Tasmanian landowner preferences for conservation incentive programs: A latent class approach

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dc.contributor.author Putten, V. I. en_US
dc.contributor.author Jennings, S. en_US
dc.contributor.author Louviere, Jordan en_US
dc.contributor.author Burgess, Leonie en_US
dc.contributor.editor en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-10-12T03:32:48Z
dc.date.available 2012-10-12T03:32:48Z
dc.date.issued 2011 en_US
dc.identifier 2011000028 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Putten V. I. et al. 2011, 'Tasmanian landowner preferences for conservation incentive programs: A latent class approach', Elsevier, vol. 92, no. 10, pp. 2647-2656. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0301-4797 en_US
dc.identifier.other C1 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10453/17939
dc.description.abstract An empirical model of landowners' conservation incentive program choice is developed in which information about landowners' socio-economic and property characteristics and their attitudes, is combined with incentive program attributes. In a Choice survey landowners were presented with the choice of two incentive programs modelled as 'bundles of attributes' mimicking a voluntary choice scenario. Landowner behaviour and decision and the type of conditions and regulations they preferred were analyzed. Based on choice survey data, landowner heterogeneity was accounted for using a latent class approach to estimate the preference parameters. Three latent classes of landowners with different attitudes to the role and outcome of establishing conservation reserves on private land were identified: multi-objective owners: environment owners: and production owners. Only a small proportion of landowners, mostly environment owners, would voluntarily join a program. Although compensation funding contributed to voluntary program choice for multi-objective owners and environment owners, welfare losses were around 4000 AUD per hectare, which is less than the average agricultural land value in Tasmania. Landowners for whom compensation funding contributed to voluntary program choice were also most likely to set aside land for conservation without payment. This raises the possibility that the government's compensation expenditure could potentially be either reduced or re-allocated to landowners who will not voluntarily take conservation action. Increasing participation in conservation incentive programs and minimizing the welfare losses associated with meeting conservation targets may be best achieved by offering programs that allow flexibility in terms of legal arrangements and other program attributes. en_US
dc.language en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2011.06.002 en_US
dc.title Tasmanian landowner preferences for conservation incentive programs: A latent class approach en_US
dc.parent Journal of Environmental Management en_US
dc.journal.volume 92 en_US
dc.journal.number 10 en_US
dc.publocation Devan, UK en_US
dc.identifier.startpage 2647 en_US
dc.identifier.endpage 2656 en_US
dc.cauo.name SCI.Mathematical Sciences en_US
dc.conference Verified OK en_US
dc.for 010205 en_US
dc.personcode 0000074144 en_US
dc.personcode 0000074145 en_US
dc.personcode 020132 en_US
dc.personcode 960812 en_US
dc.percentage 100 en_US
dc.classification.name Financial Mathematics en_US
dc.classification.type FOR-08 en_US
dc.edition en_US
dc.custom en_US
dc.date.activity en_US
dc.location.activity en_US
dc.description.keywords Latent class analysis; Utility maximisation; Conservation programs; Incentive programs; Stated preference; Stated choice; Conjoint analysis; Discrete-choice experiment en_US
dc.staffid en_US
dc.staffid 960812 en_US


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