Silas Wolmby and his brother at Weipa, along with the artist Thancoupie and journalist John van Tiggeelen, for the trip down to Cape Keerweer. As an elder closely associated with the area, Silas is a custodian of the stories of this place, and he spent a day walking the ground and showing Peter around. At Cape Keerweer, there is little of obvious significance. There is a rivermouth, dangerous shoals for the navigation of seacraft, a fishing camp and certain landmarks, such as wells, which still invoke stories of the spiritual politics that occurred there in 1606. Yet, it is the site of Australia’s first recorded conflict between European and Indigenous people. As previously mentioned, the *Duyfken* story is often recounted as a romanticised tragedy. According to Silas, the story is centred on an Aboriginal woman and one of the Dutch sailors falling in love. Peter spent a full day at Cape Keerweer following Silas about and remembers that concentrating on what Silas was telling him as one of the most tiring things he had ever done. Given the difficulties Peter faced in transcribing the stories,32 the following is a very shortened version of that told by Silas:

The blackfellas, they were all watching from the trees over there. The Dutchies didn’t know the language so they made signs with their hands: ‘Water, water.’

They must have had that fight back that way (back towards the trees on the other side of the river). That girl, she really wanted that Dutchie. He must have been a young fella. That girl was a nice, beautiful girl. She had hair down to here (right down her back) and she
had breasts and she was really beautiful. The Dutch fella turned around all of a sudden and there's this beautiful girl. The first time he turned he didn't see anything. Then he looked and saw her. She looked … that was enough.

That silly old fella my grandfather (i.e., ancestor) he hit him in the back of the neck. Maybe he is angry. Maybe he wants her for his wife, I don't know. Maybe he doesn't want the Dutchie taking the women-folk.

That silly old fella he speared one fella. Then there were gunshots from the Dutchies: 'boom boom boom boom.' Then he tells the blackfellas: 'You go and kill them all.' They have to obey him. After the gunshots he says: 'You have to go and burn that boat.' The blackfellas killed nine of those Dutchies.33

During the retelling of this story, Peter was somewhat confused, not only by the details from other stories that were also being told, but also by how Silas knew such details as how the girl looked. After all, the events had taken place almost four hundred years ago. At times, Peter recalls, he did not know whether Silas was talking about something that happened twenty years ago or four hundred years ago. Gradually, Peter realised that Silas was also telling stories from his own life, and he gained the impression that all these were being woven together, each story informing the other. Silas had fallen in love with a Scottish woman and had asked the missionary at the time to marry them. The missionary refused and the couple eloped to an island in the Torres Strait. A common theme of forbidden love apparently tied the separate stories together. Peter also remarked that, on the day, Silas had often repeated that he was not telling Peter two different stories about the Duyfken; he was in fact relating the same story, claiming 'the story about the Duyfken arriving four hundred years ago is the same story as you arriving here and us talking'.34

Reflecting on the day at Cape Keerweer, 'the relevance of that started to sink in' for Peter as he began 'to have a really brief glimpse of an understanding of about how [Silas] thought about those stories—it wasn't this factual account that has to be perfectly accurate—what's the use of that?' Instead, the truth-effects of history were put up for review, since 'the whole reason for telling a story about something that happened in the past is its relevance in the present or in your own life and vice versa'.35

Greg Dening is sympathetic to this type of historiography, which recognises that 'any question worth asking about the past is ultimately about the present'.36 As Muecke points out, the relevance of the story for the listener is also important:

The idea of a story making a statement implies contingency, singularity and rarity, because the story is responding to the real experience of the narrator, and is designed to make that experience relevant to the listener in the circumstances of telling. The story has the 'point'
of relating what ‘they were doing then’ to what ‘we are doing now’, not with a locked-in determinism, but with the ‘room for manoeuvre’ that encourages the play of interpretation in the enchanted mind of the listener.37

Henderson, a modern historian of the original Duuyken, had queried the version told by Silas because it conflicted with an account told to him by the previous two custodians of the story, who had both since died.38 Peter suggested that the difference is one of cultural significance, in that Henderson ‘was thinking about those stories as a historian whereas for Silas it wasn’t history, a story from the past, but a living relevance’.39 In a similar sense, Peter remarked that the uncertainty about how the replica journey would turn out made it ‘every bit as much a voyage of discovery as the one back in 1606’.40 He further suggests that this was probably one reason why the local people involved with the re-enactment had ‘liked the idea of our re-enactment so much. They understand better than we do what we are up to. We are re-telling an old story, keeping it alive by living it, but at the same time making it a story of our own, of our own time’.41

In his writings on philosophical method, Foucault outlines a similar form of critical practice that addresses itself to the present moment.42 The primary task of the critical philosopher is to problematise the events that characterise the present, in order to conduct a form of reflection that attends to the manner in which the present has been actualised. Such critique addresses itself to the determining conditions of existence and produces ‘an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the present’,43 which Foucault argues is instrumental in the production of potentially transformative lines of thought and practice:

The problem is no longer one of tradition, of tracing a line, but one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting foundations, but one of transformations that serve as new foundations, the rebuilding of foundations.44

Linda Martín Alcoff also considers the epistemology behind this sort of conceptualisation of history. She quotes philosopher of science Hilary Putnam in her attempt to represent truth/history as multiple and shifting: ‘The differences between fitting a version to a world, a world to a version, and a version together or to other versions fade when the role of versions in making the worlds they fit is recognized.45 This approach to history, repetition and difference offers an alternative to Peter’s initially worried interpretation of the Duuyken replica’s status as a Baudrillardian simulacrum. The replica ends up as just another version of the story, a new version, which learns something valuable from history—from all the preceding stories. After all, ‘[t]here would be no point re-enacting an event from the past unless we can learn from it how to do things better’.46
The variety and importance of the *Duyfken* story continues to be relevant in the construction of local histories. To some extent, it is paralleled with the better known example of Captain James Cook. For some Aboriginal people, the iconic value of Captain Cook supersedes the importance attached to the founding of an Australian colony by the First Fleet. Like whitefellas, these people have given Cook something of an ironic cult status, celebrating him as the ‘discoverer’ of Australia, even at times incorporating him into Dreaming schema of story and song. For example, speaking for the Rembarrnga people, Paddy Wainburraga states:

Captain Cook was around during the time of Satan. Everybody knows Captain Cook. Old people, not young people. You’ve got to have a lot of learning to know Captain Cook. More culture. Because I know from this song, I can sing it now for this bark painting. This is the way his song goes … Captain Cook came from Mosquito Island, which is east of New Guinea. He came with his two wives, a donkey and a nanny goat.47

A fight between Captain Cook and Satan eventuates, in which Cook comes out as the victor. The story ends with Cook being speared by his own people on Mosquito Island and returning to Sydney Harbour to die.

Francis Yunkaporta also used Cook as a reference point to describe the original *Duyfken* landing as an earlier event: ‘Captain Cook wasn’t here. Oh yes, Captain Cook was not on this west coast; all we know is he was doin’ the eastern coast.’48 In a comment that might easily refer to the *Duyfken* histories, Healy suggests:

In many of these histories, Cooks (and there are a number of Cooks) are, not surprisingly, figures of discontinuity. In contrast to non-Aboriginal histories, I suggest that Aboriginal histories of Cook deploy a much less ossified sense of social memory. These histories are concerned with the place of history-making, with the ethical dilemmas bequeathed by the past. These histories seem closer to the spirit of social memory in caring about the importance of being able to live with, rather than simply accumulate knowledge about, the past in the present.49

We have seen how Peter had to confront this issue of history-making and dealing with ‘ethical dilemmas bequeathed by the past’ in his own representation of Silas’ *Duyfken* story (see note 33). The issue of how historical events are transmogrified to have relevance in the present is also illustrated in Paddy Wainburraga’s story. Here the ultimate concern is not so much with Cook himself as it is with the ‘New Captain Cook people’ who ‘started thinking they could make Captain Cook another way … They started shooting people then. New Captain Cook people … All the Captain Cook mob came and called themselves “welfare mob”. They were new people now. They wanted to take all of Australia.’50
The idea that history has continuing relevance in the present draws our attention to the political nature of history-telling and history-making. Dening’s work on the voyage of the *Bounty* and the re-presentation of this history through film and other media demonstrates how re-enactment can preserve and consolidate colonial attitudes, beliefs and structures of relationship towards indigenous peoples. However, the re-enactment of colonial encounters can also offer alternative possibilities for historical agency, since it opens up a space for the revision and reconstruction of events in ways that respond to contemporary and post-imperial political and ethical perspectives. The potential for creative transformation arising through revision and critical opposition is summed up well by Meaghan Morris writing on the First Fleet re-enactment:

The 1988 protest showed that precedents, like simulacra and scripts, can be destroyed as well as revised. Aborigines had already changed the Re-enactment’s significance by proclaiming a Year of Mourning—and by making a Landing impossible. So proceedings began in open admission that the ceremony was not a ‘factual’ mimicry of the past, but a political event in the present. Once the basic premise had been altered, the ceremonial ‘present’ became, for the official script on the day, a field of suspense and evasion. Speech after speech from the dais skipped hastily from ‘the mistakes of the past’ to expressions of faith ‘in the future’. The significant present was elsewhere: with people lying in the sun, having picnics, watching boats and milling about, but above all with the insistent critical accompaniment of the Aboriginal protest. Audible and visible in most telecasts on the day, extending later into media commentary, news items, current affairs shows, and the television archive of future Aboriginal images—that protest effectively historicised, on Aboriginal terms, an entrepreneurial ‘national’ event.  

As a significant event in the reinforcement of whitefellas’ own precarious sense of nationhood, the Bicentennial First Fleet re-enactment entered history in a new form, or at least as a story that will always be remembered by whitefellas as a decidedly deflated, g(ul)t-edged celebration.

The crucial point is that historical re-enactments always have the potential to manipulate or reterritorialise dominant versions of history, resulting in the ossification of white Australia’s social memory. The representation of historical/colonial events is always a political act, which can work to fortify or to challenge white Australia’s sense of national ownership. The act of re-presenting history, particularly in contemporary and would-be post-imperial society, is therefore bound up with issues of responsibility and cultural sensitivity. Peter states that the replica *Duyfken*:
can be whatever we want. If we wanted her to be a powerful propaganda tool for some political purpose it would be an easy matter since we know she will have a high profile in the media. If, on the other hand, we want to use her as the centrepiece of a forum for reflectively investigating aspects of the current state of the world, we can do that just as easily.\footnote{52}

The original Duyfken went on to defend the Dutch East India Company’s economic and colonial interests around present-day Indonesia, engaging in battles with Portuguese armadas. We suggest that the modern Duyfken ironically operates as a very different type of warship, insular as it is an example of the ‘war-machine’ figured in Deleuze and Guattari’s critical philosophy. Their war-machine has no direct connection to war, but operates as a tool of resistance in a ‘conceptual politics’, forcing a shift in established perceptions of reality and the entrenched practices that institutionalise them.\footnote{53} The war-machine destroys, or ‘deterrioralises’, existing structures of thought and practice in order to create new conceptual territories, which might act as alternative foundations for the building of new forms of thought and new kinds of practice. Accordingly, Paul Patton prefers to call the war-machine a ‘metamorphosis machine’, because of its effects of transformation.\footnote{54}

The Bicentennial re-enactment is best seen as a lost opportunity for reconciliation, but serves as a good example of the state’s reterritorialisation of history and colonial sovereignty, even in the face of the mass opposition it encountered. The Duyfken event, however, opened up another space for the transformation of settler Australian social memory through the deterritorialisation of history and the re-interpretation of stories of pronounced intercultural importance. In this sense, the Duyfken serves as a critical tool of revision and opposition, allowing for a renewed and heightened recognition of Aboriginal lands, stories and etiquettes. For Aboriginal people associated with Cape Keerweer, and for Peter and others associated with the replica, reconstructing history is a critical and ethical task, which potentially lends itself to the process of reconciliation. As a local commented upon the story of the Duyfken: ‘This is an old story, but it’s new today’.\footnote{55}

— Reconciliation

Having initially ‘crept into the agenda’,\footnote{56} reconciliation came to play a central role in the re-enactment of the Duyfken replica.\footnote{57} The acceptance of Chevron’s proposal to pipe oil from New Guinea down the Queensland coast was aided by the public-relations coup of the Duyfken replica’s journey, especially since their commitment to reconciliation had coincidentally been made public. This was extremely important to Chevron at the time, as their pipeline was to cross through a number of land-claim areas. However, within Australia, reconciliation
as a national policy is in danger of becoming simply tokenistic, accompanied by very little political acknowledgement or government action. Prime Minister John Howard describes the current Liberal government’s strategy as ‘Practical Reconciliation’:

National reconciliation … calls for practical policy-making that effectively addresses current indigenous disadvantage particularly in areas such as employment, health, education and housing … My vision is of all Australians working together under one set of laws to which all are accountable and from which all are entitled to an equal dispensation of justice.  

This is essentially a revitalisation of policies framed by an agenda of assimilation. It seeks only to redress structural disadvantage by increasing Indigenous participation in the existing system to access basic civil equality, and is indicative of the federal government’s uninterest in questioning the structure itself to better recognise the special rights and desires claimed by Aboriginal people. These include the desire for an official apology to the stolen generations (and for past wrongs in general), for the continued development of Native title (Wik) legislation and for the establishment of a constitutional treaty. To date, these desires have remained unsatisfied, to the disappointment and alarm of many social-justice advocates. Indeed, the Howard government’s own Race Discrimination Commissioner, William Jonas, has recently called for a Senate inquiry into the lack of interest and action shown by the government in regards to reconciliation.

For some Aboriginal people, reconciliation is seen to be just another whitefella construct, perhaps aimed at assuaging a sense of national guilt without really addressing what Aboriginal people themselves want, whatever that may be in its local context. This is borne out in an observation by Gillian Cowlishaw, who notes that ‘the current “reconciliation” policy means many different things, and nothing at all to the Bulman mob [in Arnhem Land]. On the national stage it is subordinated to the divisive politics of the late 1990s.’ Ralph Folds takes a similar view, and also implicitly criticises the assimilationist desires of the present government:

Much current reconciliation theory also embraces the palatable idea of ‘two way’, couched not just in terms of overriding concern for indigenous inequality, but also a belief that their culture ‘should be recognised as an integral and distinctive part of the nation’s life and heritage’ (Social Justice for Indigenous Australians, 1991–92). Like so many attempts to define progress in indigenous societies, reconciliation is right for its western audience, its contradictions invisible behind a veil of taken-for-granted ideals. According to this theory of reconciliation, all will be well between the societies once every indigenous group achieves
equality, while also retaining all of their own cultural imperatives. How such a mind-boggling proposition of incompatible aims is to be implemented is not elaborated by its enthusiastic architects.\textsuperscript{61}

While we share these misgivings, we remain convinced that reconciliation is crucial if Australia is to become a socially and politically just society that can move forward with confidence as a pragmatically postcolonial nation. As historian Henry Reynolds comments, reconciliation is about ‘making a difference’.\textsuperscript{62} We find ourselves at the disjuncture between our colonial past and a possible postcolonial future. We have seen how Foucault has suggested that such moments of historical discontinuity pose the question: ‘What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday?’\textsuperscript{63} As an ‘exit’ from the problematic situation described by the continuing colonisation of Indigenous Australians upon their own territories, reconciliation requires the institution of a different kind of social and political practice. The success of the reconciliation process depends on how we interpret this necessary ‘difference’: what kind of difference do we need to make? Is it enough for Indigenous peoples to increase participation in existing institutions, thereby forcing the existing system to accommodate a difference in degree?

While the current government apparently believes that ‘Practical Reconciliation’ is achievable within a basic framework of assimilation, we suggest that reconciliation requires not only the institution of a different kind of political practice altogether, but also a different kind of spiritual politics. The Mabo judgment introduced a ‘difference’ into our contemporary legal and political systems through the rejection of the principle of \textit{terra nullius}. For this reason, it has been suggested that Mabo has implications for Australian constitutionalism, along with contemporary forms of sociability and the attitudes they embody, which is precisely why Mabo is so significant in discourses on reconciliation.\textsuperscript{64} We have likewise suggested that the Duyfken re-enactment is an example of a kind of cultural engagement that introduces a difference into the social memory and imaginary of the Australian community, instigating a shift in spiritual politics through the critical practice of an alternative, postcolonial attitude of relation. If reconciliation is to make a significantly postcolonial difference, this new attitude must inaugurate appropriate social forms, which can, in turn, reflect and support a postcolonial mode of belonging and identification.

\textit{Terra nullius} was imposed by the colonial British state apparatus as a constitutional principle, which became actualised as a ‘single and clearly ordered system of institutions and laws’.\textsuperscript{65} The materialisation of these structures took place through an attitude which itself embodied the assumptions of \textit{terra nullius} and reproduced them in the form of colonial social relations. \textit{Terra nullius} informs a colonial attitude, which Irene Watson refers to as a ‘demon spirit’, a \textit{muldarbi}.\textsuperscript{66} Characterised by its ‘erasure of the indigenous being’ and its ‘ability
through force to dominant [sic] all that is different or fails to conform to those who hold power',
this muldarbi certainly does not position individuals according to forms of sociability that might be thought of as ‘postcolonial’. If reconciliation requires the practical rejection of terra nullius, then Australian society must responsibly reject the colonial attitude, the muldarbi that reflects the principle of terra nullius and embodies it in the collective forms of colonial social practice.

Furthermore, it would seem that reconciliation requires the public substitution of an alternative, postcolonial attitude that does situate individuals in a relation of belonging, and which is suited to the task of constituting a postcolonial sociability that caters to the demands of mutual cultural recognition. Reconciliation therefore suggests an opportunity to begin what Foucault describes as a ‘new mode of relating to contemporary reality’, to live according to a postcolonial attitude or ethos. The questions remain: What is a ‘postcolonial’ attitude? And what form of attitude might define Australian society as ‘postcolonial’?

We suggest that a postcolonial attitude or stance is identified partly through its opposition to the ‘empire of uniformity’ that characterises modern nationalism as the exclusion or assimilation of cultural diversity to a dominant, normative culture.68 Indeed, we agree with the Canadian James Tully that the creation of an appropriately ‘post-imperial’ spirit requires a ‘world reversal, from a habitual imperial stance, where one’s own customary forms of reflection set the terms of the discussion, to a genuinely intercultural popular sovereignty where each listens to the voices of the others in their own terms’.69 This suggests a shift away from colonial processes and practices of capture, imposition of homogeneity and exclusion of contesting difference, towards the postcolonial recognition of multiplicity in its variable forms of expression.70

Insofar as Watson’s depiction of the muldarbi terra nullius describes these characteristically colonial activities, reconciliation suggests the practice of an oppositional attitude, which might be characterised in terms of a ‘listening respect’, or mewe:cell:in.71 The approach suggested by this alternative, postcolonial attitude is one of openness and empathy, requiring of the participants a ‘civic ability to see their association from multiple viewpoints’. It also involves a willingness to question, contest and renegotiate one’s cultural identity, with the result that the association itself ‘becomes’, in an ‘endless series of contracts and agreements, reached by periodical intercultural dialogue’.72

We have been arguing that reconciliation offers us a moment of discontinuity, a ‘way out’ of our racist and colonial history, that can be conceptualised both as a contextualising social process and as a chosen practice of a postcolonial attitude which social agents are responsible for performing.73 The Duyfken re-enactment can be read as an interruption to the legacy of the original landing. The first landing of the Duyfken began a hostile relationship between Europeans and the Indigenous community. This relationship was characterised
by practices of violence, based on a muldarbi attitude of disrespect, mistrust and the non-recognition of Indigenous authority. The re-enactment introduced an alternative foundation for the relationship, as the actors carefully practiced an approach of mewe:ell:in, listening respect. The protocol required to set the story right in terms of friendly relations was followed from the start. Permission was sought and given, traditional authority was deferred to and humility demonstrated. By acknowledging a responsibility for the history of poor cultural relations in Australia, and by sharing in redefining the character of cultural relations through practical engagement with Indigenous participants, the recent journey of the Duyfken may also be read as an expression of the national journey of reconciliation.

We are now able to offer the skeleton of an outline to the question: ‘What is a postcolonial attitude?’ We suggest that this term describes the performance of an attitude of mewe:ell:in. This practice is asserted as a critical alternative to the muldarbi attitude of terra nullius and its associated practices and material structures that constitute colonialism. The performance of this attitude is a choice and a task undertaken by individuals in community with others. It is an attitude of relation, or sociability, which becomes sensible only in terms of collective participation. The interrelationships between individual attitudes and collective practice, agency and sociability deny any simple separation of the individual from the community, or any clear opposition between individual and collective freedoms. This means that individual performances of a postcolonial ethos become actualised as the collective phenomenon of postcolonial society: the institutions, structures and modes of discourse and thought that, in turn, make possible the public performance of a postcolonial ethos and provide the context for the postcolonial constitution of a national identity.

In particular, reconciliation draws attention to the relational aspects of selfhood, which emphasise the need to focus on the ethical dimension of national subject-formation with regard to the process of ‘othering’. According with Foucault’s conceptualisation of ‘attitude’, the postcolonial stance of ‘listening respect’ is firmly grounded in the relational practices of a community. The cultivation of an attitude of ‘listening respect’ begins a proper reconciliatory process in which participating cultural communities are open, respectful and sensitive to each other’s differences and apprehensions. By recognising the imperative for settler Australians to seek reconciliation and for Indigenous Australians to accept it, the contemporary expressions of dominance that have arisen from historical, colonial social memory and practices can begin to be transformed. The idea that reconciliation is a people/public-centred activity and attitude, rather than a distanced bureaucratic policy, once again brings us back to the theme of a transformative spiritual politics in which the need to cultivate a certain cultural intimacy is an integral part of the process.

Peter and the crew received special attention from Silas and his brother in preparation for the trip to Cape Keerweer, so they would be known as friends to the local spirits. Intimate
acts such as sharing body odour shaped the closeness of their relationship, which was further strengthened when Silas, on leaving the Duyfken on the way back past Weipa, hugged Peter and whispered in his ear: ‘Thank you for coming here, you are my son now’.75 Such a moment of intense intimacy not only filled Peter with a sense of pride, but also allowed cultural boundaries of identity to be crossed. Along similar lines to this, Henry Giroux has called for the construction of ‘a notion of border identity that challenges any essentialized notion of subjectivity while simultaneously demonstrating that the self as a historical and cultural formation is shaped in complex, related, and multiple ways through their interaction with numerous and diverse communities’.76

Marcia Langton considers this notion in relation to the Australian situation, arguing that ‘“Aboriginality” arises from the subjective experience of both Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal people who engage in any intercultural dialogue, whether in actual lived experience or through mediated experience’.77 This intersubjectivity is exactly that of the border identity. Mediating borderlines highlight the ‘space between’,78 the zones and territories of intersubjectivity. They also promise the permanent possibility of creating and transforming identity by critically shifting the alliances that constitute these spaces. Indeed, as already delineated in Muecke’s Australian treatment of Deleuze and Guattari’s method of ‘nomadology’,79 it is in the creative spaces between where identities meet that critical ‘nomadic’ forms of thought and practice can arise through the mutual becomings produced by the encounter.

The kind of transformative power reconciliation requires to have a truly postcolonial significance can also be theorised in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s complex philosophy of becoming.80 Offering an alternative ontology to that way of ‘being’, which operates to fix identity, becoming is part of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘political ontology … describ[ing] transformative, creative or deterritorialising forces and movements’. Becoming describes a process whereby any attempts to ‘capture’ or reterritorialise subjectivity is not simply resisted in a reactive response which only serves to reinforce that ‘territory’ but, more important, it allows for the ‘invention of new forms of subjectivity and new forms of connection between deterritorialised elements of the social field’.81 Becoming is concerned with affective alliances and is not a politics that reiterates homogeneous fields of identification, as ‘[w]hat is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes’.82

Although the concept of becoming applies to all subjectivities and all social entities, it is the ‘becoming-minor’ of the dominant culture that is most suggestive of a movement towards Australian postcoloniality. Here, ‘minority’ does not refer to small ‘minority groups’. Rather, it is a qualitative term indicating a position ‘which deviates from the majority or
standard which is the bearer of the dominant social code ... [and which] provides an element capable of deterritorialising the dominant social codes. Becoming-minor is the creative process that ‘runs between’ the subjectivities of majority and minority, and which, significantly:

involves the subjection of the standard [majority] to a process of continuous variation or deterritorialisation ... In contrast to much of what goes under the name of a politics of difference, Deleuze and Guattari’s political perspective is directed not at the installation of new constants or the attainment of majority status, but rather at the minoritarian-becoming of everyone, including the bearers of minority status. They are advocates of the transformative potential of becoming-minor, or becoming-revolutionary, against the normalising power of the majority.

Reconciliation is a ‘block’ of becoming that operates between ‘black’ and ‘white’ Australia. ‘Every becoming is a block of coexistence’, and if reconciliation is a becoming-minor, it offers both Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians an opportunity to redefine our modes of coexistence in ways that contest and transform the dominant culture and the colonial identifications it relies upon. Here, becoming-minor does not simply refer to the transformation of the identity of the dominant group of ‘settler Australians’. It necessarily involves the transformation of all subject identities that are supported by colonial culture. The transformation of relational identities is achieved by shifting their habits of coexistence, and we have been suggesting that the conscientious practice of a mutual ‘listening respect’ can help to usher in new postcolonial cultural relations, which in turn enable new kinds of identification. The result is that Australian culture itself becomes postcolonial, and postcolonialism is the minor position which contests and transforms the majority colonial culture.

The specific politics of a responsible ‘indigenous-becoming’ might also be required if settler Australians are to continue to engage in an ongoing process of decolonisation. Indigenous-becoming should not imply imitation or mimicry in the sense of appropriating Aboriginal cultural capital, as has been problematically experienced in arts circles over the past decade and in popular appropriations of Aboriginal imagery through mass media, whether to sell cars or sell Australia to overseas tourists: ‘Becoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying with something.’ Neither is it aligned to the symbolic appropriations of an idealised Aboriginality used to fill the ‘lack’ of settler Australian national identity, thereby providing a grounding ‘soul’ for the sense of alienation popularised by and for white nationalists in their colonial desire for a feeling of belonging. These are obvious reifications, or reterritorialisations, of an othering discourse that seeks only to capitalise on difference and on determinations of authenticity. Instead, indigenous-becoming requires white Australians to be open to the
development of alliances with Indigenous cultures, and vice-versa, thereby allowing for the initiation and further strengthening of kinship between communities. Indigenous-becoming creates reciprocal obligations between participants and acknowledges a continuous and developing relational Aboriginal presence/present, rather than constituting Aboriginality in terms of a detached and pure heritage.

In adopting this framework it is also possible to foresee a situation in which settler Australian cultural identity could work towards an affective, relational state of postcolonial ‘indigeneity’. No longer content to merely capture and claim ‘our Aborigines’ as an exotic part of the uniqueness of the Australian identity, an indigenous-becoming could help transform the yearning of Australian cultures, and particularly that of white Australians, into an attitude and feeling of their own belonging. To be ethically sensitive this requires an appropriate postcolonial engagement with actual Indigenous desires, spiritual politics and practical philosophies, on terms agreed to by all participants. Muecke has proposed that this project is of crucial importance to the development of Australia as a ‘post-nation’, or at least, initially, as a postcolonial nation. He suggests that white Australians can learn valuable lessons not only from Indigenous philosophies but also through the alternative outlook of a nomadological approach to life in general. ‘Nomadology’ is not to be confused with the popular understandings of a nomadic way of life as simply wandering about. It is best aligned with modes of thought and practice that are intimately aware of the contextualising physical, social and conceptual environments, and the movements of desire within them that continuously recreate or revitalise alliances and the connections they have to their surroundings. In other words, ‘The nomads live in these places, remain in these places, and make them grow themselves in the sense that one notices that they make the desert no less than they are made by it’. This is similar to what some Aboriginal people know as ‘growing up’ the country and their relatives—looking after yourself through looking after all others; the intrinsic lesson of coexistence.

The expression of the reconciliation process as an indigenous-becoming translates in practical terms into an ongoing and highly visible obligation for Australians to become intimate with the process of postcolonisation itself. In this process, all Australians need to learn how to grow themselves and the country in a relational becoming with ‘others’. This has been illustrated already by the formation of self-educating local-community reconciliation groups over the last decade, but it also demands that all political representatives have an intimate knowledge of and desire for the process. In this respect, former prime minister Paul Keating initiated a more intimate political engagement than had ever been previously experienced with his 1992 Redfern speech. We acknowledge that there has been much done in relation to indigenous-becoming over the last decade or so (greater recognition of Aboriginal place names, ‘welcomings to land’ initiating many public functions and the ‘Corroboree 2000’
convention are some examples). However, the process of becoming rests on and further requires the ongoing practice and cultivation of the appropriate *new:cl:in* attitude, previously elaborated, and the kinds of cultural intimacy and respect that were embodied in the *Duyfken* re-encounter. This, of course, also implies that the government needs to rethink its policy of reconciliation as a seamless integration, as this kind of approach shows a clear inability, or unwillingness, to listen and to learn from others.

Reconciliation needs to become embedded into the fabric of the Australian social memory. Reconciliation is a journey, often presented in popular discourse as a ‘journey of healing’ and, significantly, as a ‘people’s movement’.95 Because it involves the introduction of a historical discontinuity through a shift in social attitudes and practices, the process of reconciliation needs to pervade the social consciousness—the spiritual politics—of Australian society over an extended period of time:

reconciliation needs to be seen as a *process*, something which has a time scale of generations rather than years, not something that can be hurriedly concluded by statements of apology or draft documents. These are only appropriate if they are seen as part of ongoing historical understanding, recognition and reparation—points of beginning or landmarks on a long march, not the journey’s end.96

It is the journey, the becoming, that is significant. Or, along similar lines and in terms of indigenous-becoming, ‘the preparation of the ceremony is the ceremony. Think in terms of processes, ways of living—not results to be gained.’97 Of course, results are important, especially for Aboriginal people seeking reparation for over two hundred years of colonisation, but it is especially the new ‘ways of living’ made possible through the reconciliation process that we have argued is of critical importance for a postcolonial future. The participants in the *Duyfken* re-enactment, in contrast to the First Fleet re-enactment twelve years before, have illustrated just how much satisfaction can be gained from being involved in the ‘ceremony’.

Perhaps the stories of the *Duyfken*, the original and the replica, will become an essential part of the retelling of Australian history. Perhaps not. Either way, the journey of the *Duyfken* replica has certainly contributed to a postcolonial discourse of reconciliation, and as such stands as an exemplar to the process and its ideals. Peter refers to one other story that poetically enhances this point. When anchored at the community of Mapoon, he was:

presented with a painting of a white ‘Narkut’, the Tjungundji word for dove. In this culture, like the one that spawned *Duyfken*, the dove is a symbol for the messenger … The original *Duyfken* was the messenger that brought news of a new land. The new *Duyfken* is a messenger also.98
The replica *Duyfken* deterritorialises an aspect of white Australia’s orthodox formative history. It also presents an important moment of intercultural dialogue and signifies a movement towards indigenous-becoming that we suggest needs to be an increasing part of the spiritual politics of this country.

Obviously, not everyone will get the opportunity to enjoy the kinds of personal connections and intimate relationships that Peter and others associated with the *Duyfken* have experienced. But this example of the relational practice of *mewellin* offers an accessible, alternative social attitude to the one Fogarty ends his poem on:

Ha.Fucken migloo behaviour
impression by history, linguistically
relatively didn’t discover us yet
theory or practice

Even though the anger and frustration behind Fogarty’s attitude are understandable in response to the bigger picture of white Australia’s colonialist history, the *Duyfken* replica experience has been a practical actualisation of the potential for reconciliation, demonstrating through practice that the theory really can work.

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3. The term ‘local people’ refers solely to the Aboriginal people of the particular area. Names of certain people who have died are included in some instances (with permission) as it would be otherwise difficult to distinguish them in the different contexts. No disrespect is intended. The usage of the terms ‘whitefella’ and ‘blackfella’, and ‘white’ and ‘black’, is not intended to reify negative connotations of racial difference. They are used as commonly applied distinguishing terms. ‘Settler Australian’ refers to people of European (Anglo-Celtic) descent, while ‘white’ and ‘whitefella’ generally denotes all non-Aboriginal people in a very broad sense.

There is some disagreement about the number of Dutch sailors killed in this encounter. Peter Sutton suggests that only one Dutch sailor may have been killed on the Duylfen voyage, and explains that the claim that nine men were killed probably refers to the later expedition by Carstensz in 1623. See Jack Spear Kar tin and Peter Sutton, ‘Dutchmen at Cape Keerweer’, in Luise Hercus and Peter Sutton (eds), This is What Happened: Historical Narratives by Aborigines, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Canberra, 1986, pp. 88, 106. The exact number of Aboriginal people killed is unknown, although Silas Wolmby places the figure somewhere around eighty to ninety, see John van Tiggelen, ‘Everything but the Scurry’, Good Weekend Magazine, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September 2000, p. 29.

4. Sutton, however, suggests that the dangerous waters surrounding Cape Keerweer is the most likely reason for the name. The local name is Thewena. Hercus and Sutton, pp. 99, 105.
6. Mark Galliford, Interview with Peter Manthorpe, 16 January 2002. The Duylfen replica was built to be as authentic as possible, using similar materials and shipbuilding techniques of the time, although with the addition of a diesel motor and modern safety features. For a series of photographic essays on the building and sailing of the Duylfen prior to the Cape York landing re-enactment, see Robert Garvey, To Build a Ship: The VOC Replica Ship Duylfen, University of Western Australia Press, Crawley, 2001. See also the documentary directed by Marcus Gillezeau, Little Dove—Big Voyage, Firelight Films Productions, 2000.
7. See the Duylfen website: <http://www.duylfen.com>
14. Healy, p. 3.
15. On a similar note, Paul Patton suggests that (in philosophy) ‘It is not the reassuring familiarity of the known which should provide us with the paradigm of thinking, but those hesitant gestures which accompany our encounters with the unknown’. Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 19.
16. Stephen Muecke, No Road (Bitumen all the Way), Fremantle Arts Centre Press, South Fremantle, 1997, p. 111.
17. Van Tiggelen, p. 28.
20. Manthorpe, p. 136
22. Manthorpe, p. 137.
Duyfken Lectures, hosted by the University of Notre Dame, Fremantle, 16 February 2000, p. 7).

26 Galliford.


28 Cited in Gill, p. 2.

29 Henderson, p. 148.


31 Manthorpe, ‘Replica Sailing Ships in a Postmodern Age’, p. 3.

32 This is especially so in an ethical sense:

If I transcribed for word everything Silas said it would run to untold pages and would be impossible to follow. On the other hand if I paraphrased him into my own words they would no longer be his stories … I feel a heavy weight of responsibility: What if I have not understood properly? Indeed how can I possibly have understood fully in one day stories that have been handed down over centuries? Yet I have had no time to record in writing, fixed in text. I have given my interpretation of Silas’s words an authority it doesn’t deserve, the false authority of the written word. Silas is the authority: If you want to know the stories, spend the day with him. No, you’d better spend a lifetime with him … Have I been naive committing Silas’s stories … to the internet? [on which his log was almost daily reported]. Am I guilty of just another example of colonialism, of appropriating something that isn’t mine? I asked his permission at least half a dozen times. He has trusted me …

Manthorpe, Captain’s Log, p. 148.

33 Manthorpe, Captain’s Log, p. 146. For other versions of this story, see Henderson, p. 143, and Karntin and Sutton, p. 99.

34 Galliford.

35 Galliford.


38 See Henderson, pp. 132, 143.

39 Galliford.

40 Manthorpe, ‘Replica Sailing Ships in a Postmodern Age’, p. 10.

41 Manthorpe, Captain’s Log, p. 145.


43 Foucault, ‘Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution’, p. 96.

44 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 5.

45 Linda Martin Alcoff, ‘Becoming an Epistemologist’, in Elizabeth Grosz (ed.), Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures, Cornell University Press, New York, 1999, p. 71. An interesting addition to this theme of differing versions concerns the sense of incongruity Peter experienced when displaying the Duyfken replica as a museum piece at the various ports of call. He states:

‘Why do we do this? Why do we convert Duyfken to museum mode when we open her up to public inspection … Duyfken has taken on a contemporary life, become a modern ship on a voyage firmly located in the present. Setting her up as a museum now involves hiding something of her life in the present. Manthorpe, Captain’s Log, p. 139.

46 Manthorpe, Captain’s Log, p. 140.


48 Henderson, p. 147.

49 Healy, p. 7.

50 Mackinolty and Wainburranga, p. 359.

51 Morris, pp. 186–7. See also Stephen Muecke, ‘Between the Church and the Stage’: David Unaipon at the Hobart Carnival, 1910’, The UTS Review, vol. 6, no. 1, 2000, pp. 11–19.


54 Patton prefers the terminology of ‘metamorphosis machine’ because war-machine ‘is a concept which is betrayed by its name since it has little to do with actual war and only a paradoxical and indirect relation to armed conflict … The real object of Deleuze and Guattari’s war-machine concept is not war but the conditions of creative mutation and change.’ Patton, Deleuze and the Political, pp. 109–10. See also Deleuze and Guattari, p. 351.

55 Henderson, p. 158.

56 Galliford.
According to the Chevron newsletter, concerning the involvement of the (then) San Francisco–based oil company and multinational sponsor: ‘A spirit of reconciliation was the common thread that ran through a ceremony conducted at Pennefather River’. Gill, p. 2. Chevron has since pulled out of the pipeline project.


Foucault, ‘What Is Enlightenment?’, p. 34.


Tully, Chapter 3.

Tully, p. 24.

See Patton, ‘Nomads, Capture and Colonisation’, in Deleuze and the Political, for a discussion of colonisation as capture.

Simone Bignall and Victor Wilson, personal correspondence, 5 November 2001. Mowayll:in is a Ngarrindjeri term. Our self-conscious use of the Ngarrindjeri language here is designed to reflect our commitment to ethical cultural engagement when defining the terms of reconciliation. We understand that many of the concepts and practices that we think are necessary for just cultural coexistence in Australia already form the basis of many Indigenous political processes. In using the term Mowayll:in, we hope to demonstrate our willingness to respectfully listen and learn from Indigenous knowledge and ways of living.

Tully, pp. 25, 26.


Manthorpe, Captain’s Log, p. 148. Later, Peter was living back in Adelaide and suggested to his partner, Michelle, that they send the promised wedding invitations to some of the local people they had met during the re-enactment, not really entertaining the thought that they would actually travel all the way from Cape York. But some people did show up, including Thancoupie and Ina. They sang songs and reinforced the bonds that started eight months before. Three months later, at the beginning of July 2001, Peter and Michelle reciprocated by visiting the area for the funeral of Ina, and were surprised and honoured when they were given seats at the very front of the service with the rest of Ina’s immediate family. Later in the year, Silas rang to apologise for not being able to make it to Peter and Michelle’s wedding, inviting them up again so he could show them around his country properly.


See Taussig, p. 78.


Deleuze and Guattari, p. 238.

Deleuze and Guattari, p. 238.

Deleuze and Guattari, p. 7.
84. Patton, Deleuze and the Political, p. 48.
85. Deleuze and Guattari, p. 238.
86. Patton, Deleuze and the Political, p. 126. Responsible ‘indigenous-becoming’ should be distinguished from ‘becoming-indigenous’, which is problematically associated with an irresponsible appropriation of indigeneity to benefit the dominant cultural position. In critical response to the concept of ‘becoming Aboriginal’, Dipesh Chakrabarty asks:

What is desirable and what might [be] undesirable in the process? To me it seems that such a self-conscious process for the non-Aboriginal person can only begin if the writing of Aboriginal history by Aboriginal intellectuals achieves so much sovereignty in Australian public life that it is possible for Aboriginal intellectuals to dispute their own pasts in public. They would then be able to guide us in thinking about what one may not want to inherit from the legacies of Aboriginal presence in this land.


88. Deleuze and Guattari, p. 239.
90. This yearning to belong is felt both by settler Australians and by Indigenous Australians, particularly after the territorial dispossession of many communities and the destruction of cultural forms and family bonds through the state policies that stole generations of Indigenous children. See Lowitja O’Donoghue ‘A Journey of Healing or a Road to Nowhere?’, in Grattan (ed.), pp. 288–96. On white yearning and lack, see Lattas in Cowlishaw and Morris (eds). See also Gassan Hage, White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1998, pp. 70–1.
93. Muecke, ‘The Discourse of Nomadology’, p. 34. (This quote is a translation from Deleuze and Guattari, Mille Plateaux, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1980, p. 473.)
95. Lowitja O’Donoghue, p. 296.
98. Manthorpe, Captain’s Log, pp. 150–1.
99. Fogarty, pp. 94–5. Miglo is a Queensland word for whitefella.