Abstract:
If risk taking is in some measure a signal to others by the person taking risks. the model of
"costly signaling" predicts that the more the apparent cost of the risk to others exceeds the perceived cost
of the risk to the risk taker, the more attractive that risk will be as a signal. One hundred and twelve
visitors to youth "drop-in" centers estimated the costs (danqers) of four behaviors as presented to them
and the costs that they perceived for themselves. The four behaviors were chosen to plausibly signal
different characteristics about the risk taker and also to have different magnitudes and probabilities of
cost. Cost discrepancy, the excess of presented over perceived risk, was associated with intention to
smoke in females. It is concluded that costly signaling seems to operate in behaviors with low magnitudes
but high probabilities of cost. Other behaviors with this risk profile may also be associated with costly
signaling.
