Colonial Subjectification

Foucault, Christianity and Governmentality

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Foucault’s concept of pastoral power is envisioned as a technique of power developed from the medieval period and carried through into modern political rationalities. As such, it is an old power technique—which originated in Christian institutions—in a new political shape.\(^1\) Importantly, Foucault distinguishes between two aspects of this pastoral power: its ecclesiastical institutionalisation and its function. While its institutional aspect has diminished since the eighteenth century, its function has not, in that it has been dispersed outside this initial institutional framework.\(^2\) The importance and repercussions of this distinction have been recognised by and utilised in, for example, education studies,\(^3\) but have not been central to the use of Foucault in cultural studies—an absence which is part of the general non-existent relationship between cultural studies and religion, which this special issue addresses.

This article has a twofold aim, namely to trace such a dispersion historically and contextually, and to discuss the theoretical implications of this function of
pastoral power and dismantle some of Foucault’s own presuppositions. The historical context is the former Danish colony of Greenland, which was colonised in the early eighteenth century. The colonisation was intended to lend financial support to the Lutheran mission to the Catholic Norsemen, who had settled in Greenland around the eleventh century, but had not been heard from since the fifteenth century. When the missionary Hans Egede and his family arrived, there were indeed no Norsemen to be found, only the indigenous population, which then became the target of the mission. The reason I have chosen a colonial setting to highlight this feature of Foucault’s work is that the massive social upheavals in colonised indigenous communities illustrate how crucial the social foundation of Lutheran subjectification is, and how deeply the capillaries are rooted. Nothing less than a near annihilation of indigenous society would do.

The reason this particular colonial setting lends itself well to an analysis of pastoral power and its functions is mainly because of its state-controlled mission, its origins in the early eighteenth century, and the frantic documentation activity of the Danish colonisers. Furthermore, the colonisation seemed to occur in a number of bursts: the initial stage in the eighteenth century (roughly speaking), with its semi-systematised racialised missionary politics; an intensification of control, exploitation and institutionalisation in the nineteenth; and the fragmentation and governmentalisation of the Greenlandic people in the twentieth century. This development makes it possible to trace the progression of ideas and practices of racism, institutionalism and policy within Greenland and Denmark. It is particularly the two first stages that concern me here in that I trace the movement from institutional pastoral power to functional pastoral power in Greenland and in Foucault’s work. I do so particularly through the concept of the household.

—Pastoral power and governmentality

Simply named ‘Governmentality’, Foucault’s essay was originally one of the lectures from the Security, Territory, Population lecture series held at the Collège de France in 1977–78. This lecture was subsequently published as a discrete essay in Aut Aut in 1978 and later reprinted in the anthology on governmentality, The Foucault Effect, which was published by a number of Foucault’s co-workers. The separate publication of the essay makes it easy to overlook the place of pastoral power within
the genealogy of governmentality and its central place in the power structure of governmentality as a whole. The 'Governmentality' essay focuses primarily on the differences between sovereignty and governmentality and does not therefore draw out pastoral power for special emphasis. This setting aside of pastoral power—in one essay—has generated a common understanding of pastoral power as a purely religious form of power, over, against and distinct from governmentality, which is understood as secular. Hence, governmentality too easily becomes a way of constructing a neat and ideal distinction between religion and the public sphere.

A significant exception to the compartmentalisation approach to Foucault is Danish theologian Mads Peter Karlsen, who troubles the distinction between the religious and the secular in his analysis of the Christian heritage of the Danish welfare system. Deploying Foucault's concept of pastoral power, Karlsen constructs a genealogy which traces the influence of Christianity in Denmark beginning with the role of the clerical minister in the seventeenth century, on to the beginnings of the healthcare system, the destabilisation of the patriarchal structure in the nineteenth century and the emphasis on philanthropy, all the way through to facing the truth about oneself in the treatment of obesity in the Danish welfare system. Karlsen's study draws out the implications of Foucault for the study of the Danish welfare system and how such insights may question the perceived secularism of the Danish state. As such, it points to where Foucault's probing could take us: namely, towards a critique of the narrative of secularism. So while the theoretical benefits in regards to the development of the Danish welfare system and secularism are important and innovative, the theoretical benefits in regards to Foucault and religion are secondary to Karlsen's project.

A more genealogical line of questioning of Foucault's own work is at the forefront of Matthew Chrulew's careful study of Foucault and Christianity. Chrulew traces the general backdrop of Christianity in much of Foucault's work and provides valuable summaries and references for Foucault's increasing incorporation of Christianity within his work on the subject. Chrulew classifies the central texts of pastoral power as the two lecture series from the Collège de France (Security, Territory, Population in 1977–78 and The Birth of Biopolitics in 1978–79), and the three lectures from various venues during that period, published as 'Sexuality and Power' (1978), 'What is Critique' (1978) and 'Omnes et Singulatum' (1979).
Chrulew notes that Foucault’s research into Christianity is part of the genealogy of governmentality:

He seeks to distill, from Christian ecclesial history, a diagram or dispositif that he refers to under the general term of pastorat. The pastorate comes up in numerous texts of the period as an essential precursor to where we are today.\(^{13}\)

This is an important point, especially since the connection between the pastorate and governmentality is bypassed in at least two of the articles mentioned above (‘Sexuality and Power’ and ‘What is Critique’). The Christian political technology of the pastorate is modelled on the shepherd and flock, which enters Western rationality through Christianity. Deriving from the Hebrew theme of the shepherd in relation to a nomadic group, it takes on a different ritualised diagram of power when it enters the concrete institutions of Christianity.\(^{14}\)

Foucault defines a number of significant elements of this technology of power, which vary according to the lectures. However, the recurring themes are those of obedience/submission, confession/knowledge/truth and individualisation, which together comprise a uniquely Christian mode of subjectification. As Chrulew points out, this is an extension of Foucault’s previous work on confession and examination, but brings in ‘an increased emphasis on the subjection (to the authority of the confessor) that accompanies such techniques’.\(^{15}\) Foucault identified this pastorate as ‘the apparatus from which emerged the arts of government characteristic of modernity’.\(^{16}\) The mutation and dispersion of pastoral power into modern government was a result of several counter-conducts, which reached an apex in the Reformation.\(^{17}\)

The emergence of pastoral power itself was generated by opposition, in Foucault’s words ‘resistance to power as conducting’.\(^{18}\) In his discussion of this ‘crisis of the pastorate’ Foucault thus sets aside the ‘external blockages’ to pastoral power,\(^{19}\) and instead looks to five themes of counter-conduct in the Middle Ages which mark opposition to the pastoral organisation of Christianity: asceticism, formation of communities, mysticism, interpretation of scripture and eschatology.\(^{20}\) These themes spell out precisely what it is that Foucault identified as Christianity, namely, the power relations set up in the pastorate.\(^{21}\) The internal struggles led to the reshuffling of the pastorate and resulted in the new schismatic churches and the
Roman Catholic church of the Counter-Reformation. As a result, governmentality ‘emerges as a political rationality through a process that can be defined as secularisation only ambiguously: insofar as it further instils and intensifies the configurations of the pastorate, it carries out what Foucault elsewhere calls a Christianisation-in-depth’. Foucault is thus not suggesting a transition from religious power to secular power. Rather, the sixteenth century is in general an ‘age of forms of conducting, directing, and government’ of which the questions of conduct within pastoral power was but one. This focus on conduct outside the religious realm articulates a sphere of thought and practice with its own objects, rationality and mode of intervention, a situation to which Protestantism managed to conform itself, inscribing itself into the genealogy of reason. This expansion into civil life of conducting conduct necessarily entails the counter-conduct of political resistance. The important point is that ‘what is at stake in such counter-conducts or –claims is precisely the same element that is targeted by governmental power: it is a battle over forms of conduct and the forces of life’. Chrulew’s emphasis on the connection between pastoral power and governmentality implicitly addresses Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Foucault in Homo Sacer, where he points to the lack of clarity when it comes to the intersection between techniques of domination and technologies of the self. By emphasising the role of pastoral subjection techniques in governmentality, Chrulew has shown how subjectification takes place within this power formation, and thus sets the coordinates for technologies of self.

All this means that Foucault has, as Chrulew notes, ‘identified a specific mode of contemporary secular power, one inherited from the church, [which] suggests a challenge to certain prominent ways of conceiving the question of religion and politics’, which in turn points to the necessity of ‘identifying the precise manner and effects of [the state’s] nonetheless very “clerical” apparatuses of governmental power’.

—GOVERNMENTALITY AND COLONIALISM

In an important analysis of colonialism, governmentality and pastoral power, Lynn Blake analyses a particular event in British Columbia in 1876, where an Oblate missionary, Father Charles Grandidier, developed a plan to police the insubordinate,
secr etive and disorderly behaviour of 'native people'. The necessity of the plan, and hence a sober, orderly and disciplined native population, was agreed on by the Superintendent of Indian Affairs (I.W. Powell) and Chief Justice (M. Begbie), but the means to reach that goal were imagined quite differently by Grandidier and Begbie. Blake attributes these differences to their differing conceptions of order and the methods for its enforcements, as well as the objects and products of the enforcements. She regards the fact that both groups agreed on the necessity for managing the population as a significant intersection between pastoral power and governmentality. However, she attributes differences in the conceptualisations of how to proceed to differences between pastoral power and governmentality.

One could say that Blake in a sense pushes what is implicit in Foucault to its extreme, namely the Roman Catholic nature of pastoral power. In Blake's conceptualisation of pastoral power discipline, surveillance, judicial violence and self-examination are all firmly connected to the institution of the Roman Catholic Church and the enactment of pastoral power is carried out as a Christian regulation of the Christian population: 'Pastoral power, then, is a very old modality of power that can be characterised as: productive in its constitution of Roman Catholic Christian subjects; disciplinary in its focus on individual bodies and minds; normalizing in its promotion of the self-regulation of its subjects; and sovereign in its juridicality and use of spectacular force.'

Blake's treatment of the relationship between pastoral power and governmentality is occasionally somewhat unclear, as she sometimes appears to keep them separate while she brings them together at other moments. Following Karlsen's and Chrulew's readings of Foucault, I question the separation itself—especially in the period she is working with, that is, the nineteenth century. Blake chastises Foucault for not drawing pastoral power into the 'anatomy of governmentality' as a modality of power and repeats this criticism in her considerations: 'he does not explore the governmentality of pastoral power itself'.

Following Karlsen and Chrulew, this seems to be precisely what Foucault does argue: pastoral power as a technique of power derived from Christian practice is absorbed into strategies of governmentality, thus adapting the Christian subjection to a this-worldly situation. In this sense, Foucault's genealogy of governmentality is also a genealogy of a more complex and, indeed, sophisticated secularisation narrative.
The issue to which Blake directs us—the very Roman Catholic nature of pastoral power—is nevertheless indicative of a larger problem: the eclipse of Protestant ideology within Foucault’s work. This problem emerges in Blake’s article when she shows that the colonial administration in British Colombia was British Protestant and thus held a different view of society and how to govern it. So the governmentality strand in Blake’s argument presents itself as closer to a Protestant view of society, government and civilisation. Blake does note that her argument could be taken in this direction: ‘I do not want to suggest that government and Anglican or Protestant missionaries saw eye to eye—there is ample archival evidence that they did not’. However, she does note that '[d]enominational strategies of conversion did vary significantly' and '[t]hese types of strategy clearly aimed to produce a different kind of native subject than did the Oblate missions’. She concludes that ‘Catholic “reasons of state” skewed the development of power, the nature of the spaces it was to invest, and its products, to a degree that made it almost incompatible with the projects of the provincial government’.  

While Blake does not want to suggest the compatibility between the government and Protestant ideology is virtually seamless, her argument does indicate a higher level of compatibility in purpose, strategies and overall reason between the provincial government and Protestant missionaries. This comes as no surprise, once one relinquishes the insistence on a dichotomy between religious and secular governance and realises that the colonial foundations of law mean that the dominant beliefs of the settlers—in this case, British Protestantism—are built into the very structure of the legal arrangements. Blake, however, relegates the conflation between government and Protestant ideology to internal British struggles and the prevalent anti-Roman-Catholic bias, which means that in British Columbia the Oblates took the predictable place of the ‘Catholic Other’ inherent in nineteenth-century British nationalism.

Blake’s observation that the Roman Catholic pastoral power differs from Protestant pastoral power hints that not only is it an internal religious struggle but that the different pastorals have different social agendas. Bringing the Reformation into the genealogy of power that Foucault began to construct will emphasise the role of theology within the genealogy of governmentality, and will help us understand
the aggressive social agenda of the Protestant missionaries and what limits or coordinates were imposed on the colonised society.

—LUTHERAN PASTORAL POWER: CONSTRUCTING PROTESTANT SUBJECTIVITIES

In the midst of fleshing out the relationship between the individual and the pastor in the first volume of *History of Sexuality*, Foucault mentions in a footnote that ‘the reformed pastoral also laid down rules, albeit in a more discreet way, for putting sex into discourse’, thereby indicating his own Roman Catholic bias. Not only do Foucault’s analyses and conceptualisations appear Roman Catholic because of his historical focus on the Middle Ages in the lectures in *Security, Territory, Population*, but his emphasis on confession and masturbation are all within a Roman Catholic frame of reference. This distinction is extremely important because it reveals the difference between the subjectification practices of the Roman Catholic confessional and the catechism—which is where I would primarily situate the Lutheran subjectification process. If the Roman Catholic pastorate produced desiring subjects, then what kind of subjects did the Protestant pastorate produce? And what kind of master?

One of the items within the Roman Catholic economy of salvation made redundant by the Reformation was the confession—that privileged social interaction between pastor and the individual. But catechism, the instruction in faith, was retained. In accordance with his notion of the priesthood of all believers, Luther’s move was to shift this instruction from the church to the home, where the housefather was responsible for his own. Thus, the unity of the family became a religious fellowship—in fact, the seed of the Church—and the exercise of prayers and catechism of the house-father establishes church life. Which selves are then fostered by the catechism? As I show below, the catechisms construct roles of gender and hierarchy into which individuals are subjected. A very important inflection is the individual–hierarchy relation. The relations established are both vertically oriented. The relationship between the believer and God is the primary relationship and the foundation of the social relationships. The social relationships are in turn defined hierarchically, in terms of who is subservient to whom. In contrast, the self that Foucault describes as generated by the confessional is characterised by a vertical relationship to the priest—or, in Foucault’s terms, ‘the
pastor’—and a horizontal relationship to the rest of the flock, as well as the notion of desire, which is always directed at someone or something else.

The colonial context provides an insight into the establishment of these selves. Whereas Roman Catholic missionaries were generally much more willing to incorporate indigenous religious practices within a Roman Catholic framework, the Protestant missionaries were uncompromising in this regard. Both approaches were undertaken for theological reasons, connected to the views on nature. Roman Catholicism regards nature as a signifier of the realm of the spirit and so the indigenous practices are also regarded as signifiers of God. In stark contrast is the Protestant view, where nature is the realm of ecclesiastical civilisation, in which indigenous practices have no place. This means that in order to enter into the Protestant framework, the former lifestyle should be firmly rejected, thus attempting to shatter the social fabric from which the newly converted came.

—Turning to Greenland.

In nineteenth-century West Greenland, the Danish Colonial Administration instituted local councils (forstanderskaber), as—ostensibly—an attempt to promote self-government and include Greenlanders in the government of the colonial districts. The establishment of the local councils was an attempt to regulate and order what previously had been dealt with through ‘uncontrollable’ custom. This restructuring of colonial society took place 150 years after the initial colonisation and entailed a subtle shift towards distribution and especially housing. Before these shifts, it was not uncommon for seven to eight ‘families’ to live together in a household in the so-called longhouses. This type of dwelling enabled families to share the maintenance of hunting equipment such as the umiaq (the wife boat), a large boat, rowed by four women, which was the primary mode of transport as well as used for hunting larger whales. The frame was made of whalebone or wood, and covered by seven skins from bearded seal. The maintenance and operation of such a boat would have exceeded what any ‘nuclear’ family could have contributed, and so it was practical that such a boat was shared by a household. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the shift towards smaller units of dwelling began, which was completed by the end of that century. This meant that items such as the umiaq became much rarer, given few families could afford one by themselves. This again
had a fundamental impact on the way of life of the individual families, since without transport it became impossible to move around during summer. Furthermore, the Trade also profited greatly from this shift in dwelling, partly because of the wood they could sell to build houses, and partly because they could trade the surplus of the individual household, which earlier would have been distributed to other members of the larger households, that is, 'uncontrollable custom'.

The rationale behind this restructuring was naturally not articulated in terms of concern for the profit margin of the trade. It was due to 'hygienic and moral' concerns, as expressed by, among others, doctor C.J. Kayser, who was sent to Greenland by the Danish king in 1845 to inspect the grounds for an epidemic that had killed thirty-seven people in 1844. After travelling around with the district doctor, Kayser, who found the domestic arrangement of the Greenlanders problematic, observed:

The only separation which occasionally takes place between the different families occupying a Greenlandic house is a caribou hide, which by aid of strings forms some sort of dividing wall, and reaches only circa one or one and a half foot above the plank bed. Here they all lie, young and old, married and unmarried, strangers and dwellers among each other in a fashion that is just as harmful in respects to hygiene as well as morality. It would not be correct to see this as the only cause for the gross immorality which is rampant among the Greenlanders, but it cannot be doubted that it is encouraged by this.

The issue of protection against epidemics and famine was central in the strategies of the colonial administration of the Greenlanders, which resulted in—among other things—the reordering of their housing conditions because of the dangers to health and morale. And while these shifts in housing were articulated as an enactment for the protection of the Greenlanders, they were in actuality a further step in a colonial politics of control.

This control of health and morals through a specific regime of housing is an example of what Foucault describes as the constitution of the sexual confession in scientific terms, where the (Christian) sexual morals are hidden behind the concern for health and sanitation issues. The sanitation issues, which were such a worry to the colonial administration, are firmly connected to Western notions of family,
which in turn are connected to Christian conceptualisations of family and sexuality. Already from the mid eighteenth century the Danish missionaries saw it as their task to lead Greenlanders 'to a realisation of their deep depravation and show them the way to the one who can save them from this and transform them into new people in heart, house and mind'. It is the implementation of the household ideology of Lutheranism through catechism that interests me here, and which I see as the prime site for the subjectification of Lutheran subjects.

—The Lutheran Household.

The monogamous, heterosexual, and patriarchal nuclear family is a central feature of Lutheran social philosophy. Not only is it the archetype of all social relations, but it is also the starting point of all social developments (established in 'Paradise') and economic conditions of management and service (economic theory is based on one-family households), as well as being the foundation-stone of the church. In Denmark, Luther’s catechism was the code of conduct, disseminated through expositions by various Danish theologians. The exposition I focus on there is Danish court theologian Erich Pontoppidan’s authorised catechism from 1737.

Pontoppidan’s catechism places a heavy emphasis on the family through a couple of measures. Most importantly, he subsumed the discussion of the ordering of society in Luther’s Haustafel under the fourth commandment, which in the Lutheran tradition is the commandment on honouring the parents. Within the Ten Commandments, the Haustafel’s fundamental importance to social structure is emphasised—or, rather, the Fourth Commandment (‘Honour your father and your mother’) is expanded to accommodate the social structure of the Haustafel and thus constitutes the centre of all social ethics. The harsh and severe penalties for fornication show how central the model of the monogamous family is to the control of society in this period, and also how influential—indeed, fundamental—Protestantism was to the order of Danish society.

What emerges is a program for fostering subjectivities within a tripartite hierarchical order: king–subjects; minister–disciples; parents–children. The parents–children function is the fundamental one, used to describe the relation between king and subjects, minister and disciples. It may therefore be argued that the father is the central figure, encompassing the role of breadwinner, pastor and
priest of the household. As such, he is construed as possessing supreme authority. We thus have an extensive masculine domination which is taken for granted, since Lutheranism and its systemic patriarchy considers the physical superiority of man as the expression of a superior relationship willed by God. The archetypical nature of family means that the terminology was stretched to signify other social relationships, such as the ruler as the father of the country, the lord of the manor as the father of the estate, and the employer becomes the housefather. All these fathers look after their children (subjects, peasants and servants), who in turn all serve God by obeying the master.

This theory was articulated in Luther’s two catechisms, so ‘through a process of infinite repetition, this theory of Patriarchalism was hammered into the minds of faithful Lutherans’. The catechisms thus construct and normalise a number of social and gendered roles which correspond to the hierarchies of social power, and which are naturalised through the practice of catechism and its questions and answers. This practice can be seen as a sanctification of the private sphere but also as a de-clerification, or, in Foucault’s words, a laicisation of Christian instruction and a dissemination of the pastoral into the capillaries of everyday life. It is a displacement of the sovereign power enacted by the pope to all men in society, who are heads of families, households, estates and kingdoms. I suggest that this particular displacement of power is a crucial feature in the emergence of governmentality.

—THE COLONIAL SOCIAL ORDER

This is the social order which was exported to Greenland, as well as its ideological underpinning: Pontoppidan’s catechism, which was translated and modified to fit the colonial situation by Hans Egede’s oldest son, Paul. The imposition of this understanding of family (that is monogamous, patriarchal, a one-family household) as a model of society, reinforced by incessant repetitions of catechisms, had a significant social impact in Greenland. The place of the Lutheran family structure within a larger order, as well as its assigned roles of subordination and mastery, meant that the Danish and Norwegian men who came to Greenland assumed the position of master, whereby the Greenlanders were subjected as children—or, at the very least, placed in a subservient relation to the Danish men. Instruction via
catechism would have implanted the notion of divine reason behind Danish mastery and Greenlandic subservience. In Pontoppidan’s catechism, mastery was unfolded according to three ranks: king, minister and father, all of whom are anchored in God. This authority structure was likewise assumed in Greenland. However, both God and king were absent figures, made known to the Greenlanders only through the missionaries and merchants, and sometimes used as threats if the Greenlanders did not comply with the desires of the missionaries.59

Backed by powerful forces, the missionaries and merchants gained their position of mastery, and the Greenlanders, one by one, were compelled to enter into this racialised structure. The missionaries were also ‘parenting’ Greenlanders in the sense that the missionaries chose, employed and trained catechists, and reported back to the Missionary Department in regard to their progress, how hard they worked, and to what extent they were eligible for a pay rise. Another circumstance that fortified Danish mastery was intermarriage and the physical paternity of the Danish and Norwegian men who married Greenlandic women and produced families. These relationships set in motion whole series of events that radically altered the Greenlandic social fabric, in that privileged mixed families became the Greenlandic elite. This new family unit was constructed through a significant curtailment of the social position of Greenlandic men. Polygamy was forbidden for baptised men and Greenlandic women began marrying European men. This ideological dismantling of the Greenlandic family structure and the implementation of the Lutheran household structure was thus already well underway by the restructurings of the nineteenth century. Already one of the earlier missionaries, Berthel Laersen, saw it as the task of the missionary to lead Greenlanders ‘to a realisation of their deep depravation and show them the way to the one who can save them from this and transform them into new people in heart, house and mind’.60 However, the actual implementation of nuclear family dwellings only took place at a later stage, corresponding to a more general shift in the function of families.

In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault notes that the family unit shifted from being a model of government under the management of the father to an instrument of government, through which information contributing to statistics may be obtained. The idea of family as model has a long pedigree, notably within the
Christian worldview: Foucault draws out Aquinas’s analogies of government, where the father and incidentally the pastor are his third analogy, after that of God and nature. The Lutheran understanding of family, which I discussed above, also corresponds to the model of government. Significantly, it was only after the shift in focus to population that the model of the family could be discarded as an insufficient way of conceptualising economy and government. The family could instead be subsumed within the population as an element—or indeed, as Foucault puts it, a ‘relay’—which denotes its place as a privileged unit within this framework, as a connection that controls the currents of governmental strategies. Hence, the family could be deployed in governmental campaigns which Foucault designates as campaigns of medicine, mortality, and hygiene.61

The shift in the understanding of economy in the eighteenth century consequently meant a shift in the understanding of family: where economy earlier indicated a form of government, it later denoted ‘a field of intervention for government’.62 The family underwent the same shift. The shift of the role of the family within this framework of governmentality means a renewed focus on and privileging and consolidating of this particular organisational unit. In colonial Greenland, however, the gradual implementation of the model-family, that is, the nuclear family, took place as an instrument of government. The family was a part of the restructuring of society according to what was perceived as ‘civilisation’. This is what Foucault calls ‘a permanent intervention in everyday conduct’—recall the heart, house and mind from the Laersen quote above—indicating the specific locations of this restructuring.63

—Conclusion

This article analyses the role of pastoral power in Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality at a theoretical level and at a historical level. Historically I have indicated how the Lutheran household structure was regarded as the fundamental building block of civilised society, and how it was implemented in Greenland; first as an authority structure that subjected the Greenlanders to Danish colonial authority, and then as a concrete restructuring of the Greenlandic dwelling patterns with profound social implications. Foucault’s pastoral power as subjectification strategy
did not immediately lend itself to such an analysis, but needed to be examined for its own presuppositions and tweaked to be applicable to a Protestant context.

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Notes

2 Ibid., p. 333.
4 A note on my use of ‘Lutheran’, ‘Roman Catholic’ and ‘Protestantism’: these terms intend to signify a historical context, in that the Roman Catholic church and Protestant churches are the results of the Reformation, which is the common (Protestant) term for the series of protests against the Catholic church in the sixteenth century. The qualifier ‘Roman’ indicates my view of Roman Catholicism as one interpretation out of several possible interpretations of Christianity, as a way of limiting the universality implied in the term ‘catholic’. Within Protestantism, there are also a series of interpretations and church communities of which the Lutheran Church is one (with Reformed Christianity and Anglicanism being the other two major movements). As the name indicates, the Lutheran churches trace their theology and social teachings back to Martin Luther, one of the actors (along with John Calvin and Huldrych Zwingli) in the Reformation movement of the sixteenth century.
The use of these terms thus presume an already contextualised approach to ‘Christianity’, which along with Catholic, is a universalising term.


7 Of the 13-week course, the analysis of the pastorate stretches over five lectures (from 8 February to 8 March) linking together government and raison d’État. Foucault, Security, Territory, and Population, pp. 115–237.


9 As does Mitchell Dean in his Governmentality. Power and Rule in Modern Society, Sage Publications, London, 1999, see for example p. 82. Dean reduces pastoral rule to a philosophy of the socially vulnerable, which ‘rests on a specific conception of the potential inclusion of all humankind within the community, the solidarity of rich and poor, and the duty of almsgiving’. Even though Dean includes discussions of Christianity within his chapter on ‘Pastoral Power, Police and Reason of State’ (pp. 73–97), his understanding of Christianity is already shaped by Enlightenment ideals of Christianity as ‘enchantment’. He completely sidesteps the central role of Christianity in the shaping of the modern self because he operates with a preconceived understanding of Christianity as restricted to a religious domain and thereby separation from modernity and civil government. Foucault’s own understanding of the social impact and extent of penetration of Christianity is far more sophisticated than Dean’s analysis could lead us to believe.

10 Mads Peter Karlsen, Pastoralmagt–Om Velfærdssamfundets Kristne Arv, Anis, Copenhagen, 2008.


I thank Matt for generously making earlier drafts available to me.

12 Ibid., p. 95.

13 Ibid., p. 99.

14 Ibid., p. 102. Foucault goes to great pains to show that this is a unique mode of power relations, unprecedented in Greco–Roman thought. During my schooling as a biblical scholar, we were always taught (admittedly from a particular methodological perspective) to emphasise the continuities between Christianity and its Greco–Roman context, for example, how the masculinity exhibited by
Jesus in the gospels and Paul in his letters actually conforms to particularly Stoic ideals of masculinity—another point which Foucault will not concede. Foucault cannot accept a notion of self-mastery because it goes against his notion of subjection within the pastoral mode of power. Hence, again we face the uniqueness of Christianity amidst Greco–Roman ideals. This seems to me a very theologically conservative position. See Jonathan Z. Smith for a comprehensive critique of Christianity as ‘Wholly Other’ in Drudgery Divine. On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, London, 1990, esp. chapter 2.

15 Chrulew, p. 106.
16 Chrulew, p. 111.
17 Foucault discerns two types of pastorate as originating from the Reformation (which he sees as a pastoral battle rather than a doctrinal one), namely the Protestant type, which was meticulous and hierarchically supple, and the counter-Reformation type, which was hierarchised and centralised, Foucault, Security, Territory, and Population, p. 149. This generated an ‘intensification … in its spiritual forms’ which increased the level of control in the material or temporal dimension, pp. 229–30.
19 These are unconverted populations, extra–Christian practices (witchcraft and heresies) and the relations with political power and economics. Foucault, Security, Territory, and Population, p. 194.
20 Foucault, Security, Territory, and Population, p. 204.
21 Chrulew, p. 116.
23 Chrulew, p. 112.
25 Chrulew, p. 123.
28 Blake, p. 80.
29 Ibid., pp. 81–2.
30 Ibid., pp. 83 and 90.
31 Michel Foucault, ‘Subject and Power’, pp. 333–5.
32 Note the importance of Nietzsche for such an interpretation of Foucault in both the work of Karlsen and Chrulew.

33 In ‘What is Critique?’, Foucault notes the importance of the Reformation (p. 389) in the development of the Aufklärung in Germany (p. 389) and refers to the importance of natural law as an important element of counter-conduct (p. 385). Beyond this particular article, he does not return to an elaboration of the later importance of the intellectual development stemming from the Reformation.

34 Blake, p. 90.


37 Blake, p. 87. We might also note van der Veer’s argument that the separation of church and state in Britain actually meant the enfranchisement of Catholics and Dissenters, and that this generated a shift from religious loyalty to national loyalty. Van der Veer thus argues that nineteenth-century British nationalism includes Catholics, whereas Blake sees British nationalism as excluding Catholics, van der Veer, p. 22.

38 Blake, p. 83.


40 In my current research I am analysing the subjectification techniques of Radical Pietism. The relationship between Pietism and governmentality has been noted by, for example, Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt, Coping with Distances: Producing Nordic Atlantic Societies, Berghahn Books, Oxford, 2007. Philip Gorski, on the other hand, argues that Weber theorised the relationship between religion and discipline, and Foucault that of discipline and the state, but that neither dealt with all three. Philip S. Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003.

41 In order to move beyond the Roman Catholic overtones of shepherd/pastor, and to emphasise my Protestant focus, I designate the shepherd as the master.

42 A catechism is a manual of Christian doctrine, and was first used in reference to a written instruction in the early sixteenth century and Luther’s Small Catechism. Before this, the term referred to oral instruction before baptism. F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone (eds), The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 301.
As Peter Wallace outlines in his study on the long-term process of the European Reformation, Luther’s program consisted of three pillars: justification by faith; the authority of scripture alone; and the priesthood of all believers. The priesthood of all believers meant that every baptised Christian was a priest before God and not dependent on anyone else for the reception of grace. Peter G. Wallace, *The Long European Reformation*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke & New York, 2004, pp. 79–80.


The Trade is shorthand for det Kongelige Grønlandske Handelskompagni (KGH), the Royal Greenlandic Trade. KGH was the state-organised trading company that monopolised trading between Greenland and Denmark from its inception in 1774 to the mid-twentieth century. Petersen, p. 171.


C.J. Kayser, quoted in Rud, p. 189; my translation.

See a similar analysis of Fijian society in Thomas, *Colonialism’s Culture*. Thomas argues for a restructuring of Fijian society which was in accordance with British notions of sanitation and is nevertheless presented as a reinstitution of traditional Fijian society with the cooperation of the local chiefs.

Foucault, *Will to Knowledge*, p. 65.


Literally ‘house-table’. Luther coined the phrase to refer to sections in the New Testament which describes an order of the household, where the various roles are defined and positioned within a structure of subordination. Examples include Ephesians 5:21–6,9; Colossians 3:18–4,1; Titus 2:1–10; and 1 Peter 2:18–3,7. While there is some discussion in New Testament scholarship as to what extent these household codes from the texts refer to internal community structures or the larger social fabric, there seems to be little doubt that Luther saw connections between household management and the larger social fabric, and happily borrowed these structures to order society around the male leader. Foucault sees the expansion of Aristotle’s ‘concerning household management’ to include the economy of the souls as a patristic innovation, attributed to Gregory Nazianzen, Foucault *Security, Territory, and*
Population, p. 192. Foucault therefore does not take the New Testament household codes into account, nor for that matter Luther’s appropriation of them.


56 Ibid., p. 546.

57 Ibid., p. 542.


59 The first king to visit Greenland was Christian X in 1921. Hans Egede stands out as having a propensity for aggressive threats. A particularly grievous example is when he told the Greenlanders, that the smallpox epidemic killing them by the hundreds was in fact God’s punishment for their lack of diligence towards the word of God. Hans Egede, Relationer fra Grønland 1721–36, Bianco Lunos bogtrykkeri, Copenhagen, 1925, p. 275.

60 See note 53. Berthel Laersen came from the ‘Vajsenshus’ orphanage in Copenhagen and worked as a missionary in Greenland from 1739–1782. He married a Greenlandic woman, Susanna, had five children and founded one of the elite families in Greenland.

61 Foucault, Security, Territory, and Population, pp 104–5, and Will to Knowledge, p. 100.


63 Ibid., p. 154.