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<title>General</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10453/267" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10453/267</id>
<updated>2013-06-18T21:24:28Z</updated>
<dc:date>2013-06-18T21:24:28Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Takeover premiums and the perception of auditor independence and reputation</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10453/12721" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Bugeja Martin</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10453/12721</id>
<updated>2010-07-13T08:51:15Z</updated>
<published>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Takeover premiums and the perception of auditor independence and reputation
Bugeja Martin
Faff, R
This study investigates if there is a positive association between takeover premiums and the bidder¿s perception of target firm auditor reputation and independence. Using auditor size as a proxy for auditor reputation, the results indicate that target shareholders receive a higher takeover premium when a Big 4 auditor audits the target firm in the year prior to the takeover announcement. This result is only significant however in the period prior to the highly publicised audit failures. The impact of perceived auditor independence on takeover premiums is studied using the levels and size of non-audit service (NAS) fees provided by the target firm auditor. Using three proxies for auditor independence, the results do not show an association between perceived auditor independence and takeover premiums. This finding is robust to partitioning the sample by auditor size, takeover hostility and splitting the sample into takeovers pre- and post- the corporate scandals that occurred in 2002.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Corporate governance and the long-run performance of firms issuing seasoned equity: An Australian study</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10453/12722" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Brown Philip</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Lee Michael</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Owen Sian</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Walter Terry</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10453/12722</id>
<updated>2010-07-13T08:51:15Z</updated>
<published>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Corporate governance and the long-run performance of firms issuing seasoned equity: An Australian study
Brown Philip; Lee Michael; Owen Sian; Walter Terry
NA
Corporate governance has been propelled to the forefront of contemporary business thinking by a string of high profile corporate collapses and dramatic regulatory responses in the United States, Australia and in other countries as well. A particularly extensive body of research has emerged surrounding the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. We combine the governance literature with evidence on the long-term underperformance of firms issuing seasoned equity to examine the benefits of corporate governance in a setting where it is more likely to matter. That is, we address the question, ¿Does good corporate governance mitigate post-issue underperformance?¿ For a broad sample of Australian seasoned equity offerings and employing a comprehensive, self-constructed governance database, we first demonstrate that issuing firms substantially underperform a variety of benchmarks over the long term, confirming similar findings in the existing literature. We then find evidence that better-governed firms do not experience the same degree of post-issue underperformance. Our findings, which are robust to a variety of estimation methods and econometric specifications, are consistent with the windows of opportunity hypothesis and with equity raisings being an important channel through which better corporate governance can improve future performance.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Privacy In Social Networks: A Comparative Study</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10453/12720" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Chen Shan</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Williams Mary-Anne</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10453/12720</id>
<updated>2013-02-08T04:41:59Z</updated>
<published>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Privacy In Social Networks: A Comparative Study
Chen Shan; Williams Mary-Anne
S. Dewan, V. Venkatesh and H-C. Chan
Social networks provide unprecedented opportunity for individuals and organizations to share information. At the same time they present significant challenges to privacy that left unaddressed will stifle information sharing and innovation. In this paper we analyse four different prototypical existing social networks, and identify key problems that arise for a privacy-by-design approach to the development of a new breed of social networks.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Errors in estimating unexpected accruals in the presence of large changes in net external financing</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10453/12718" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Shan Yaowen</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Taylor Stephen</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Walter Terry</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10453/12718</id>
<updated>2010-07-13T08:51:13Z</updated>
<published>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Errors in estimating unexpected accruals in the presence of large changes in net external financing
Shan Yaowen; Taylor Stephen; Walter Terry
Faff, R
We demonstrate that the articulation among accruals, cash flows and revenues which is typically assumed in tests of earnings management does not hold when large (positive or negative) external financing activities are present. Our study provides evidence that managers¿ ¿normal¿ operating decisions associated with net external financing activities are likely to lead to economically and statistically significant measurement errors in unexpected accruals. This is a serious concern given the frequency with which the partitioning variable used to identify instances of alleged earnings management is correlated with significant movements in net external financing. Simulation tests show that even at modest levels of net external financing changes, rejection frequencies for the null hypothesis of no earnings management rise dramatically
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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