Upward and downward accountability in local government: the decentralisation of agricultural extension services in Tanzania

Main Article Content

Wilfred U Lameck
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4363-6175
Rudie Hulst
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2414-4079

Abstract

A key assumption behind decentralisation in developing countries is that it enhances the accountability of local government and results in policies that reflect the preferences of the local community. However, previous research shows that local politicians and administrators in many developing countries to a large extent behave as if they were primarily accountable to central government, not local communities. The literature suggests various explanatory factors but does not provide insight into their relative weight and into how different factors interact. This paper combines comparative case-study research with in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with local government politicians and officials involved in the delivery of agricultural extension services in Tanzania. It shows that limited administrative and political decentralisation and centralistic human resources management restrict downward accountability to the community. Downward accountability is also constrained by the social rules that local politicians and administrators observe. For downward accountability to materialise, formal systems of public administration need to introduce incentives to that effect.    

Article Details

How to Cite
Lameck, W. U., & Hulst, R. (2021). Upward and downward accountability in local government: the decentralisation of agricultural extension services in Tanzania. Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, (25), 20-39. https://doi.org/10.5130/cjlg.vi25.6472
Section
Research and Evaluation (peer-reviewed)
Author Biography

Rudie Hulst, VU University

J.R. Hulst

Dr.

Lecturer , Faculty of Social Sciences,  department of Political Science and Public Administration

New Public Governance (NPG)

E-mailj.r.hulst@vu.nl