Information Feedback and Learning in Construction Bidding

Bee Lan Oo
Abdul-Rashid Abdul-Aziz
Yoke Mui Lim


Information feedback condition in recurrent construction bidding is an important design variable about optimal procurement design. Contractors tend to optimize their bids in recurrent bidding with positive review of historic bids. Our experiment examines the effects of partial and no information feedback conditions on student (inexperienced) bidders’ bidding trends, and the extent to which their bidding trends agree with the behavioural patterns proposed by learning direction theory. The results show that the variations in bids over time for both information feedback conditions are statistically significant. Although the bidders with partial bidding feedback information are more likely to vary their bids as indicated by learning direction theory, their bids are less competitive than those with no bidding feedback information. Construction clients would need to consider the information feedback conditions in their procurement of construction services with the goal to achieve efficiency in construction bidding.


bidding, experiment, feedback, learning

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