Cost discrepancy, signaling and risk taking

Abstract

If risk taking is in some measure a signal to others by the person taking risks. the model of "costly signaling" predicts that the more the apparent cost of the risk to others exceeds the perceived cost of the risk to the risk taker, the more attractive that risk will be as a signal. One hundred and twelve visitors to youth "drop-in" centers estimated the costs (danqers) of four behaviors as presented to them and the costs that they perceived for themselves. The four behaviors were chosen to plausibly signal different characteristics about the risk taker and also to have different magnitudes and probabilities of cost. Cost discrepancy, the excess of presented over perceived risk, was associated with intention to smoke in females. It is concluded that costly signaling seems to operate in behaviors with low magnitudes but high probabilities of cost. Other behaviors with this risk profile may also be associated with costly signaling.