From the Stereotypification of the Non-European Other to the Prototypification of the European Self: A Case Study of Turkey’s Membership to the European Union from the French Perspective

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Turkey's potential membership to the EU epitomizes this dichotomy because beyond the question of the EU's limits it leads to questioning the EU rationale. Whilst opinion polls show concerns about Turkey joining the EU in various countries, the debate is particularly earnest in France where it has become a matter of national import through the "No" vote on the European Constitution in May 2005. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to analyse French arguments, both in the press and in opinion polls, against Turkey's membership in order to determine whether or not a prototypification of Europe, as the self, can be drawn from the French stereotypification of Turkey, as the non-European other. The study thus focuses explicitly on the relationship between stereotype and prototype. In other words, this study explores what the French rejection of Turkey reveals about the concept of Europeanness in the French collective psyche. In the first part of the essay, we identify the salient traits commonly associated in France with Turkey on the one hand, and Europe and Europeans on the other. The essay's second part analyses the notion of Europeanness drawn from these representations and evaluates to what extent that concept of Europeanness is the antithesis of the stereotypical representation of Turkey as the non-European other, since as pointed out by Nachbar and Lause 'common stereotypes directly reflect our beliefs ' (1992, 244).

Methodology
For the purpose of this study, a stereotype is defined as a belief, opinion, or representation held about a group and its members (Amossy and Herschberg-Pierrot 2004, 28). In other words, the stereotype of Turkey refers here to a collective image based on the traits typically associated with Turkey in France. Nachbar and Lause (1992, 236) refer to stereotypes as 'mental cookie cutters,' standardised conceptions that simplify a complex reality by associating a set of characteristics, often related to age, sex, race, religion, vocation or nationality, to the members of a group. Although a stereotype is at once a non-critical judgement and a form of second-hand knowledge, the stereotypification process is considered in social sciences to be a constructive part of the cognitive process. That is simplification and generalisation, even if sometimes excessive, are necessary to compare new situations or groups to familiar pre-existing models and thus understand the world, and plan and adapt our behaviour accordingly. A stereotype is: 'un concept bien défini qui permet d'analyser le rapport de l'individu à l'autre et à soi, ou les relations entre les groupes et leurs membres individuels' [a well defined concept that facilitates/enables the analysis of the relationship of an individual to the other and to him/herself or the relationships between groups and their individual members] (Amossy and Herschberg-Pierrot 2004, 28). 1 As standardised conceptions, stereotypes generate by their very existence a commonality shared by members of a designated group about members of another group. According to Nachbar and Lause 'Popular stereotypes are images which are shared by those who hold a common mindset-they are the way a culture, or significant sub-group within that culture, defines and labels a specific group of people ' (1992, 236). Consequently a stereotypical representation held by a specific group is derived from their beliefs and values.
Therefore it can be argued that 'a stereotype is a valuable tool in the analysis of popular culture because once the stereotype has been identified and defined, it automatically provides us with an important and revealing expression of otherwise hidden beliefs and values' (Nachbar and Lause 1992, 236).
The concept of prototype originally appeared in cognitive psychology to refer to 'les processus de catégorisation dans le cadre plus général de l'étude des structures des connaissances en mémoire humaine' [the categorisation processes involved in the wider study of structures of types of knowledge in human memory] (Dubois and Resche-Rigon 1993, 373). However, for the purpose of this study, we mainly concentrate on the semantics of prototypes that establish a relationship of equivalence between category and word. The notion of prototype used here refers to the concept or mental representations associated with a term; it is ' le meilleur exemplaire communément associé à une catégorie' [the best example commonly associated with a category] (Kleiber 1990, 49). This implies that a prototype is a sub-category that typically represents the category associated with it, because it includes its most salient characteristics, and that there might be more than one prototype associated with any given category. From this point of view, protypification is the result of a process of typification and graduation (Amossy and Herschberg Pierrot 2004, 93). In other terms, one prototype does not possess all the characteristics associated with the related specific category and all members of the category do not possess all the characteristics of the prototype. In this essay, the EU is a prototype of Europe, and therefore the French concept of European is a prototype of Europeanness. A prototype does not identify itself with the actual group but with the concept associated with the group (Kleiber 1990, 62).
This study uses the psycho-linguistic notion of prototypes that defines prototypes as being instrumental to the semantic categorisation of a group.
This study is based on information extracted from public opinion polls carried out in Libération on the left; and Le Monde in the centre. Those newspapers underpin this study because the choice of lexis and personalities invited to write in the daily press is a very important factor in the stereotypification process. Indeed, stereotypes are secondhand knowledge acquired through cultural mediators who, voluntarily or not, contribute to the creation and the circulation of their own stereotypical representations based on their own beliefs and values. The stereotype will carry even more credit if the 'truth' is transmitted in articles written by 'reliable' experts. In the case of Turkey, it has to be noted that all three newspapers have resorted to experts, such as Robert Badinter, a former president of the Constitutional Council and a former minister for Justice, and Valery Giscard D'estaing, to either justify or oppose Turkey's application to join the EU, thus giving more weight to the opposed arguments on the Turkey-EU question.

Typology of arguments against Turkey's membership
Opinions polls carried out at national or European levels since 2002 show that a clear majority of French people, irrespective of gender, age, professional status or education (although opposition strengthens with age or poorer education), oppose the possible enlargement of the EU to include Turkey. This rejection of Turkey's membership is evaluated at between 64% and 68% in the Eurobarometer polls, and between 56% and 75% in national polls for the period (European Commission 2002, 2003bIpsos 2002Ipsos , 2004Ifop 2005). This rejection is not simply widespread; it is also entrenched, as shown by the fact that despite legal assurances that a referendum would be held in France on this matter before Turkey is granted full membership, 22% of French people rejected the European Constitution as an expression of opposition to Turkey (Louis Harris 2005). That entrenching of anti-Turkey viewpoints is also demonstrated by the fact that the application of countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, which many respondents would not class as European, would have more support (Morocco: 36% in favour, Tunisia 35%, Turkey 30%) (TNS-Sofres 2005a, 2006. Moreover, unlike in other EU countries, French opposition to Turkey's EU membership does not reflect a clear stance from political parties. Although opponents to Turkey's membership are found more frequently in conservative parties, despite the support displayed by Mr Chirac, the French Socialist party is greatly divided on the issue, as are many parties on the left. Thus, although the rejection of Turkey is deeply entrenched, the degree of opposition varies and many political parties, trade unions and political clubs are also divided on the issues, as reflected in newspaper headlines. In a dossier entitled 'Le débat français sur l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'UE' [The French debate surrounding Turkey's accession to the EU], which suggests that a consensus is far from being reached, Le Monde (2004) compiled articles that confirm the difficulty of categorising arguments for or against Turkey's membership according to political parties. Amongst its contents are titles such as 'Valéry Giscard d'Estaing dénonce l' "ambiguité" française face à la Turquie' [Valéry Giscard d'Estaing denounces the ambiguity of the French towards Turkey]; or, 'Le processus d'adhésion de la Turquie à l'UE avive les tensions au PS et à droite' [Turkey's accession process to the EU fuels tension within the Socialist Party and the Right]. Not only is the lack of consensus underlined by these articles, but it is also given magnitude by quoting such a key figure for the future shape of the EU as Valéry Ce n'est pas pour combattre le chômage. Le salaire moyen des travailleurs turcs est inférieur à celui pratiqué dans l'Europe des Quinze et leurs avantages sociaux sont très limités. Le risque d'accroitre les délocalisations au sein du marché unique est plutôt accru. Ce n'est pas pour favoriser l'agriculture française. La population agricole en Turquie représente environ le tiers de la population. La moyenne dans l'UE est de 5%. La PAC devra donc nécessairement être transformée pour permettre aux agriculteurs turcs de subsister ou de se reconvertir dans d'autres activités. Ce n'est pas non plus pour améliorer ou équilibrer le budget européen. Le coût de l'intégration de la Turquie sera au moins égal à celui des dix nouveaux adhérents à l'Union européenne.
[It is not to fight unemployment-the average wage in Turkey is lower than that of the European Union prior to its latest enlargement and social benefits are extremely basic. The risk of relocation within the EU is even greater. It is not to support French farming-about a third of Turks are farmers. The average farming population in the EU is 55%. Therefore the CAP will have to be reviewed to enable Turkish farmers to survive or opt for other activities. It is not to improve or 2 In his theory of communication action Habermas stated that the bedrock of liberal democracy is actors' rationality, i.e. their ability to justify their actions , understand the various forms of justifications put forward in a communication setting and determine which ones are acceptable or not. These reasons can be pragmatic (personal gain), they can be based on kinship and a sense of identity or they can be based on universal standards of justice.
balance European finances-expanding the EU to Turkey would cost at least as much as it did for the 10 new members states. rien ne justifie que l'Union européenne s'installe en Asie mineure, sur un territoire plus vaste que celui de la France et établisse des frontières communes avec l'Arménie, la Géorgie, l'Iran, l'Irak et la Syrie. Il n'y a pas de région du monde plus chargée de tensions et de menaces que celle-là. L'Union européenne a vocation à contribuer à sauvegarder la paix et à protéger les populations menacées, plutôt que de se trouver directement impliquée dans des conflits régionaux où la Turquie serait partie.
[Nothing can justify the EU expansion into Asia Minor, to a territory larger than France, and that shares borders with Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq and Syria. No other region in the world is confronted by such tensions and threats. The raison d'être of the EU is to maintain peace and protect populations under threat rather than ending up directly involved in regional conflicts involving Turkey.] The first set of arguments suggests that Turkey is rejected on utilitarian grounds. The stereotype at work here is that of a poor country threatening the well-being of existing EU members. The prototype is that of a Union whose main aim is to enhance and protect the economic and social standards of its existing members.
Ethical-political arguments are justifications that 'rely on a particular conception of the collective "us" and a particular idea of the values represented by a specific community' (Sjursen 2002, 494). These are 'kinship-based' arguments, that is the 'duties and responsibilities emerging as a result of belonging to a particular community' (494). In terms of enlargement, this means accepting new countries because they are part of 'our' community and share 'our' values. The analysis of opinion polls and articles from the previously mentioned newspapers reveals that Turkey is rejected because it is not perceived as belonging to Europe, whether geographically, historically and culturally.
Many articles refers to these three facets and in the polls, 64% mentioned that the cultural differences between the EU and Turkey were too great, 54% felt that it did not historically belong to Europe, and 48% that geographically it was not part of Europe Not only are these questions perceived as legitimate, but, to a large extent, they are seen as a moral duty towards fellow members of the EU. French people extend the moral duty to question Turkey's claim that it shares the same values as the EU member countries to women and minorities' rights and therefore is qualified to join. Haddad Mezri (2004, 28)  [Privileged Turkey may boast about granting women the right to divorce (1923), the right to vote (1934), the right to abort (1987), but deprived Turkey will still, to this day, resort to "crimes of honour", arranged or underage marriages … and the most barbaric violence.
Despite its claims, Turkey is not seen as being on a par with EU member countries.
These discrepancies classify Turkey in the 'other' category. Michel Wieviorka (2005, 41), analysing the arguments of those against Turkey, extends this notion of otherness to the concepts of democracy and the secular republic. Turkey is defined as 'un pays non-démocratique qui ne progresserait pas comme il le devrait pour se conformer aux demandes de l'UE et qui ne devrait son allure républicaine qu'à un pouvoir militaire' [An undemocratic country that is not progressing as it should to meet EU standards and whose

The concept of Europeanness
The question arises here whether or not geography might be the consensual criterion used to assess Europeanness, given it is one of the main reasons put forward against Turkey and is often suggested in the press. In his article 'La Turquie, alibi du oui et du non' [Turkey, the alibi of the "Yes" and the " No" supporters], the sociologist Michel Wieviorka (2005, 41)  L'identité européenne demeure en effet une notion ambigüe. De multiples visions du 'fait' européen s'enchevêtrent sans pour autant se superposer: la réalité historique de l'Europe ne coïncide pas avec les données physiques et géographiques, à tel point qu'il est pratiquement impossible de répondre à la question «qu'est-ce qu'un européen?». (...) L'accélération du processus de construction européenne conduit les citoyens comme les responsables politiques à s'interroger sur l'avenir des organisations fondées sur l'adéquation entre état, nation et territoire. Ces interrogations prennent place dans un contexte où se développent à la fois un sentiment de fragilité face aux processus de globalisation et des tentatives de reterritorialisation ou de réinvention d'identité dont le rapport au territoire semble précisément difficile à cerner.
[European identity remains an ambiguous notion. Multiple representations of Europeanness coexist without matching; the historical reality of Europe is not reflected by physical or geographical boundaries to the extent that it is virtually impossible to find an answer to "What is a European?" The increasing pace of the EU integration process is leading European citizens and politicians to question the future of organisations based on the relationship between States, nations and territories. These questions arise at a time when both the feeling of insecurity due to the globalisation process is increasing, and attempts to reclaim territory or re-invent an identity that is aligned with a territory are proving difficult to sustain.
Even if the status of a supranational state in the French standardised conception of Europe is granted, the EU remains an entity associated with a set of characteristics that do not confer on the EU any specific Europeanness. Drawing a parallel with Renan's attempt to define a nation through the exploration of history, geography, anthropology, religion or politics, we can only conclude that like the nation, Europeanness and Europe encompass too vast a set of characteristics to be limited by a strict definition other than the conscious and manifest will that EU member countries have of being brought together (Renan 1997). Our contention is that this desire is fuelled by a tangible sense of kinship; it is not derived from a clearly defined notion of Europeanness, but from a rejection based on a perception of non-European otherness, in this case, represented by Turkey itself.

Conclusion
Our analysis of the opinion polls and the press leads us to conclude that despite common reference to pragmatic and moral arguments, the prominence of ethicalpolitical arguments against Turkey's membership of the EU, as presented in the Sjursen model, shows that the feeling of kinship is the key element in determining the acceptance of the 'other.' The absence of the feeling of kinship will therefore lead to the rejection of 'the other,' as is well illustrated in the specific case of Turkey's application to join the EU. However, we also conclude that the French prototypical representation regarded as a threat requiring group protection create a bond between members of a group? Turkey seems to epitomise the dangerous 'other' from whom the European 'self,' as perceived by French people, needs to be protected, but this 'self' is, at best, a concept riddled with many contradictions, and, at worst, an empty entity. The problematic lies, we suggest, in the lack of consistency by which citizens of EU member states in general, and France in particular, associate with the notion of Europe or Europeans in defining themselves. From this perspective, the issue of Turkey's membership is the trigger to more fundamental issues regarding the raison d'être of the EU and the direction it needs to take in the future. For that reason, we end with the words of the Green Party MEP, Gérard Onesta (2005,1): Dans une Union en panne institutionnelle et budgétaire, et qui connaît des repliements nationalistes, la Turquie va peut-être d'avantage s'inscrire-et pour longtemps-dans le tempo des consultations électorales nationales que sur l'agenda communautaire. Pourtant la Turquie est un véritable sujet européen, puisqu'il pousse chacun à divulguer son projet sociétal et ses vues géopolitiques à long terme, ce qui est l'essence même de la construction de l'Union. Il est vrai que tous les élargissements qu'a connus l'histoire de l'Europe, c'est celui-ci, par sa nature et son ampleur, qui révèle le mieux les carences du processus européen.
[In an EU at an institutional and financial standstill, couple with a movement of unprecedented nationalistic fallback positions, Turkey might be more prominent at the forefront of national debates brought about by various national elections than the Union's agenda. Yet, Turkey is a matter of true European importance, since it leads each of us to unveil one's longterm conception of society and geopolitics, the very essence of the Union. It is true to say that from all the previous enlargements in the history of the Union, it is this one (to Turkey), both by its nature and its scope, that highlights most the deficiencies of the European integration process.]