Decentralised Trade Mitigates The Lemons Problem

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dc.contributor.author Moreno Ruiz, Diego en_US
dc.contributor.author Wooders, John en_US
dc.contributor.editor en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-02-02T11:02:13Z
dc.date.available 2012-02-02T11:02:13Z
dc.date.issued 2010 en_US
dc.identifier 2010005893 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Moreno D and Wooders John 2010, 'Decentralised Trade Mitigates The Lemons Problem', Wiley-Blackwell, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 383-399. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0020-6598 en_US
dc.identifier.other C1UNSUBMIT en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15711
dc.description.abstract In markets with adverse selection, only low-quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low. We show that under decentralized trade, however, both high-and low-quality units trade, although with delay. Moreover, when frictions are small, the surplus realized is greater than the (static) competitive surplus. Thus, decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem. Remarkably, payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish, even though both high-and low-quality units continue to trade, and there is trade at several prices. en_US
dc.language en_US
dc.publisher Wiley-Blackwell en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00584.x en_US
dc.title Decentralised Trade Mitigates The Lemons Problem en_US
dc.parent International Economic Review en_US
dc.journal.volume 51 en_US
dc.journal.number 2 en_US
dc.publocation Malden en_US
dc.identifier.startpage 383 en_US
dc.identifier.endpage 399 en_US
dc.cauo.name BUS.Centre for the Study of Choice en_US
dc.conference Verified OK en_US
dc.for 140200 en_US
dc.personcode 0000071133 en_US
dc.personcode 112051 en_US
dc.percentage 100 en_US
dc.classification.name Applied Economics en_US
dc.classification.type FOR-08 en_US
dc.edition en_US
dc.custom en_US
dc.date.activity en_US
dc.location.activity en_US
dc.description.keywords Adverse Selection; Durable Goods; Markets; Equilibrium; Information en_US
dc.staffid en_US
dc.staffid 112051 en_US


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