Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

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dc.contributor.author Amir, R en_US
dc.contributor.author Evstigneev, I en_US
dc.contributor.author Wooders, John en_US
dc.contributor.editor en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-02-02T11:02:34Z
dc.date.available 2012-02-02T11:02:34Z
dc.date.issued 2003 en_US
dc.identifier 2010005896 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Amir R, Evstigneev I, and Wooders John 2003, 'Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates', Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 183-207. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0899-8256 en_US
dc.identifier.other C1UNSUBMIT en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15749
dc.description.abstract This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover. en_US
dc.language en_US
dc.publisher Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00541-9 en_US
dc.title Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates en_US
dc.parent Games And Economic Behavior en_US
dc.journal.volume 42 en_US
dc.journal.number 2 en_US
dc.publocation San Diego en_US
dc.identifier.startpage 183 en_US
dc.identifier.endpage 207 en_US
dc.cauo.name BUS.Centre for the Study of Choice en_US
dc.conference Verified OK en_US
dc.for 140100 en_US
dc.personcode 0000071134 en_US
dc.personcode 0000071137 en_US
dc.personcode 112051 en_US
dc.percentage 100 en_US
dc.classification.name Economic Theory en_US
dc.classification.type FOR-08 en_US
dc.edition en_US
dc.custom en_US
dc.date.activity en_US
dc.location.activity en_US
dc.description.keywords Research Joint Ventures; One-Way Spillovers; Cournot Equilibrium; Oligopoly; Knowledge; Agents; Games en_US
dc.staffid en_US
dc.staffid 112051 en_US


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