Walrasian equilibrium in matching models

UTSePress Research/Manakin Repository

Search UTSePress Research

Advanced Search


My Account

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Wooders, John en_US
dc.contributor.editor en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-02-02T04:01:44Z
dc.date.available 2012-02-02T04:01:44Z
dc.date.issued 1998 en_US
dc.identifier 2010005903 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Wooders John 1998, 'Walrasian equilibrium in matching models', Elsevier Science Bv, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 245-259. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0165-4896 en_US
dc.identifier.other C1UNSUBMIT en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10453/14478
dc.description.abstract We analyze trading in a model in which the agents and their preferences are the same as in the main models of matching and bargaining, but in which trade is centralized rather than decentralized. We characterize equilibrium when trade is centralized and, by comparing our results with results from the matching literature, we show conditions under which decentralized trading processes reproduce the allocations of our centralized one. We establish that the competitive price as defined in the matching literature (i.e.. relative to the stocks. flows, or totals) coincides, in the appropriate setting, with the equilibrium price in our model. en_US
dc.language en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier Science Bv en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00002-X en_US
dc.title Walrasian equilibrium in matching models en_US
dc.parent Mathematical Social Sciences en_US
dc.journal.volume 35 en_US
dc.journal.number 3 en_US
dc.publocation Amsterdam en_US
dc.identifier.startpage 245 en_US
dc.identifier.endpage 259 en_US
dc.cauo.name BUS.Centre for the Study of Choice en_US
dc.conference Verified OK en_US
dc.for 019900 en_US
dc.personcode 112051 en_US
dc.percentage 100 en_US
dc.classification.name Other Mathematical Sciences en_US
dc.classification.type FOR-08 en_US
dc.edition en_US
dc.custom en_US
dc.date.activity en_US
dc.location.activity en_US
dc.description.keywords NA en_US
dc.staffid en_US
dc.staffid 112051 en_US

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record