Abstract:
In this paper we develop a conceptualisation of organizational decision-making as a
practice that is, necessarily, ethical. The paper starts with a discussion of the notion
of decision-making as it relates to organizational rationality and the relationship
between management and control. Drawing on Derrida’s discussions of undecidability
and responsibility, we suggest that as well as being able to consider organizational
decision-making as an instance of (albeit bounded) rationality or
calculability, it can also be regarded as a process of choice amongst heterogenous
possibilities. On that basis, we follow Derrida in arguing that for a decision to be
considered an instance of responsible action it must be made with neither recourse
to knowledge of its outcome nor to the application of pre-ordained rules. Illustrating
our argument with a discussion of Eichmann’s ‘I was just following orders’ defence,
we suggest that rules for ethical decision making, rather than ensuring ethical
outcomes, can work to insulate organizations from moral responsibility. We conclude
with a discussion of ethics and democracy in relation to responsible decision
making in organizations.
