On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games

UTSePress Research/Manakin Repository

Search UTSePress Research

Advanced Search


My Account

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Wooders, John en_US
dc.contributor.author Shachat, J M en_US
dc.contributor.editor en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-02-02T11:02:16Z
dc.date.available 2012-02-02T11:02:16Z
dc.date.issued 2001 en_US
dc.identifier 2010005899 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Wooders John and Shachat J M 2001, 'On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games', Academic Press Inc, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 342-363. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0899-8256 en_US
dc.identifier.other C1UNSUBMIT en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15716
dc.description.abstract We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is strictly competitive, in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the supergame provided preferences over certain supergame outcomes satisfy a natural monotonicity condition. In particular, equilibrium play does not depend on risk attitudes. We establish an invariance result for games with more than two players when the solution concept is subgame perfection. Classification Numbers: C72, C9. en_US
dc.language en_US
dc.publisher Academic Press Inc en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0808 en_US
dc.title On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games en_US
dc.parent Games And Economic Behavior en_US
dc.journal.volume 34 en_US
dc.journal.number 2 en_US
dc.publocation San Diego en_US
dc.identifier.startpage 342 en_US
dc.identifier.endpage 363 en_US
dc.cauo.name BUS.Centre for the Study of Choice en_US
dc.conference Verified OK en_US
dc.for 140100 en_US
dc.personcode 112051 en_US
dc.personcode 0000071138 en_US
dc.percentage 100 en_US
dc.classification.name Economic Theory en_US
dc.classification.type FOR-08 en_US
dc.edition en_US
dc.custom en_US
dc.date.activity en_US
dc.location.activity en_US
dc.description.keywords Finitely Repeated Games; Minimax Hypothesis en_US
dc.staffid en_US

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record