— Abstract

On a Saturday afternoon just out of the city, I sat with a woman who cast herself ‘Jane’. Baby ‘Jo’ and partner ‘Mardi’ played ‘kangaroos’ on the floor. We talked, sampling some ways of looking and telling.

I said, ‘… [and] when you saw the child?’
Jane said, ‘Well, that was amazing, wasn’t it?’
‘We cried’, said Mardi.
‘We did’, smiled Jane.¹

And so a looking moment was marked and presupposed its hearing. Jane and Mardi expose the shapes of telling set within the heady seductions of ‘foetal imaging’, itself a prevalent frame for the discourses of preformation. Medical imaging/imagining, it is thought, constitutes, and is constituted, within geographies and effects of inscription, forcing us to contemplate the tensions between biology and text. But as well, this is a bigger story—a tale of two women, some technology, and a baby. As they recalled their first glance of nine-week-old Jo, the moment of material-transparency was secured within a specific realm of loving and living. I began to wonder about the task of explanation and the dependence upon disclosure implicit in lived negotiations of identity. And more. ‘Who writes like that—like emotion itself, like the thought (of the) body, the thinking body?’² Language and rhetoric drive histories of coalescence between doing and telling, casting and speaking, listening and hearing, masking the more elaborate...
moments of irresolve in what Lauren Berlant has described as ‘public-sphere narratives and concrete experiences of quotidian life that do not cohere or harmonise’. In this paper, dialogue between the mysteries of difference, ‘of différence’ and the partiality of critique, hopes to deploy a digressive optic through which to imagine possibilities for a logic of sight surprised by its own luminous inflections. With this, I ask in exploratory terms, ‘What might a “foetus” hear from wor[l]ds well placed to deselect?’

—— A PROPOSAL ——

In 1965 Swedish medical photographer Lennart Nilsson published a series of foetal images in Life magazine, and in doing so, encouraged speculation about the truth-value of such work. The article in which the imagery appeared was called ‘Drama of Life Before Birth’. Nilsson recorded the embryo, and later, the foetus, often to create an impression of linkage with the female body. He did this through a series of quite simple devices such as enlargement and cropping. From these images, contemporary notions of ‘foetal space’ and ‘foetal personhood’ emerged as ways to disperse established discourses of individualism and human actualisation—through a perceived absence of dependence on the maternal body, the foetus ‘got itself a life’.

But more than images of the autonomous ‘unborn’, Nilsson’s work stressed the strength of persuasion through strategies of language. In the book Fetal Positions: Individualism, Science, Visuality, Karen Newman writes that all but one of the images were photographed ex utero, having been removed from the uterus and re-staged in a studio setting to reproduce as developing foetuses. She clarifies that Nilsson’s photographs do not dramatise ‘life before birth’. Rather they are photographs of fetuses obtained through both spontaneous and surgical abortion. Working in cooperation with doctors in Sweden, where many privileged American women of sufficient means obtained abortions during the sixties, Nilsson perfected photographic techniques for chronicling embryonic development.

Newman offers a number of points about Nilsson’s work. One concerns the notion of ‘foetal personhood’ which operates as a persuasive linguistic strategy where acts of foetal abortion, as one example, are opposed. As visual modes of obstetric and embryological representation, the images have helped to shape social and political debates about abortion practices through the combination of photograph and caption: the aesthetic and the didactic. They work to sustain what Newman terms an anti-feminist rhetoric, or propaganda, of ‘pro-life’, ‘anti-abortion’ and ‘new right’ campaigns. Terms such as ‘abortion’ over ‘pro-choice’, ‘baby’ or ‘unborn child’ in place of ‘foetus’, ‘mother’s womb’ rather than ‘uterus’, and so on, connote powerfully alongside foetal imagery to frame public and political activity. Newman also
suggests that Nilsson’s imagery has often been used to proclaim and reinforce the idea of a ‘foetal identity’, where the foetus is seen as distinct from a subjugated, or erased, female body, a position already well examined in strands of feminist critique, and as she writes, a ‘paradigm more or less complicated by other categories, such as race, class, and/or historical context’.

Images such as these are by now commonly accepted as evidence of an ante-natal being, despite what some might suggest is their strange or ironic means of production. But recalling Donna Haraway’s ‘curiosity about the regions where the lively subject becomes the undead thing’, Newman’s approach is complicated, and complicating, as she argues against the ease of resolve, suggesting that Nilsson’s images are firstly the effects of boundary—life and death are perceptibly indistinct even though the written text of the Life magazine article eventually reveals that most of the images were indeed created after surgical removal of the foetus.

Following Deleuze, ‘something happened’, something which tempts the necessary possibility of objectlessness. As Newman writes, one happening occurs by way of ‘highly technical skills and complex instruments … [that] make ‘visible objects and relationships which were invisible’—and which therefore cannot be judged against a perceived real; and another asks what such a ‘reality perception’ refers to—is it life or death, or the confusion with which we are confronted by the appearance and seduction of the ‘undead thing’? What are the qualities of such perplexity at this time?

Along these disordering lines, Newman emphasises an active schema of interruption found in the annals of medical knowledge. For what I will go on to discuss, the idea of a break, perhaps an interlude, rather than a continuum, could be useful. Tracing a period between the ninth century and the present, Newman discusses differing depictions of the pregnant female body, the foetus, and other obstetrical illustrations found in the Museo Ostetrico in Bologna. In many images, the uterus and placenta are de-emphasised and the foetus is shown as a developed infant, or even an adult. In others, the female body is truncated or otherwise mythologised. In the case of one image, drawn around the 1480s by Leonardo da Vinci, the uterus is quite clearly detached and reveals a disaffiliated foetus sheltering within. Of this illustration, Newman offers:

Leonardo’s sketch is remarkable for its naturalistic detail. It and others of his life drawings have inspired generations of commentators to see in his work the rebirth of Man in all his individuality. Yet Leonardo’s design signifies beyond any canons of the realistic or natural. Instead of soft tissue and clinging folds, the uterus remains a vessel, but here it recalls a spherical box—almost a Fabergé egg—that opens to reveal its treasure, the curled-up baby within. The umbilical cord discreetly outlines the curve of the fetal thigh and buttocks, but there is no indication of dependence on the maternal body. In Leonardo’s drawing, there is certainly a proliferation of realistic detail, but it is far from ‘realistic’.
Newman considers that while obstetrical images can represent ‘quasi-objective medical vision tending toward the diagrammatic and non-individuated’—[recalling da Vinci] they [can also] provide an almost unbounded opportunity for the transgression of their own generality through the proliferation of excessive detail. We might recall, too, that the Fabergé egg is distinct in design and thus not reproducible. Da Vinci’s method of producing generality refers specificity through elaborate detail, even though its singularity implies reduction.

To think of foetal imaging in this intricate way asks about the imaginal nature of pregnant embodiment despite its drift into spatial and ideological articulation and its tangled relationship with technology, and with notions of life and death. Even though technological developments are historically multilateral and complex, the inclination is to search for technological coherence in the hope of its (unattainable) retention. Yet, if we consider that the sites for negotiating technological meanings are already, and increasingly, fractured and dispersed, openings for inventive and ruinous practices emerge.

I draw on the notion of ruin from the writings of Dorothea Olkowski, and specifically from her use of the term ‘the ruin of representation’, a phrase borrowed from the work on femininity by Michele Montrelay where it ‘refers to the unconscious representation of castration, which, unlike conscious representation “no longer refers to anything but the words which constitute it. Taken out of reality, it no longer refers to anything other than its form...”[T]he unconscious representation is only a text’. Here, we are invited to trial the departure of the phrase from its Freudian–Lacanian origins where, for Olkowski, it is less likely to achieve such a ruin: ‘[T]he point [in Montrelay] is that if such representation is ruined, its castrating effects disappear and the representation circulates “emptily” ... It may be the case that the difference here is less than Montrelay thinks’.

The spaces of discrepancy are already exemplified in visual imaging modes, such as digital text messaging, email, and ‘chat’, to suggest just three examples, through which a logic of fragments and hints is created, if then to be discarded. In Nilsson, it is the relationship between the fragment and its discarding which is explored—the foetus, by its actual death, is already lost to the image. In Berger’s terms, we have entered ‘the abyss between the moment recorded and the moment of looking’.

Put simply, it is uncomfortable because it cannot be resolved. The citational qualities of the image propose a challenge to well-established views requiring more stability, such as in the troubled realms of a Foucauldian feminism where a critique of foetal imaging often centres Foucault’s notion of biopower, and suggests that such imaging is a mechanism for surveillance. For writers such as Jana Sawicki reproductive technologies can be understood as having been set within broader dialogues of social discipline and docility, and are thought the
most recent of a set of discourses that constitute a disciplinary technology of sex that was
developed and implemented by the bourgeoisie at the end of the eighteenth century as a
means of consolidating its power, improving itself, [and] ‘maximising life’.  

Adding that disciplinary technologies are not plainly repressive devices, for there is no
violence or capture of women’s bodies which observably achieve disciplinary effects, Sawicki
offers that submission occurs through the production of ‘new objects and subjects of knowl-
edge … [the] channelling [of] desires … and [the establishment of] bodily norms and tech-
niques for observing, monitoring and controlling bodily movements and capacities’.  
In some instances, these effects may appear helpful, but the body remains controlled through
methods and procedures that render it simultaneously ‘more useful, more powerful, and
[thus in Foucauldian terms] more docile’.  

I am still thinking through Foucault’s strange relationship to female subjectivities even
though strong arguments supporting the surveillance position continue. But what I think
happens with this type of feminist critique is a tendency toward universalist notions of
surveillance effects—medical modes of body surveillance are reliant on optical instruments
which deploy variable properties of illumination that organise light through wavering densities
of looking and recording. optics generate tonal flux and assist the view that visualisation and
reproduction are disparate modes, are not the same. What is relevant here identifies in
specific ways the limits of the surveillance position and underscores the assumption that if
a (female) queer subject engages the array of available reproductive technologies, for instance,
tropes of democratisation surround her: she will, almost triumphantly, shift oppressive repro-
ductive boundaries or dwell, simultaneously and inescapably, in a type of ‘oppression-
and-liberation’ sphere.  

Thus the redemptive queer subject is mythologised as complete,
with the subtext one of transgression in the service of human potential, even though it is
evident that these scientific practices fragment and segregate, ‘cell’ and ‘re-cell’, split and cleave.

Jana Sawicki’s text, in particular, is one which names a difficult tension as it is clearly a
careful consideration of ways to propose feminist thought through Foucauldian strands. One
concern, however, is found within the chapter ‘Disciplining Mothers: Feminism and the New
Reproductive Technologies’ where women who identify as lesbian, and single women, are
figured either as critical tropes within the terms of those identifications, or as potentialities
for subversion:

The question is not whether these women are victims of false consciousness insofar as
they desire to be biological mothers, as much as it is one of devising feminist strategies in
struggles over who defines women’s needs and how they are satisfied.
For a text which claims also to be representatively feminist, one might wonder about the methodological hesitations preceding the eighty fourth page onto which a specifically queering context finally appears, and about what relation this appearance has to understanding the actual complexities of surveillance modes within the apparent self-evidence of their conceptual convergence. Here, it may be a case of proposing that these kinds of wavering tensions retain-and-disperse their particular antipathies. And that if, as Sawicki has as well written, strands of feminism and of anti-feminism can agree on certain aspects of medical intervention into reproductive practice, the question shifts from one of oppositional tension to the negotiation of ‘reasoned differences’, or select ‘microinterventions’ into specific cultural practices. The introduction of the contraceptive pill approximately fifty years ago is one period when arguments which eventually rejected this technology were strongly articulated through the extremes of both feminist and anti-feminist positions, marking acknowledgement of the multifaceted qualities of technological invention amid its intricate drift into broader cultural flows:

Who, in retrospect, would deny women many of the contraceptive technologies that were developed and introduced in [the 20th] century? Both feminists and anti-feminists resisted the legalisation of birth control. Feminists saw birth control as a means for men to escape their responsibility to women. Anti-feminists feared that if women had more control over their biological reproductive processes, they would reject their social roles as mothers and wives. (Like some radical feminists today, they tended to conflate control over the biological process of motherhood with control over motherhood itself.)

And so restoring the maternal female body, the ‘missing mother’, to foetal or birth imaging ‘simply reinscribes a cultural logic of individualism’. Yet more conflation occurs where the inventive dispersion of the maternal is subsumed within the assumption of its continuity in historical representations as well as in contemporary life. As Newman puts it,

the right’s insistent inscription of fetus as ‘baby’ and feminist demands to restore the woman’s body to obstetrical representations both display a profound humanist nostalgia for the realist image; at the same time, they perhaps seek to allay a profound anxiety about what constitutes ‘life’ and the ‘individual’ in the postmodern scientific environment … [T]he power of reproductive technologies to disperse maternity materially as well as socially, disrupts the singularity of maternal identity—and suggests the difficulty with identifying visual technologies merely as tools of institutional power.

For my project, Nilsson’s images work a tension between oppositions such as life/death, visible/invisible, developed/undeveloped, real/unreal, and do so via photographic means, themselves often thought technologies of confirmation. If we are uncomfortable with these
manoeuvres it is perhaps because we are asked to confront what John Berger has called the 'half-language' of discontinuous meanings. In the photograph what is revealed is sought with our eyes, where appearances project a capacity for coherence,

[for] something approaching a language . . . [which] arouses an expectation of further meaning. What makes photography a strange invention—with unforeseeable consequences—is that its primary raw materials are light and time . . . A photograph arrests the flow of time in which the event photographed once existed. All photographs are of the past, yet in them an instant of the past is arrested so that, unlike a lived past, it can never lead to the present.

Every photograph presents us with two messages: a message concerning the event photographed; and another concerning a shock of discontinuity.

Even though we know that it is not possible to gain the spatial distance required for recording the foetus from within a female body, nor to backlight the amniotic sac in a way which renders the image in sharp detail, we remain captivated and surprised by the undemanding beauty, perhaps by the charm, of Nilsson's works. As images, his reprise the evaluative emphasis of the classicist tradition and return us to questions of demarcation and myth in the spaces of technological intervention into cultural life. If we say that they are disturbing features of a surveillance society, perhaps it is because they disrupt neutrality and ask us to contemplate the place of the demon or the fiend at the poignant limits of mortal life. Through their unusual and uncanny appearances these figures connote an intense fragility which is as extreme as the lively discontinuities of their making.

As Newman has also considered, narrative creation plays a large part in constructing photographic meanings. But if we agree with Berger that photography is a 'half-language', what we anticipate in Nilsson's work, perhaps understandably, is reassurance about the continuity of life. What we attain, however, is a broken narrative. What is useful about the split recalls Berger's insistence that '[p]hotographs do not translate from appearances. They quote from them'. With Nilsson, the foetus appears through the photograph offering us the hope of life which we learn is actually a citation from death. Nilsson's foetuses evoke death's rhetorical power as they prepare us for new 'undead' places, such as the test tube or the petri dish, where notions of the individual are now well imagined at an intracellular, or life-latent, level. Perhaps it is here that tangibility and citation combine to produce a moment in which 'appearances tell us very little, but they are unquestionable'.

— Dis/articulations

I understand Newman's work to offer the view that medical inscriptions are inherently unstable, and that hierarchies of interpretation help to fashion and deploy dominant understandings in reproductive thought. Emphasising the notion of context, Newman highlights
some of the discontinuities between early obstetrical knowledge and present day formations, a point often overlooked in tenacious quests for causal discourses and substantive linked events. I want to pause here and explore these effects of boundary, particularly in relation to the conceptual flows implied by the term ‘foetal space’ in newly imagined contexts—what kind of ‘cellular’ milieu does this spatialised corporeality produce?

With all its semantic possibilities, ‘foetal space’ has been extended out of the body and into the petri dish, and marked by the first IVF birth in Britain in the late 1970s. This event prefigured the arrival of new forms of maternal fragmentation within the emerging specificities of assisted reproductive practices. It is clearly now the case that disassociation, not traditional female/male coupling, can result in conception, with one writer claiming that ‘the self-evidence of … nodal discursive anchors [such] as kinship, nature, individualism, ownership, intention, bodily integrity, and so on’, are now disrupted.

But as a collective term, ART is a site of contested meanings which are often determined within specialised contexts. While these tend to emphasise the presence of ART intervention, they de-emphasise the sites through which intervention occurs. This is particularly relevant for queer reproductive contexts, as I will go on to explore. The term is also place-specific, giving onto the influence of cultural determinations and contexts. In US medical circles, for example, the term is often shortened to ‘assisted reproduction’. For one writer, this tends to underestimate its technological origins and normalise the range of interventions into the body that the various practices involve. Another view is offered from critics such as E. Ann Kaplan and Susan Squier who prefer the term ‘reproductive technologies’ because it captures a specific convergence: the nexus of medical technologies associated with reproduction (both conceptive and contraceptive), visualisation and informatics technologies like film, television, and video which reproduce information, and a range of reproductions of human life beyond its temporal and taxonomic boundaries.

To trouble the notion of taxonomic boundaries, or those boundaries which derive from the limits of classification, I want to explore ART as a series of spatialising processes where movement between different sites is dependent upon mechanisms of material transference—bits and pieces of bodies are moved beyond (unknowable) corporeal limits, reformed and returned. In this project, the ensemble of ART is not only medical but can operate within and beyond these constraints. For this reason I have tentatively settled on the term ‘assisted reproduction’ (AR), and use it in a way which emphasises both its normalising generalisations and its playful reliance on specific gadgets and contraptions. Recalling da Vinci, AR is elaborate for its emphasis on the vessel, and here, on its array of ‘half-languages’ or discontinuous meanings.
While often simply conceptualised as a 'container', a vessel functions as a means of transfer. In medical ART, items such as tubes, syringes, straws, dishes, gels and bottles are structuring devices which attend to the notion of journey, to the overturning of 'matter', its shifting and renegotiation of margins between bits of bodies and bits of elsewhere. In my interests, in non-medical 'AR', the vessels are more likely to be jars and hypodermic syringes through which specific 'half-languages' are put to work and which make unexpected citational appearances. Remembering the comments that one interview respondent made during a nervous dash across town with a jar of sperm in her cleavage—'Just don’t have an accident coz it’d be really hard to explain what this is in this jar'—emphasises the movement oriented method by which AR is actualised. It as well highlights the limits of expressibility which surround it.

What I explore as spatial elements includes the various functional items mentioned above, and the moment, perhaps the 'abyss', between what constitutes medical ART and non-medical AR. While the more common option would be to instate queer practices as imitative margins within a broader nexus of heterosexual reproduction, the distinction I make here is one which rests on the evaluative intricacies of reasoned selection between both modes. The concern about retention and loss occurs at times when queer practices simultaneously traverse both ART and AR, and at times when the notion of 'queer' itself is the lesser retention. It is worth noting my interest in the problematic of the term 'non-heterosexual', then, if only to foreground what scientific experimentation may already depose, may already undermine, alongside the generative momentum of material transference between vessel and substance, journey and arrest.

With Philip Rawson, for example, ways are offered for exploring not only movement in and around bodies but movement in and around their microscopically imagined tracts, their 'line[s] of molecular or supple segmentation' the segments of which ‘could be’ like quanta of detoxification. In one sense, Rawson suggests that a vessel is an articulation, a 'joining together' of inner and outer space. It can be thought a device for exploring the idea of interdependence between differing spatial elements—here, the uterus and the foetus, or perhaps what some have termed the culturally over-defined romance between 'sperm' and 'egg', now well troubled by research into somatic cell fertilisation. There, 'ordinary' sperm is rendered redundant in fertilisation techniques.

Rawson's proposal elevates tensions between what constitutes interiors and exteriors, and is drawn from exploring the relationship between ceramic techniques and architectural principles—a rationale for thinking through what constitutes moments of utility is offered. Using a comparative method Rawson suggests that ceramic techniques and constructions are architecturally defined, where 'units' and 'properties' intertwine through 'arrangement.
Such a unity carries ‘implied energies’, or elemental ‘fields of reference’, established by way of ‘agreed conceptual and semantic units’. Through these, a vessel’s ‘implied energies’ can be proposed. For a ceramic vessel, these units can include

- lines and linear surfaces; angular breaks in the surface in or out, such as shoulders, flanges, flutings, cuts or steps. They can be ripples, finger striations, irregular undulations, humps and hollows; appliqué lumps or actual holes. On the broad scale, they can be structural components of various sizes; added features such as handles or knobs; relative proportions of heights to widths. They can be differentiated volumes. And they can be glazed or painted ornamental features.

Figured in Rawson is the notion of energy. I understand this to represent a momentary convergence between time and space, where events of pasts, presents, and futures coalesce, yet meta-form, or perhaps ‘refract’, this time through aesthetic structuring and ‘kinetic value’. I am cautiously selective in my use of Rawson who tends also to nurture the notion of ‘properly established’ connections between an object and the reading of its symbolic value. This exacting enables the rhythmic sense-making referred to above, and, I would add, implies a logic of locational returns. Even so, there is a useful poetic at work in both arrival and flight which can be contextualised out of continuum and into temporary visitation:

Energy in static art can only be referred to by static arrangements of shape acting as symbols. A fixed image cannot show energy actually at work, though the potter may have witnessed it in the making. However violent the act of making is revealed by surface handling, however pronounced the traces of process under heat, we can only read them in the pot-as-object as traces of past agitation … without exception, what are usually called the decorations on ceramics consist of images of energy: the creeper in the act of creeping, the lotus unfolding, fluids flowing, heroes of the archetypal world in revelatory action, animals embodying vigor, pattern as originating archetype—even light as force materialised into enamelled color. It is not unreasonable then to think of the potter’s body shapes as also coding energy-images in their own special symbolic ways. The spaces they generate … imply a kind of four-dimensionality: implying time as well as static form; projecting verbs as well as nouns and adjectives.

This form of suppleness appeals to equally pliable concepts about articulation found in the work of Stuart Hall even though in Hall, retention can be made to fall away. There, the term represents the process-oriented ways in which linkages between disparate elements are made, or un-made, ‘dis-articulated’, under certain conditions, and at times, simultaneously. In Hall, their connectivity does not guarantee ‘unity’, but its fleeting (in)stabilities.
to this notion are the surrounding conditions and their degree of workability in differing contexts. Of these ideas Hall writes that articulation is

the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time. You have to ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? The so-called 'unity' of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary 'belongingness'. The 'unity' which matters is a linkage between the articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected. ^49

Rawson's concept of past agitation alongside Hall's momentary belongingness both deploy a type of conceptual elasticity which works (forges, yet discards) forms of connection/disconnection. I suggest that these seem as applicable to the drift of bodies and cells, in both ART and AR, as they do to socio-political discourses; the ways that assisted reproduction occupies iterative, yet liminal, places that tease and provoke in cooperative dispersal. Here, the notion of the iterative is drawn from two texts by Jacques Derrida, by way of the writing of Elizabeth Grosz, who considers Derrida's assertions on notions of identity and iteration, where '[t]he identity of any statement, text, or event is never given in itself. Neither texts, nor objects, nor subjects have the kind of self-presence that gives them a stable and abiding identity; rather, what time is, and what matter, text, and life are, are becomings, openings to time, change, rewriting, recontextualisation' ^50

As the form of the connection between bodies and cells, I venture that reproductive technologies join and disperse a reconsideration of bodies within existing and substantial repertoires of body practice. They do so borrowing agitations of past and present, yet craft 'images of energy', or 'optical densities', with both a potter's precision and the ensemble of visceral shadows such precision casts. These specific 'energy-images' inhere movement and multi-dimensional viscerality. Here, it would be reasonable to imagine that, as you read these words, quantities of coffered sperm are in local, and probably transmeridian, transit, being reconstituted in intimate (queer) interludes. Intracellular deals are being done, and are articulated through inventive spatial meanderings, 'energy-images', that craft and sculpt, suspend-and-settle, strategised moments of 'belongingness'.

The cell and the spaces that it occupies, its technoscientific imaginings (here, as 'coffered sperm'), 'spill', therefore, in more ways than one. A discussion with another interview respondent about how non-medical AR might be thought certainly revealed 'substantial repertoires' of all kinds of practices. Localised meetings of 'sperm and egg' were well dis/articulated in a range of chaotic ways—boundary effects and visceral interiorities were again animated in 'cooperative dispersal'. These are the lines:
I said, 'The questions that I’m interested in have to do with concepts of technologies. Do you see what you’re doing as an act of technology? Do you see it as an act of, sort of, “sex”? … How do you think about it?’

Rianto replied, ‘… I would think about it as an act of technology. I don’t think of it as an act of sex, no …’

I continued, 'And how would you describe “technology” then, in that sense?’

He said, ‘Well, I guess the use of an artificial intervention to deliver, like, a natural product, I suppose … But that’s the notion that it’s the use of a tool to either facilitate or make more effective some kind of human process …’

I went on, ‘And the tool being the actual vessel, perhaps, that you’ve used, or, the transfer?’

Decidedly, Rianto replied, ‘Both things. The tool being the actual vessel and then for the woman, whatever she chooses to use to inseminate with, which, as far as I know, after a couple of attempts at turkey basters they tend to toss away, has basically been hypodermics. And I suppose the technology extends then also to the various bags that people might have used from time to time. Technology probably also relates to things like the porn magazines I’ve sometimes used … In a sense, the technology refers to the fantasies that I have. Very good question. This is an interesting one … It also relates then to the settings, yes, very much. Teri was always really nice about the settings. She always made sure the lights were dimmed and, you know, that the jar was tastefully placed …’

I laughed.

He then said, ‘… the bed was nicely made. Alexandria and I were a bit more rough and ready about it … What else about the technology? Certainly, all that stuff about walls that get used for women to put their legs up against while the sperm dribbles in, or whatever, all those things, I guess, are part of the technology, yes, when I think about it’.

I asked, ‘[These are] part of a broader process?’

Rianto said, ‘Yes, yes … yes. They’re all part of the kind of structure around which you … because, I mean, for heterosexuals, you don’t normally think about that sort of stuff. I mean, yes, sometimes you’ve got bullshit about mood music and stuff, but you know, you have the sex in the bed and … that’s it’.

Rianto said, ‘what I really love about this stuff is … the amazing degree, particularly for the women, of planning that has to go [into] it, you know, like, “Oh, so when will it be next month?” is what you usually say, you know, at the end of it and it’s like, “Well, I think it’s gonna be around then, so let’s look at our diaries. When are you gonna be? Can you just mention when you’re kind of available?” “Oh, I’m gonna be away so I better give you my mobile number … yeah, will that be okay?” “Yeah, so when might you be back?”’
or “The plane doesn’t land till … oh.” “Can you get an earlier flight because, oh, you know, it’d be … ah … be just under …” ‘ he laughed, then added, ‘ … I love it. It’s just … planned to the absolute degree. So … diaries become part of that technology … mobile phone calls, yeah. Certainly the telephone is a very essential part of the technology. Vehicles, cars. Yeah, yeah, it’s funny when you actually think about the range of things that form part of the [process] that you have to use …’

‘So’, I said, ‘it kind of moves it beyond the … sperm/egg arrangement … That’s partly how we’ve thought about reproduction … that this now becomes more of … an expansive process’.

Jubilantly, Rianto remarked, ‘It’s a performance!’

In posing the questions, I had both the Foucauldian notion of human activity as technologically constitutive and Sarah Knox’s ‘not-outside of technoscience’ somewhere in mind, even though such strands may not figure in how Rianto understood the question. In Technologies of the Self Foucault discusses the theme of ‘self-renunciation’ induced by self-disclosure writing that the theme of self-renunciation is very important. Throughout Christianity there is a correlation between disclosure of the self, dramatic or verbalised, and the renunciation of self. My hypothesis from looking at these two techniques is that it’s the second one, verbalisation, which becomes the more important. From the eighteenth century to the present, the techniques of verbalisation have been reinserted in a different context by the so-called human sciences in order to use them without renunciation of the self but to constitute, positively, a new self. To use these techniques without renouncing oneself constitutes a decisive break.

Would a specifically queer(ing) context, then, such as that evoked by the objects and events that Rianto recalls, enable such a ‘decisive break’, one through which a constitution of self is induced not only by social, economic, and institutional technologies, but also by the visceral extensions Rianto discusses? These may well be moments beyond enunciation, or simple subject–object relations, moments which self-verbalisation cannot achieve, cannot become yet momentarily seek out to conjoin. In disclosing his intimate manoeuvres as figures of technological extension Rianto renounces a known self, and so breaks the assault of disclosure mechanisms, his sense of self-generation mischievously performative and scoping. Another excerpt tells more about such theatrics:

I said, ‘When you said that the other two … women that stopped contacting you, you weren’t sure whether they were pregnant or not … that doesn’t enter into it?’

Rianto replied, laughing, ‘No, no, no. I don’t need eight kids in my life!’

Teasingly, I said, ‘Oh, come on, why stop now?’!
He quipped, ‘Well, I am joking about the fact that I probably need a dozen so that I can
do “Old King Lear” and spend one month with each of them when I’m old because I’ll
be such a crotchety bastard that that’s about all they could stand …’

But for all the stress on notions of ‘wavering viscerality’ so far attempted, there is a qual-
ity to this fragmentary shifting which could be considered quite differently. The theatre of
this particular ‘foetal imaginary’ is certainly elaborate, but in this case it is also dermographic—
imagined (and recalled) through the tonal variations of the body. On one occasion Rianto’s
perceptions and experiences of the ‘donor dad’ moment were informed by a complex
social and political mosaic, advanced in one instance by the tonal accents, the dermographies
of racialisation—Rianto had been chosen because of a perception of ‘cultural diversity’ mostly
indicated by the colour of his skin. Here is the excerpt:

Rianto said, ‘[Kerry and Julie] wanted a child who would have a different cultural back-
ground … and also would have olive skin … They were very clear about that because they
didn’t want the kid frying in the Australian sun …’ Chuckling, he remarked, ‘They thought,
“Get some colour in there!” But they … consciously wanted to try and get a multicultural
background … They’re women who are passionately aware of, and involved with, multi-
cultural issues … and so wanted that as part of what the kid’s heritage was.’

An alliance between eugenic principles and the notion of genetic ‘heredity’ is not to be
dismissed, but its terms of alliance may not be easily defined. The articulation above occurs
between the making of life and its constitutive discourses in ways which recollect lived
densities (vessels, hypodermics, porn, settings, walls, planning, diaries, mobile phone calls,
flight schedules, vehicles, and so on), as well as the surfaces upon which ripple the burdens
and limitations of place-specific innocence. I could gesture that the aversion to ‘frying in the
Australian sun’ mentioned above is also the onset of a different kind of avoidance, the germ
of a skin-led evasion through which is developed another kind of cultural membrane, a ‘hard
skin as protection against implication in the living memory of the country, the brutalities
of colonisation still so vividly worn by some, hidden by others.’

While Rianto made reference to the ennui of ‘heterosexual … bullshit about mood music
and stuff’, which may pose a playful interruption to the settings in which ‘heterosexual
heredity’ is reproduced, is this enough? What does Rianto’s participation in AR conjure amid
his Shakespearean projections? And what do these specific dermographics introduce into
this particular rendition of ‘reasoned difference’ elsewhere proposed?

These lines from Deborah Lynn Steinberg help summarise certain points about eugenics:

[I]t is significantly the case that most debates around IVF and related practices have not been
cconcerned with the ways in which these practices may reflect, reproduce and, perhaps
most importantly, (re)normalise eugenic sensibilities … [C]ritical studies either of the
history of eugenics or of reproductive technologies [have not] considered the reproduction
of heterosexuality as a specifically eugenic project … [W]hether or not heterosexuality
has been theorised specifically as hereditary, it is not only assumed to be so in and of
itself, but is intrinsically bound up with those characteristics (desired or derided) which
have been understood more conventionally as appropriate (or inappropriate) objects of
eugenic practices.

I make the assumption that ‘related practices’ are those specifically rendered through medical
intervention (ART), but it is unclear in the article if this is so. Yet the place of the imagined
foetus (the spatialised foetus, foetal space), and the connections between queer specificities
and assisted reproduction, seem to conspire toward an uneasy relationship between what is
being donated and then received. What are the mythical shades of this cellular economy?

In Steinberg, the ensemble of medical ART inheres a heteronormative basis. Steinberg
has asked who IVF, as one example, is for, which involves us in a discussion about retention
and location. Her study is specific to Britain, a survey of access to, and availability of, IVF and
GIFT (Gamete Intra-fallopian Transfer, rarely performed now, at least in Australia). Steinberg
discusses de-selection and ‘regulation’ of notions and practices of ‘family and sexuality’. Social
profiling and its links to ‘patient-screening practices’ are dominant features of her research.
The article I write of is largely a report and its efficacy for drawing attention to the strictures
of class-based, divisive and racialised ‘reproductions’ is acute. However well it argues against
discriminatory practices, and against the retention of inappropriate eugenic principles, its
capacity to retain binary oppositions is equally acute. Favouring a different dominant sub-
version over the ‘heterosexist selective rationality conceptually underpinning [IVF] and other
reproductive technologies’ seems a lesser strategy than one which attempts more adequate
understandings of the value of ‘reasoned’ retention. In fairness, Steinberg’s preamble to
this claim is more contextually oriented than a general ‘democratisation’ would imply:

To ask whether it is possible to democratise access to IVF-related treatments is, in essence,
to entertain the possibility of divorcing this sphere of reproductive medicine from
conventional discourses of family and from the historical role of medicine as an agency of
sexual and reproductive regulation and control. To argue for democratisation would seem
to accept that such a divorce is possible … I would suggest that a widening access to IVF/GIFT
treatments is not only not enough, but indeed, as a proposition, sidesteps the more funda-
mental questions about the power of medical discourse and professionals, the character
and political economy of medicine generally and reproductive medicine specifically, and
the wider social climate around notions of ‘fit’ parenting (in which the former have been
centrally implicated).
While asserting the problematic conditions for lesbian parents living in Britain, including custodial, financial, and social instabilities and limitations, as well as the reproduction of ‘conventional heterosexual couples’ as the preferred recipient norm, the final paragraph of the article remains of crucial concern for its redemptive quest. There, Steinberg writes that:

[i]t would seem unlikely that granting ‘equal’ access (were this possible) to lesbians, single women, and those who are marginalised on racial, classed and other bases would fundamentally shift the heterosexist selective rationality conceptually underpinning [IVF] and other reproductive technologies.

Yet, in my tentative delineations between ART and AR elsewhere in this paper, I have attempted a way to describe practices which are more about acts of heredity that propose not an outcome but a ‘catching’ of heredity that turns, and is turned, somewhere between such notions as life and death, nucleus and cell, transformation and viscerality. What might such a forming of the cellular do, if form is itself a basis of connection and disconnection, as Hall would have it? The method of splitting the settings through which the cell operates, ART and AR, might then be thought a momentary indistinction which recalls such concepts as Berger’s ‘half-language’ (of citational gestures), a forming method approaching a split.

This writing is framed through notions of emergence and exploration. But if what I have called a ‘cellular economy’ exists, and as a reasonably identifiable practice, I propose that it does, then the giving of the cellular ‘gift’, in Rianto’s case, the donation of ‘multicultural sperm’, could also be thought a moment of ‘nucleic suggestion’—it suggests a location as well as a nudge away from it, a momentary, yet constant, vibration between the problem of selection and its occasional shifts. At the same time that I attempt this approach, the ART/AR split, I know that I cannot easily delineate between the terms or the deeds which sustain it; one reproductive practice informs the other. In moments where queering practices (e)merge in so-called ‘heterosexist reproductions’ there is a ‘distinct fluidity’. As one example, we see from Rianto’s various acts that these distinctions are both ‘emergent’ yet selective and delineating. In recounting some of the reproductive settings he was involved with, a complex and interactive mosaic is offered:

Rianto said,

I’m now the father of six children, well, six that I know of. There may be a couple that are astray as well. And they’re in five different, I guess, family relationships, if you want to use that term. Certainly, five different relationships with the mother. I first started with a woman with whom I had been in a heterosexual relationship briefly … [who] had said … when she wanted to have a child she would quite like it if I would be the father. She came to me after I’d come out as a gay man and she was quite aware that I was in a
partnership relationship with a gay man … She … said, ‘Now’s the time. I want to have the baby. Clock’s ticking over. Let’s do it’. I said ‘Yes’. … [Within a couple of months, a]
lesbian couple with whom I was marginally … acquainted … asked me to be part of a group of four, I think, potential donors to one of the women, and as it turned out, they then decided just to settle on [me] … Subsequent to that it was … a heterosexual couple who were friends of mine, who, again, I started off being one of three donors. Two of the others dropped out and I ended up being the sole donor and that was in a situation where the man’s sperm count was low and there was nothing much that could be done about it … And then the lesbian couple asked me if I’d have a second child with them, which I did. Then along the way, there were two or three requests made to me through a lesbian … friend of mine who would approach a number of men at any one time when she was asked [by other women if] … she knew of any donors … So, there were two or three situations there and they’re the ones I think I’ve lost track of. I don’t know … we didn’t continue and I don’t know if that was because it took, or what. I was never going to know and that was fine … And then I had another child to a lesbian couple who I … have never seen since she was born. I’ve seen photographs, but that’s all. And now, I just had a child to a good heterosexual single woman friend of mine who wanted to have a child as a heterosexual single woman. She … had lined up … another gay man who then, I think, got cold feet … I said, ‘What about me?’ and she said ‘Fine’. … So, that’s the kind of situations [in] which I’ve had them … And … I’ve got very different degrees of relationship to the children from those [arrangements].

As I spoke with him I had the feeling that the term ‘heterosexual-single-woman-friend’ was almost satirical, as if it was too much work to delineate between recipients. This may be a hoped for ruin which is strangely recollected, possibly imposed in this writing moment, but it asserts instants of delineation-and-variability which are strongly featured in the excerpt above—the ‘cellular arrangements’, the ‘energy-images’, were made in citational ways, but with absolute intent alongside ‘momentary belongingness’. The implication, or the form of cellular connectedness, is thus also one of un-citedness, or in Derridean terms, a type of indeterminate sharing through which the sperm as ‘text isn’t cited; rather … it is simply suggested, but this time without the quotation marks, thus being clearly brought to the attention of those who know their texts and have been brought up on [their] reading.’

The notion of a form of connectivity shifts the issue of heredity from a dependence on nucleic connection/disconnection to one of imagined nucleic sampling—a specific kind of locatedness and re-locatedness, perhaps a re-normalisation set within the visual/informatic appearances of the ‘spell’ of the cell. The cellular economy, as an imagined spatial entity, asks us to again think about the ‘regions … [of the] lively subject [and the] undead thing,’
though the difficult emergence of a new, if peaceable, eugenic principle seems at play. Such a principle echoes modes of selection and deselection through trajectories of hyperstimulation not unlike those borrowed from Derrida—what is hyperstimulated to the point of contextual assimilation is also implicated in a silencing which is not actually so.

In possible contrast to Steinberg, but not limited to such disparity, the regions of nucleic sampling in both ART and AR, then, are themselves propositions which acknowledge constraint as well as possibility. An exchange has indeed ‘happened’, yet its form of negotiation, its system of ‘intra-cellular’ dealing, only hints at a merger. As a ‘new (ART/AR) reader’, Jane, once remarked

‘[Sometimes] the egg and the sperm … they just don’t get on. That was when we thought we should change sperm … And we’d become very loyal to FM47, you know, we were really fond of him. [But] we dumped him.’

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22. Sawicki, p. 84.
27. Newman, p. 113, original emphasis.
32. Berger, p. 87.
35. Farquhar, p. 193.
37. For a discussion on what taxonomy is and how it works, see Jeffrey Schwartz, Sudden Origins: Fossils, Genes, and the Emergence of Species, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1999, p. 15, who writes that ‘[t]o a taxonomist, the species is the basic unit of nature and is distinguished by one or more characteristics that are unique to it. As formalised by Carl Linnaeus … a species is always subsumed in a genus, which is the next highest category in a biological classification. If two or more species are similar enough in a particular way, the taxonomist may choose to put them in the same genus, which would be defined on the basis of these common features.
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continue to provide an unsettling tension. See also Nefli Oudshoorn, Beyond the Natural Body: An Archology of Sex Hormones, Routledge, New York and London, 1994, especially in relation to metaphorical language and its capacity to determine meaning even though ‘rumous’ gestures may be implied.

30 Berger, ‘Appearances’, p. 89

40 See again Deleuze and Guattari, 1874: Three Novellas, or ‘What Happened?’ , p. 196, original emphasis. In this section, the notion of molecular lineage strings a different coursing, this time, that of cellular ‘segmentation’. I use it to draw writing and bodies more closely together, as the tentative ‘squering traditions’ of critique I craft here require. One might attempt to ‘write the body’, as others have done (see for example, Vicki Kirby, ‘Corpus Delicti: The Body at the Scene of Writing’, in Rosalyn Diprose and Robin Ferrell, (eds), Cartographies: Poststructuralism and the Mapping of Bodies and Spaces, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, 1991, pp. 88–100), but how well can one write the cell, the interiority which is also the fragment whose whole is the subject of metaphorical conjecture, as well as scientific determination? How might a rhizomatic approach be worked here?


44 Rawson, p. 6.

45 Rawson, p. 6.


47 Rawson, p. 7, my emphasis.


49 Hall, p. 115.


56 Rianto [pseud.], p. 11.


59 I have been asked to consider the writings of North American feminist and critical theorist Alys Eve Weinbaum whose project concerns relations between ‘human reproduction, racial formation,
and racial nationalism in trans-Atlantic modern thought as one way to expand my argument on eugenic principles and ‘multicultural genetic heredity’. While a cultural logic for thinking ‘race’ and ‘reproduction’ is sought in my writing, is indeed probably outside its current scope, I remain uneasy about the implied parallel between ‘racial formation/nationalism’ in the United States and the ‘intracellular deals’ crafted in Australia. I remain tentatively more aligned with the propositions in Steinberg concerning heteronormative ‘heredity’, even though the example also presents an extended locale. Were my concerns framed away from the particular refracting qualities of ‘place-specific innocence’, amid the intercorporealties of reproductive organisation (and I include here those technologies often thought materially external to the body), I might consider, as Weinbaum does, that … ideological[s] of inclusion [have been] grounded … in notions of biological, reproductive, and thus genealogical connection[.] [B]eing ‘American’ [‘Australian’?] has often required having been born to a mother descended from an esteemed family whose Anglo-Saxon pedigree is free of the contamination of so-called interracial sex or miscegenation. While I am grateful to my anonymous reader for their caution about my apparent ambivalence, I remain concerned that Weinbaum’s interests in the effects of racialisation in the US reinstates a cultural logic still dependent on the normative assumptions of anti-racism for its own redemption, and is thus possibly developed along universalist lines. I acknowledge, however, that the debate is not ended, and that one of the limits of instating the notion of ‘cultural logic’ as good to think with also involves the constraints of a contextualising imagination. See, for instance, Alys Eve Weinbaum, ‘Reproducing Racial Globality: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Sexual Politics of Black Internationalism’, Social Text 67, vol. 19, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 15–41, and ‘Alys Weinbaum’, University of Washington, <http://depts.washington.edu/engl/people/profile.php?id=66>.

Rianto [pseud.], 1–3.
Haraway, ‘Gene: Maps and Portraits of Life Itself’, p. 133 [my emphasis].


What I am not attempting is what Austrian monk Gregor Mendel did in the 1800s: With ‘garden peas … [Mendel] demonstrated that the heritable factors that were responsible for an organism’s features are distinct, particulate entities, or units, that can be passed on intact to offspring. The eventual expression of these units of inheritance in future generations depends on how they reassociated in offspring and whether the expression of one unit is masked by another. Had Darwin been aware of Mendel’s experiments he would not have undermined his case for evolution by invoking “blending inheritance” in which the characters of parents were not distinct but melded to produce the features of the offspring’. See Schwartz, p. 39. My project recalls that linked to the head of Zeus: a heredity which is indeed fragmented, yet ‘full-blown and raging to go’. See again Schwartz, p. 3. Mendel is credited with ‘discovering the laws of heredity’ in 1865. See Science Journal cited in Justin Healey (ed), Genetics: Issues in Society, The Spinney Press, Roselle, NSW, 2001, p. 10.

Jane and Mardi [pseud.], p. 16.