Abstract:
Negotiation is an information exchange process as well
as an offer exchange process. Theories of competitive negotiation
are typically founded on game theory where the
agent’s utility function is the focus. If an agent is uncertain
of the integrity of its information then it may not know
its utility with certainty. Here what an agent knows and how
certain it is of what it knows are modelled using tools from
information theory that are applied to value information. An
agent attempts to instil a sense trust in its opponent by revealing
information of comparable ‘value’ in its responses
to that which it has received. Each proposal and claim exchanged
reveals valuable information about the sender’s
position. A negotiation may break down if an agent believes
that its opponent is not playing fairly. The agent aims to
give the impression of fair play by responding with comparable
information revelation whilst playing strategically to
influence its opponent’s preferences with claims. The agent
makes no assumptions about the internals of its opponent,
including her motivations, logic, and whether she is conscious
of a utility function.
